JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA, JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR

The Supreme Court held that the appellants' promotions to Associate Professor pursuant to its 2016 judgment in Christy James Jose cannot be disturbed by the High Court's subsequent directions, emphasizing that once this Court's order attained finality through contempt compliance, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to revisit the matter. The decisive ground was that the appellants, having obtained relief directly from this Court and secured implementation through contempt proceedings, were strangers to the later litigation before the KAT and High Court, rendering the impugned judgment inapplicable to them. Rejecting the notion that non-parties could be adversely affected without recourse, the Court clarified that persons aggrieved by judgments in which they were not impleaded must pursue remedies under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, as established in K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 473 and Rama Rao v. M.G. Maheshwara Rao (2007) 14 SCC 54, which permit fresh applications before tribunals even by non-parties when decisions operate in rem. The Court allowed the appeal to the extent it concerned the appellants, directing that the High Court's observations shall not affect their career prospects, while disposing connected matters with liberty to approach appropriate forums under Article 309 read with AICTE Regulations and the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968.

JUSTICE SANJAY KAROL, JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI

The Supreme Court partly allowed the Union's appeal holding that the arbitral tribunal erred in awarding pre-award interest despite Clause 16(3) GCC's absolute bar on "amounts payable to the contractor under the contract", rejecting L&T's ejusdem generis construction as incompatible with the plain disjunctive "or" in Manraj Enterprises (2022) 2 SCC 331. The decisive ground was Section 31(7)(a) Arbitration Act, 1996 which subordinates the arbitrator's discretion to contractual exclusions, following Bright Power Projects (2015) 9 SCC 695 and Sree Kamatchi Amman (2010) 8 SCC 767, while distinguishing Ambica Construction (2017) 14 SCC 323 decided under the 1940 Act. The Court rejected the respondent's compensation argument noting that admitted sums under Claims 1, 3 and 6 remained "amounts payable under the contract" and Clause 64(5) GCC only bars interest "till the date of award", leaving post-award interest untouched. Consequently, the award was modified to delete pre-award interest of Rs.1.77 crore, Rs.1.70 crore and Rs.2.28 crore respectively, while upholding conditional post-award interest at 8% per annum (reduced from 12%) from award date till realization under Section 31(7)(b) which operates independent of party autonomy, setting aside the concurrent judgments of Allahabad High Court and Jhansi Commercial Court under Section 34/37 to this limited extent.

JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA, JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN

The Supreme Court held that sureties are liable only to the extent of Rs 4,00,000 under Section 133 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as the Bank permitted the principal debtor to overdraw without their consent, thereby varying the contract. The decisive ground was that Section 133 mandates a partial discharge of sureties for transactions subsequent to an unauthorized variance, rejecting the High Court’s all-or-nothing approach. The Court distinguished Section 139, emphasizing that impairment of the surety’s remedy against the principal debtor is essential for discharge under that provision, which was absent here. Rejecting the respondents’ contention of complete discharge, the Court applied the principle from Basavaraj that sureties may waive rights only through express stipulation, and followed Bishwanath Agarwala, where overdrafts without guarantor consent limited liability to the original sanctioned amount. The Court affirmed that creditor may proceed against sureties without exhausting remedies against the principal debtor, citing State Bank of India v. Indexport. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the Gujarat High Court’s order, and directing that sureties are liable only for the original Rs 4,00,000 with applicable interest, while remaining discharged for excess withdrawals.

JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA, JUSTICE R. MAHADEVAN

The Supreme Court dismissed appeals by unsuccessful resolution applicants Torrent, Vantage and Jindal, affirming NCLAT’s 01.10.2024 order approving SEML’s resolution plan for SKS Power, holding that clarifications sought by the CoC via RP’s 08.05.2023 email did not modify commercial terms and that Section 61(3) IBC confines appellate review to material irregularity by the RP, not to merits of CoC’s commercial wisdom. The decisive ground is that SEML’s 10.05.2023 clarification merely explained pre-existing clauses: Clause 6.3.14 already earmarked entire Rs 180.05 crore margin-money for secured creditors; the reply only detailed interim replacement of BGs 6-7 pending cancellation, while Clause 6.3.2(b) always offered CoC option to take Rs 240 crore upfront NPV of Rs 301.64 crore deferred NCDs, hence no enhancement. Rejecting allegations of post-negotiation discrimination, the Court held RP acted under CoC’s 29th-meeting direction, negating “material irregularity” under Section 61(3)(ii), and emphasised concurrent NCLT-NCLAT findings cannot be disturbed unless arbitrary. Precedents K. Sashidhar v Indian Overseas Bank (2019) 12 SCC 150 and Kalyani Transco v Bhushan Power (2025) SCC OnLine SC 2093 establish that CoC’s commercial wisdom is non-justiciable; limited review under Section 31(1) IBC is confined to Section 30(2) compliance. The Court warned that expanding judicial scrutiny beyond statutory grounds undermines IBC’s time-bound, creditor-driven process, incentivises strategic litigation and erodes value; implementation of the plan having been completed, no interference is permissible.

JUSTICE SURYA KANT, JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA, JUSTICE JOYMALYA BAGCHI

The Supreme Court partly allowed WBSEDCL’s appeals, holding that APNRL is entitled to Change-in-Law compensation under Article 10.1.1(b) & (f) of the 25-year PPA/PSA from 25.08.2014 (date of Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secy., (2014) 9 SCC 516 cancelling Ganeshpur captive coal block) plus carrying cost till payment, but rejected compensation for e-auction/import coal procured before that date to meet tapering-linkage shortfall. The decisive ground is that the Court’s reinterpretation of the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1957 and MMDR Act, 1957 and enactment of the Coal Mines (Special Provision) Act, 2015 constitute a “change in interpretation of law” and “change in mining law” materially impairing APNRL’s right to the captive source, triggering Article 10; Article 2.5’s indemnity against escalation for alternate coal operates only while the captive block is available and does not eclipse Article 10. Rejecting WBSEDCL’s plea that the PPA is silent on source, the Court, applying Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pty. Ltd. v. MMTC Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 308, read the term “captive source” in Article 2.5 alongside the 03.01.2011 minutes and 30.04.2012 letter to identify Ganeshpur as the contemplated source. APTEL’s award of pre-cancellation alternate-coal compensation is set aside; CERC shall modify its 11.02.2026 implementation order within four weeks.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal and affirmed the summary decree, holding that the defence disclosed no triable issue under Order XXXVII CPC. The decisive ground was that purchase orders, debit notes, balance confirmations and statutory ‘C’ Forms emanated from the appellant’s registered office in Delhi, constituting a clear territorial nexus under Section 20(c) CPC; the objection was further barred by waiver and absence of demonstrated prejudice. The Court rejected the plea that subsequent filing of Section 65-B Evidence Act certificate along with e-mail chain was procedurally fatal, observing that procedural rules are meant to subserve justice and the appellant had full opportunity to rebut. It spurned the contention that the 12.09.2014 e-mail acknowledging liability was fabricated, noting the appellant neither denied that Punit Kumar Bansal was its Manager (Purchase) nor tendered his affidavit. The alleged mismatch between purchase orders and multiple invoices was held to be a common commercial feature of bulk TMT-bar supply and, sans quantitative discrepancy, did not raise a bona fide defence. Applying the principles in M/s Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. K.C. Trading Co. that leave to defend must be refused where the defence is moonshine and in Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi that territorial objection without failure of justice is sterile, the Bench found no perversity in the single Judge’s refusal of leave to defend and upheld the decree for Rs. 2,33,46,254/- with interest.

JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA, JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR

The Delhi High Court set aside the arbitral award granting refund of excess licence fee and operational loss compensation, holding that the 'as is where is' clause in Clause 17 of the agreement precluded such claims, while upholding the refund of security deposit and litigation expenses. The decisive ground was that the respondent-claimant, being aware of encroachments through pre-bid inspection and having accepted the site unconditionally, could not subsequently claim compensation for the same defects, as this would amount to rewriting contractual terms and prejudice other bidders who refrained from bidding due to visible encroachments. The Court rejected the argument that DDA's letters promising removal of encroachments created a fresh obligation, holding that oral assurances cannot override express contractual terms in tender matters. Applying the principles of caveat emptor from K.C. Ninan v. Kerala State Electricity Board (2023) and S.K. Pandey v. MCD (2012), the Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation of 'as is where is' clause as excluding encroachments was perverse and suffered from patent illegality, being contrary to public policy governing tender processes. The Court directed that the respondent is entitled only to security deposit of Rs.10,22,000 and litigation expenses of Rs.60,000 with 9% interest from 03.11.2011 till realization, while setting aside the award of Rs.70,89,840 towards excess licence fee refund and operational loss compensation.

JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH

The Delhi High Court quashed the Stage-II result for AIIMS Maternal-Fetal Medicine Fellowship (January 2026) holding that conducting an online CV-cum-PowerPoint interview instead of the advertised “departmental clinical/practical/lab based assessment” constituted an impermissible deviation from the Prospectus under Article 14. Justice Jasmeet Singh rejected AIIMS’ plea of PCPNDT bar and academic autonomy, ruling that the 1994 Act does not prohibit practical tests on simulators/phantom models and that institutional discretion cannot override the sanctity of the Prospectus which, as Punjab Engineering College v. Sanjay Gulati (AIR 1983 SC 580) and Varun Kumar Agarwal v. Union India (2011 SCC OnLine Del 1133) affirm, is binding on both candidates and authority like a statutory contract. The Court brushed aside estoppel, applying Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar (2019) 20 SCC 17 to hold that participation does not cure illegality where the very selection modality is altered. Consequently, the 22.12.2025 Stage-II declaration was cancelled and AIIMS directed to reconduct a practical assessment strictly in terms of Clause 5 of the 2025 Prospectus, with interim stay continuing till compliance.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

The Division Bench dismissed DBPL’s review petition, upholding the 23.12.2025 judgment that had rejected its belated challenge to the 28.03.2003 compromise decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, holding that the settlement was executed by the then-recognised management (R.K. Nanda and Promila Nanda), consideration was duly acknowledged in open court on 20.11.2002, and no fraud was demonstrated; the Court refused to re-open the matter merely because present directors (Mehras) now disown the transaction. The decisive ground is that DBPL, having received and encashed the Rs 1.80 crore demand drafts and acted on the settlement for eight years, is estopped from resiling under the principles of approbation and rei interventus. The Court rejected each review ground: (i) the Order XLI Rule 27 application was rightly not pressed at final hearing and is meritless since the drafts were received by DBPL itself, the possession letter post-dates the decree, and the 1993 power of attorney is neither in respondent’s possession nor relevant; (ii) the judgment in Co. A (SB) 7/2006 (Arun Mehra v. Durga Builders) was part of the record before the learned Single Judge; (iii) the police report carries no evidentiary value; and (iv) Form 32 showing Mehra’s alleged takeover is contradicted by their express reluctance in SLP (C) 20293/2006 (order 15.10.2012) to assume liabilities. The Bench reaffirmed that a compromise decree can be impeached only on clear proof of fraud or want of authority, neither being present, and dismissed the review application as abuse of process.

JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

The Delhi High Court set aside the Department of Fertilizers’ order dated 24.07.2024 and the accompanying unsigned “Oral Hearing Report” that had upheld the petitioner’s removal from the Nutrient Based Subsidy Scheme for the period 13.03.2024 to 09.09.2024, holding the departmental exercise vitiated by patent procedural illegality and substantive non-application of mind. The decisive infirmities were: (i) the hearing report bore no signature or designation of the deciding officer, rendering it an anonymous adjudication contrary to the principles of natural justice and the Court’s earlier direction in W.P.(C) 6667/2024 dated 10.05.2024; (ii) the report purported to “uphold” the 13.03.2024 removal order which had already been set aside by the same Court, rendering the subsequent affirmation per incuriam; (iii) the show-cause notice never invoked Clause 31 of the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1985 yet the final order grounded removal on alleged FCO violations, breaching the doctrine of audi alteram partem; (iv) the department ignored its own 08.06.2023 guidelines which prescribe graduated penalty—recovery of one-day production subsidy for first violation—and instead imposed the maximum consequence of expulsion, violating the principle of proportionality. The Court relied on the constitutional bench ruling in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 that fairness is an integral part of procedure, and Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 215 on strict adherence to tender/ subsidy conditions. Consequently, the Secretary (DoF) was directed to nominate an unbiased senior officer to conduct a de-novo hearing, issue a fresh speaking order determining subsidy entitlement for the disputed six-month period, and, if removal is proposed under FCO, serve a specific fresh show-cause notice; all previous findings stand quashed and the petitioner is entitled to be heard on merits uninfluenced by the earlier tainted exercise.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree for possession, holding that Defendant No.4's possession was derivative through the original lessee Defendant No.1 and terminated upon valid termination of the lease under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The decisive ground was that Defendant No.4 failed to establish any independent title or lawful possession, his claim of oral purchase from Smt. Bela Bose being unsupported by documentary evidence and falling foul of the maxim nemo dat quod non habet. The Court rejected the argument of absence of privity between Plaintiff and Defendant No.4, holding that once the tenancy of Defendant No.1 was validly terminated by notice dated 05.01.2023, all derivative possessors including Defendant No.4 became trespassers. Applying the standard of preponderance of probabilities, the Court found the Plaintiff's title documents and termination notice to be unrebutted, while Defendant No.4's claim of payment of Rs.70 lakhs over six years without receipts or agreement was inherently improbable. The assessment of mesne profits at Rs.12,000/month with 10% annual enhancement was upheld as equitable compensation for unauthorized occupation from 01.08.2020 until possession, reflecting prevailing market rents in Karol Bagh.

JUSTICE NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE, JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, affirming CESTAT's remand order directing verification of diplomatic exemption certificates under Notification 27/2012-ST. The decisive ground was that while exemption notifications require strict construction, this principle operates only at the eligibility stage, not to deny exemption where substantive compliance is demonstrated. The Court held that rendering services to foreign diplomatic missions constitutes substantive compliance with the Notification, while certificate verification remains a factual inquiry. Rejecting the Revenue's contention that all conditions including serial-numbered undertakings and unique identification numbers are mandatory substantive requirements, the Court distinguished between eligibility conditions and procedural verification, holding that CESTAT's limited remand for certificate verification neither dilutes the Notification's mandatory character nor dispenses with certification requirements. Following Commissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co. (2018) 9 SCC 1 on strict construction of exemption notifications, the Court emphasized that once substantive compliance is shown, factual verification cannot be denied. The Court ruled that CESTAT's discretionary remand for documentary verification falls within appellate powers under Section 35C, and such factual directions raise no substantial question of law under Section 35G, while penalties were rightly set aside given the compliance shown.

JUSTICE AMIT SHARMA

The Delhi High Court quashed the cancellation orders dated 17.02.2014 and 05.01.2015 of M/s Universal Promoters' registration, holding that neither the Deputy Commissioner nor the Registrar of Firms possessed jurisdiction to cancel a registration certificate once granted under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The decisive ground was that Section 64 IPA only empowers rectification of mistakes to align register entries with filed documents, not adjudication of disputed facts or cancellation; the Deputy Commissioner, not being the statutory "Registrar" under Section 57 IPA, usurped power by purporting to "review" registration, an act unknown to the statute. Rejecting the respondents' reliance on Section 21 General Clauses Act, the Court distinguished Atowar Rahman (Gauhati FB) and held that registration under IPA is merely an administrative acknowledgment, not a quasi-judicial "order" amenable to rescission; fraud, if any, must be established by a civil court under Section 65 IPA before the Registrar can amend entries. Following Sri Lakha Granites (Raj HC) and Supreme Tech Engineering (Guj HC), the Court reiterated that the Registrar is a recording officer sans adjudicatory power, and the resignation letter of 31.03.2006 was ineffective until 2010, so initial registration was valid. Consequently, Registration Certificate No. S-1003/2006 dated 08.05.2006 was restored, with no order as to costs.

JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA

The Delhi High Court granted regular bail to Kashinath Malik under Section 306/3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, holding that the prosecution's sole evidence—alleged CCTV footage—was manifestly unreliable and failed to establish a prima facie case. The decisive ground was the Court's finding that the footage was not from a stationary CCTV camera but a shaky mobile recording of a screen, lacking clarity, continuity, or identification of faces, rendering it inadmissible and insufficient to sustain incarceration. The Court rejected the State's opposition based on modus operandi and parity with co-accused Jagbandhu and Sanjay Malik, who had been granted bail on identical evidentiary infirmities. Emphasizing the principle of parity and the prosecution's failure to collect any corroborative evidence beyond the footage, the Court applied the bail jurisprudence that liberty cannot be deprived on speculative or tenuous material. The judgment reinforces the precedent that vague visual footage, absent facial recognition or contextual linkage, cannot form the basis of continued detention. The Court directed the petitioner's release on a personal bond of ₹10,000 with one surety, clarifying that the observations shall not prejudice the trial's outcome.

JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA

The Delhi High Court granted regular bail to the accused under Sections 305(B), 317(2), and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), holding that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to justify continued incarceration. The decisive ground was the complete absence of evidence linking the accused to the alleged theft of the vehicle, coupled with the fact that the allegedly stolen vehicle was recovered not from the accused but from his co-accused brother, who had already been enlarged on bail. The Court rejected the prosecution's reliance on a CCTV footage clip from a petrol pump, which purportedly showed the accused fueling the vehicle, as the sole evidentiary basis for detention, noting that such tenuous identification evidence, absent any direct proof of theft or possession, failed to meet the threshold for denying bail. Applying the principle of "bail is the rule, jail is the exception" and emphasizing the constitutional mandate of personal liberty under Article 21, the Court held that incarceration since 06.01.2026 without substantive evidence constituted an unreasonable deprivation of liberty. The Court directed release on furnishing a personal bond of ₹10,000 with one surety, reinforcing that prolonged pre-trial detention without credible material undermines the presumption of innocence.

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH, JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the State's appeal against acquittal, upholding the trial court's judgment that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondents Sanjeev Singh and Shivji Jaiswal committed murder under Sections 302/34 IPC. The decisive ground was the prosecution's case being riddled with material contradictions, unnatural witness conduct, and defective investigation. The Court found that eyewitnesses PW-1 and PW-3, despite knowing the respondents as regular liquor shop visitors, failed to disclose their names in the first PCR call at 00:52 hours on 15th November 2010, instead reporting unknown assailants attempting snatching - a fatal omission undermining their credibility, following Jagir Singh v. State (1975) 3 SCC 562 which holds non-disclosure of known assailants' names creates serious doubt. Their testimony suffered from significant improvements - initially stating only Sanjeev Singh used the iron rod while Shivji Jaiswal used fists, but later claiming both used the rod. The recovery of the alleged weapon (iron rod) under Section 27 Evidence Act was disbelieved as farcical since police examining the spot for hours failed to notice it merely 10-12 feet from the body, applying Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu (2009) 17 SCC 273. Medical evidence revealed discrepancies - the rod's diameter was 1.6 cm versus 6 cm in the medical report, and despite six head injuries, no skull fracture occurred as expected from such a heavy weapon. The investigation was defective - blood-stained clothes weren't seized, no DNA analysis connected the rod to the deceased, fingerprints weren't found, and no public witnesses were examined despite availability. Following Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, the appellate court refused to interfere with the trial court's reasonable view, strengthening the presumption of innocence in acquittal cases.

JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA

The Delhi High Court granted anticipatory bail to transgender accused under Section 309(6)/3(5) Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, holding that non-cooperation during investigation cannot be equated with misuse of liberty when the accused have consistently appeared as directed. The decisive factors were the simple nature of injuries classified as swelling and abrasion by the medical officer, the absence of any misuse during prolonged interim protection, and the established principle that no accused is obliged to self-incriminate. The Court rejected the State's apprehension that bail would embolden the accused, distinguishing this case from the co-accused who obtained bail only post-arrest, and emphasized that mere assertion of non-cooperation without concrete evidence cannot override the presumption of innocence. Applying the doctrine of parity, the Court noted that one co-accused had already been enlarged on bail, and the existence of a cross-FIR suggested inter se dispute rather than unilateral criminality. The judgment reinforces that anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC should not be withheld as punishment for perceived smartness during interrogation, and liberty cannot be curtailed merely because the investigating officer is ineffective. The Court directed the petitioners to execute personal bonds of ₹10,000 each with one surety and report to the IO every Wednesday for two months to ensure availability during trial.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court set aside the CAT's order quashing the charge memorandum against respondent Sameer Wankhede, holding that judicial interference at the threshold stage of disciplinary proceedings is warranted only in exceptional circumstances of lack of jurisdiction, ex facie illegality, or established malice. The decisive ground was that the charge memorandum, though marking witness list as 'NIL', relied entirely on documentary evidence comprising call transcripts voluntarily submitted by the respondent himself before the Bombay High Court in criminal proceedings, thus not requiring oral testimony. The Court rejected the CAT's findings of procedural impropriety and malice, emphasizing that mere absence of witness list constitutes a curable defect under Rule 14(3) and 14(4) of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965, particularly when documentary evidence forms the substratum of charges. Following Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2006) 12 SCC 28 and State Bank of India v. R.B. Sharma (2004) 7 SCC 27, the Court held that departmental proceedings based on identical facts need not be stayed merely because criminal proceedings are pending, especially when the respondent himself produced the incriminating evidence. The CAT erred in pre-judging the case and drawing adverse inferences at the preliminary stage when the respondent had failed to exhaust internal remedies by submitting his written defence. The Court directed the respondent to participate in the departmental enquiry and file his reply before the disciplinary authority.

JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA

The Delhi High Court granted regular bail to the accused under Sections 309(6), 310(2), 311, 317(3), 61(2), 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, primarily on the ground of parity with co-accused who had already been enlarged on bail, and due to material inconsistencies in the prosecution's case. The decisive factors were the contradictory CCTV footages shown during separate bail hearings—none of which aligned with the FIR’s narrative—and the implausibility of 9-10 armed assailants fleeing after snatching merely one or two anklets from a jeweller’s household. The Court noted the prosecution’s shifting stance on the number of accused and the belated filing of the complaint, though it acknowledged these discrepancies await trial scrutiny. Rejecting the State’s opposition, the Court held that no compelling grounds existed to deny liberty, especially when co-accused had been granted bail under similar circumstances. The principle of parity, coupled with the prosecution’s failure to present a consistent or credible version of events, tilted the balance in favour of bail. The accused was directed to be released on furnishing a personal bond of ₹10,000 with one surety.

JUSTICE NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE, JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal holding that the suit was within limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the three-year period began from the last payment on 17.05.2016 and the suit filed on 23.05.2019 was saved by excluding the mediation period under Section 12A proviso of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The decisive ground was that the ledger account, though open and current, lacked reciprocal demands, rendering Article 1 inapplicable, following Bharath Skins Corporation v Taneja Skins Company Pvt Ltd 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5523 which held that a buyer-seller relationship creates only unilateral demands. The Court rejected appellants’ contentions of non-service of pre-institution mediation notice, defective goods, and procedural defects in plaint, holding that the non-starter report under Legal Services Authorities Act carried statutory sanctity under Section 29 Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and procedural defects like unsigned pages or delayed statement of truth are curable under Vidyawati Gupta v Bhakti Hari Nayak (2006) 2 SCC 777. The Court affirmed the ex-parte decree of ₹8,34,336/- with 10% interest from 09.01.2019, emphasizing that appellants’ failure to prosecute diligently and unsubstantiated allegations against counsel barred condonation of 1,000-day delay under Section 5 Limitation Act.

JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

The Delhi High Court upheld the CGIT’s finding that Punjab & Sind Bank’s termination of respondent Ramesh Chandra Semwal on 11.05.2003 violated Section 25-F Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as he had completed 240 days’ continuous service under Section 25-B(2) during 12.05.2002-11.05.2003, but modified relief by substituting reinstatement with ₹11 lakh compensation within three months (default interest 9% p.a.) and set aside regularisation, holding: (i) delay in raising dispute does not bar reference absent statutory limitation, following Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Society (1999) 6 SCC 82; (ii) initial burden on workman discharged by oral evidence, arrears payment, branch manager’s regularisation recommendation and management’s failure to produce muster rolls, triggering adverse inference per H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank (1985) 4 SCC 201 and R.M. Yellatti v. AEE (2006) 1 SCC 106; (iii) calendar-year computation is inconsequential once continuous engagement 1996-2003 is proved; (iv) tribunal cannot grant regularisation beyond reference scope, distinguishing Uma Devi (2006) 4 SCC 1; (v) compensation, not reinstatement, appropriate after 23-year lapse for daily-wage workman nearing superannuation, applying B.S.N.L. v. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 and Amit Kumar Dubey (2025) guidelines of ₹1.5 lakh per service year.

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH, JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

The Delhi High Court modified the appellant's conviction from Section 302/34 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC, holding that his act of restraining the deceased by the neck during a fatal assault constituted culpable homicide not amounting to murder, as the prosecution failed to establish shared intention to cause death. The decisive ground was the complete absence of neck injuries in the post-mortem report despite the appellant's alleged act of catching hold from behind, coupled with medical evidence that death resulted from combined blunt force impacts to head and chest inflicted by co-accused Sunny using a helmet, not from any injury attributable to the appellant. The Court rejected the trial court's mechanical inference of common intention under Section 34 IPC, emphasizing that such intention requires clear evidence of prior meeting of minds or shared mental design, not merely facilitative presence. Applying Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 465) and Sudam Prabhakar Achat v. State of Maharashtra (2025 SCC OnLine SC 602), the Court held that where assault occurs suddenly without premeditation and the accused's role is secondary and non-weaponised, knowledge of likely death suffices for Section 304 Part I, not Section 302. The Court directed the appellant's release after converting his life sentence to the period already undergone (4 years 7 months 16 days), set aside the fine of Rs. 20,000/-, and granted refund if deposited, holding that the ends of justice were met by the incarceration already undergone.

JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA, JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging a COFEPOSA detention order at the pre-execution stage, holding that a detenu who has absconded and evaded execution cannot invoke Article 226 jurisdiction to challenge the order without first surrendering. The decisive ground was that allowing such a challenge would enable the detenu to take advantage of his own wrongful conduct in evading the law, thereby frustrating the very purpose of preventive detention. Rejecting the petitioner's contention of unexplained delay and loss of live-link, the Court emphasized that the delay in execution was attributable to the petitioner's deliberate abscondence, as evidenced by his being declared a proclaimed offender twice and the issuance of a look-out circular. Applying the principles laid down in Alka Subhash Gadia v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496 and Subhash Popatlal Dave v. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 533, the Court reiterated that while pre-execution challenges are not completely barred, they are permissible only on limited grounds such as lack of jurisdiction, wrong purpose, or non-application of mind—none of which were established here. The Court distinguished the case of co-accused Farha Hussain, whose detention order was quashed on peculiar facts, and held that the petitioner must first surrender before seeking judicial review. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with liberty reserved for the petitioner to challenge the order post-surrender.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the CAT's judgment upholding disciplinary penalty against a DANICS officer who passed an order accepting refund of compensation and reversing land acquisition after his transfer, holding the petition barred by four-year delay and devoid of merit. The decisive ground was that the doctrine of merger has no application where CAT merely granted liberty for administrative reconsideration of penalty without reopening adjudication, and the subsequent rejection of representation cannot revive the cause of action. The Court rejected arguments that the officer acted on legal opinion and passed quasi-judicial order, holding that under Section 16 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, once land vests absolutely in Government, no statutory power permits LAC to restore land or accept refund for reversal of acquisition. Following the principle that Article 226 interference in departmental inquiries is confined to procedural irregularity or perversity, the Court found the disciplinary authority's findings that the officer acted with mala fide intention and ulterior motive to favour a private person after being transferred, cannot be termed perverse. The Court distinguished K.C. Surender's case as he merely implemented predecessor's order, applying the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se, and held that constructive knowledge of Khushi Ram's withdrawal application and exclusion from acquisition was attributable to the petitioner.

JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, holding that the deceased was not a bona fide passenger and consequently the question of "untoward incident" under the Railways Act, 1989 did not arise. The decisive ground was that AW-1 Shiv Kumar, the deceased's father, failed to discharge the initial burden of proof as his testimony was hearsay—he neither witnessed the ticket purchase nor accompanied the deceased, rendering his affidavit insufficient under Rina Devi (2019) 3 SCC 572 which mandates direct evidence of ticket purchase. While the Court found the Tribunal's inference of run-over based on DRM report and keyman Ajit Kumar's testimony legally unsustainable for lacking loco-pilot evidence, it upheld the dismissal since bona fide passenger status is prerequisite for compensation. The Court condoned 65 days' delay citing Mohsina v. Union of India (2017) SCC OnLine Del 10003 where 804 days were condoned considering economic disability, applying the beneficial construction principle from Rajni v. Union of India 2025 INSC 1201. The appeal was disposed of maintaining that claimants must establish passenger status through direct evidence, not conjecture.

JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA, JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR

The Delhi High Court set aside the draft assessment order dated 10.02.2026 passed under Section 144C(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, holding that the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) acted without knowledge of the Court's earlier order dated 06.02.2026 which had extended timelines and directed supply of relied-upon documents. The decisive ground was that the FAO's order, though passed mechanically through the faceless system, could not be faulted personally as the communication gap prevented the 06.02.2026 order from reaching him before he passed the impugned order on 10.02.2026. The Court rejected any contention of mala fides, noting that the Department fairly conceded the communication failure. Applying the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit (the act of the court shall prejudice no one), the Court extended the doctrine of procedural fairness to faceless assessment regimes, emphasizing that digital opacity cannot override natural justice. Following its earlier directions in the petitioner's own case, the Court extended all timelines by sixty days, directed the petitioner to file reply by 16.03.2026, and the TPO to pass fresh order by 16.04.2026, while clarifying that the petitioner is estopped from raising objections regarding the extended timeline.

JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA, JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR

The Delhi High Court quashed the lookout circulars against petitioners Gaurav and Mridu Hari Dalmia, holding that their indefinite continuation violated fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. The decisive ground was that all income-tax proceedings emanating from the 17.03.2021 search have culminated in the petitioners' favour, with the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal having quashed all assessments under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 between 23.07.2025-29.01.2026, leaving no outstanding demand. Rejecting the Revenue's contention that Foreign Tax and Tax Research Division references under DTAA justified continued restraint, the Court held that rights cannot remain suspended indefinitely when the Department has failed for five years to elicit foreign information. Following the principle that coercive measures require ongoing proceedings or tangible tax demand, the Court directed that the lookout circulars be set aside upon the petitioners furnishing an undertaking not to alienate foreign assets without thirty days' prior intimation to the Income Tax Department. The Court emphasized that businessmen cannot be confined perpetually when no proceedings subsist, and that the State's investigative inertia cannot perpetually infringe citizens' liberty to travel and conduct business.

JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA, JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal against refusal of interim injunction, holding that Mountain Valley Springs failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that respondent’s mark “BABY FOREST” is deceptively similar to its composite registered mark “FOREST ESSENTIALS” or its sub-brands “FOREST ESSENTIALS BABY” / “FOREST ESSENTIALS – BABY ESSENTIALS”. The decisive ground was application of the anti-dissection rule: since “FOREST” is a generic dictionary word and the appellant had claimed exclusivity only in the composite expression “FOREST ESSENTIALS”, it could not monopolise the word “FOREST” for ayurvedic baby-care goods; moreover, the marks, trade-dress and tree logos were held visually, phonetically and structurally dissimilar so that an average consumer of imperfect recollection would not be confused. The Court rejected arguments of secondary meaning, actual confusion and mala fide adoption, observing that evidence of emails, social-media posts and Google predictions was scanty, possibly motivated, and deserved trial; it also found the appellant’s belated applications to register “FOREST ESSENTIALS BABY” after suit indicative of weakness. Relying on Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. 1990 Supp SCC 727 (limited appellate interference in discretionary interim orders) and Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) 5 SCC 73 (passing-off parameters), the Bench held the Single Judge had correctly applied the trinity of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, and dismissal of interim applications was neither perverse nor arbitrary; the appeal was therefore dismissed, leaving all contentions open for final disposal.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR No.249/2023 under Sections 498A/406/506/509/34 IPC, holding that matrimonial disputes settled through mutual compromise warrant extinguishment of criminal proceedings where no public interest element subsists. The decisive ground was that respondent No.2, who had instituted the complaint, unequivocally affirmed receipt of full settlement consideration (Rs.15 lakhs) covering alimony, istridhan and maintenance, and expressly waived prosecution after obtaining divorce by mutual consent on 28.04.2025 pursuant to counselling-mediated settlement dated 10.01.2025. Rejecting the State's implied objection that offences under Section 498A are non-compoundable, the Court applied the principle that inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (erstwhile Section 482 CrPC) enables quashing when continuation would constitute an abuse of process, drawing upon B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 675 and Nikhil Merchant v. CBI (2008) 9 SCC 677, which hold that matrimonial acrimony giving rise to essentially private disputes may be buried by mutual forgiveness to secure ends of justice. The petition was disposed of directing petitioners to deposit Rs.20,000 with Delhi High Court Staff Welfare Fund within four weeks and file proof thereof along with original affidavits before the trial court for record closure.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the CAT's order upholding the seniority list and appointments of Divisional Officers (Fire), holding that the petitioner's challenge was barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and his seniority grievance had been expressly abandoned. The decisive ground was that the petitioner, who was promoted to Divisional Officer in July 2013, had failed to challenge the September 2013 appointments of respondents 5 and 6 within the one-year limitation period, instead filing his OA only in May 2016, and had expressly relinquished his seniority challenge before the Coordinate Bench on 22.05.2019. The Court rejected the contention that limitation should run from the 2016 seniority list issuance, holding that challenge to foundational appointments cannot be deferred by reference to consequential administrative actions, and distinguished between recruitment year (determined by requisition date) and actual appointment dates. Applying the principles from N.R. Parmar v. Union of India (2012) regarding inter-se seniority determination between direct recruits and promotees under DoPT OM dated 04.03.2014, the Court held that respondents 5 and 6 belonged to the 2012-2013 recruitment year while the petitioner fell in the subsequent cycle, and that judicial review cannot substitute expert UPSC assessments of eligibility unless statutory violations or mala fides are established, which were absent here.

JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA, JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA

The Delhi High Court partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction under Section 6 POCSO Act and Section 376AB IPC, and instead convicted the appellant under Section 18 POCSO Act for attempted aggravated penetrative sexual assault, reducing the sentence from 30 to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The decisive ground was the absence of conclusive proof of penetration, as the victim’s statements, though consistent, created reasonable doubt on whether actual penetration occurred. The Court rejected the appellant’s contentions regarding defective charge, delay in medical examination, non-examination of the aunt, and alleged tutoring of the child witness, holding that no prejudice was demonstrated and that minor discrepancies in a child victim’s testimony are not fatal. It upheld the presumption under Sections 29 and 30 POCSO Act, emphasizing that the victim’s testimony, being consistent and credible, could form the sole basis for conviction even without medical corroboration. Reliance was placed on B.C. Deva v. State of Karnataka (2007) 12 SCC 122 for the principle that reliable child testimony needs no corroboration, and on Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey (1992) 3 SCC 204 to clarify that even slight penetration suffices for rape, though here, doubt persisted. The conviction under Section 342 IPC and the fine imposed were sustained, with all sentences to run concurrently.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court allowed the State of Bihar's writ petition and set aside the CAT's refusal to extend time for disciplinary proceedings against respondent Rakesh Kumar Dubey, holding that the Tribunal's fixation of an unduly constricted timeline—effectively only 38 days after a year-long stay—rendered meaningful completion of the inquiry impracticable. The decisive ground was that the disciplinary proceedings remained stayed from 10.11.2022 to 15.12.2023 by the Tribunal's own interim orders, and its subsequent direction dated 04.10.2024 retrospectively commencing the six-month extension from 10.05.2024 left insufficient time for examining witnesses in serious charges of facilitating illegal sand mining. Rejecting the respondent's contention that impending retirement should preclude extension, the Court emphasized that the employer's statutory right under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules to conduct a thorough inquiry must reach logical culmination, and inconclusive proceedings would prejudice both parties. Applying the principles of natural justice and fair procedure, the Court followed the precedent in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 6 SCC 190 that disciplinary authorities must be afforded reasonable opportunity to complete inquiries, particularly where delay is attributable to judicial orders. The Court directed conclusion of proceedings within six months, balancing administrative efficiency with procedural fairness.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR No.352/2022 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC registered at PS North Rohini, holding that continuation of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility after the parties achieved complete matrimonial settlement through mediation and subsequent divorce by mutual consent on 13.01.2026. The decisive ground was that respondent No.2, the original complainant, unequivocally affirmed before the Court that she had received the full settlement amount of Rs.15 lakhs towards istridhan, alimony and maintenance, and voluntarily consented to the FIR quashing without any coercion, as evidenced by her affidavit on record. The Court rejected any suggestion of public interest in prosecution, emphasizing that the dispute was essentially private in nature involving matrimonial discord between erstwhile spouses, and distinguished cases where offences involve larger societal concerns or third-party rights. Applying the principles enunciated in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Court exercised its inherent power under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita to quash criminal proceedings to secure ends of justice, while directing petitioners to deposit Rs.15,000 costs with Delhi Legal Services Authority and file proof thereof along with original affidavits before the Trial Court within three weeks.

JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

The Delhi High Court appointed Justice Shailender Kaur as Sole Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, holding that the petitioner's compliance with Section 21 notice dated 06.05.2025 sufficed to invoke the arbitration clause in the 2015 loan agreement, rejecting the respondents' limitation and prior invocation objections as untenable at this referral stage. The decisive ground was that scope of judicial scrutiny under Section 11 is confined to prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, following the Supreme Court's exposition in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, (2024) 12 SCC 1, which overruled the "ex facie meritless" test and held that issues of limitation, accord and satisfaction or prior invocation are exclusively for the arbitral tribunal under the kompetenz-kompetenz principle. The Court emphasized that its role is merely facilitative to give effect to parties' agreed dispute resolution mechanism, without adjudicating contentious facts, and that rejection at this stage would leave the claimant remediless given the bar on appeals under Section 11. The arbitrator was directed to proceed after disclosures under Section 12(2), with fees per Fourth Schedule and equal cost sharing, keeping all rights and contentions open for merits determination.

JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

The Delhi High Court extended the Sole Arbitrator's mandate for six months beyond 27.02.2026 under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, holding that sufficient cause existed warranting extension where arbitral proceedings commenced October 2023 after appointment order dated 25.09.2023, pleadings concluded 08.02.2024, but cross-examination of Respondent's 75-year-old witness remained incomplete due to ill-health coupled with repeated adjournment requests, rendering final arguments impossible within the statutory twelve-month period from pleadings completion plus prior six-month extensions granted vide arbitrator's order dated 16.01.2025 and this Court's order dated 04.08.2025. The Court rejected any suggestion of dilatory tactics, noting Petitioner's diligent efforts and Respondent's express consent through partner Mr. Sanjay Agarwal appearing in-person, applying the Supreme Court's ruling in Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited v. Berger Paints India Limited (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494) that Section 29A(5) empowers extension for sufficient cause on such terms as the Court deems fit, while clarifying that mandate termination under Section 29A(4) is discretionary where delay stems from bona fide circumstances beyond parties' control. The petition was allowed with the arbitral tribunal directed to conclude proceedings expeditiously within the extended period ending 27.08.2026.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The High Court quashed FIR No.232/2024 under Sections 281/125(a) BNS (corresponding to Sections 279/337 IPC) arising from a motor vehicle accident, exercising inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS, on the decisive ground that parties had amicably settled their disputes through mediation at Delhi Mediation Centre. The Court noted that despite grievous injuries including shoulder fracture requiring surgical plate insertion, the complainant-pillion rider who was not wearing helmet, had voluntarily accepted total compensation of Rs.2,20,000 towards medical expenses, with full payment completed through demand draft dated 27.02.2026. Rejecting the continuation of criminal proceedings as serving no useful purpose where parties have genuinely compromised, the Court followed the principle established in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 that criminal proceedings may be quashed where dispute is essentially private in nature and compromise is genuine, particularly in non-compoundable but compoundable-like offences. The Court directed petitioner to deposit Rs.10,000 with Delhi High Court Staff Welfare Fund within four weeks, with proof of deposit and original affidavits to be filed before the trial court by 28.03.2026, ensuring complete closure of all consequential proceedings emanating from the FIR.

JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. and set aside the trial court's order dated 13.08.2009 that had dismissed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for default upon the complainant's death. The decisive ground was that the trial court committed a manifest illegality by dismissing the complaint instead of permitting the legal representative to continue the prosecution under Section 302 Cr.P.C., which expressly provides for substitution upon a complainant's death. The Court rejected the respondent's implied position that death of the complainant results in automatic dismissal, holding that such approach defeats the substantive rights of the complainant's estate. Applying the binding precedents in Jimmy Jahangir Madan v. Bolly Cariyappa, (2004) 12 SCC 509, Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 983, and Rashida Kamaluddin Syed v. Shaikh Saheblal Mardan, (2007) 3 SCC 548, the Court reaffirmed that criminal proceedings under Section 138 NI Act do not abate on the complainant's death and must be continued by the legal representative. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the trial court with directions to restore the complaint and dispose of the same expeditiously, preferably within six months, keeping in view the 2009 vintage of the case.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the CAT order directing payment of salary only for actual working period, holding that a disabled employee who remained absent for 133 days pre-COVID and failed to resume duties despite repeated directions cannot claim salary for non-attendance. The decisive ground was that the petitioner’s prolonged absence from 27.09.2019 to 06.02.2020 preceded the pandemic, rendering reliance on DoPT OM dated 19.05.2020 exempting PwDs from duty rosters irrelevant, particularly since the advisory nature of these circulars left employers discretion to assess functional requirements. Rejecting the contention that inclusion in duty rosters violated disability protections, the Court emphasized that the petitioner continued absenteeism even post-COVID, leading to his eventual termination, and that the Tribunal had already granted the only relief legally sustainable—payment for actual service rendered. The principle applied was that Article 226 cannot be invoked to seek wages for period of non-performance, especially where absence predates any lockdown restrictions, following the ratio in State of Rajasthan v. Natan Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1462, that “no work no pay” embodies constitutional propriety unless statutory disability benefits override. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed with no costs.

JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of both appellants under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act for possessing 201 kg of ganja, holding that the prosecution proved conscious possession and compliance with statutory safeguards beyond reasonable doubt. The decisive ground was the consistent testimony of official witnesses (PWs 2, 3, 5) regarding recovery from the TSR driven by A1 with A2 present, corroborated by intact seals “OS” and “RK” on samples tested positive by FSL (PW8), and statutory notices under Section 50 served and declined. Rejecting arguments of non-compliance with Sections 42 and 50, the Court held that Section 50 applies only to personal search (State of Punjab v. Baljinder Singh (2019) 10 SCC 473), not vehicle search, and recovery from a public road attracts Section 43, rendering Section 42 objections untenable. The absence of independent witnesses was held non-fatal following Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563, as official witnesses withstood cross-examination. Precedents Gorakh Nath Prasad v. State of Bihar (2018) 2 SCC 305 and Madan Lal v. State of H.P. (AIR 2003 SC 3642) were relied upon to affirm that once possession and procedural compliance are proved, presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 operate, and the appellants failed to rebut the same.

JUSTICE SANDEEP V. MARNE

The Bombay High Court dismissed the revision application and affirmed the trial court's decree under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, restoring possession of 'Barley Bungalow' to the plaintiffs, holding that the defendant's status as a watchman/caretaker in one outhouse since 2006 did not constitute "settled possession" of the entire bungalow. The decisive ground was that plaintiffs proved through cogent evidence—repair agreements, cheque payments, and witness testimony of carpenters and masons—that they were in possession during extensive repairs until the defendant forcibly broke in on 14 February 2016, establishing illegal dispossession within six months as mandated by Section 6(2). Rejecting the defendant's claim of decades-long possession, the Court held that mere permissive occupation as a gratuitous licensee cannot ripen into possessory title, applying the Supreme Court's rulings in Behram Tejani v. Azeem Jagani that "a person holding premises gratuitously or as caretaker can never acquire interest irrespective of long possession" and Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira that "caretaker holds property only on behalf of the principal." The Court emphasized that Section 6 requires only summary enquiry into possession and dispossession, not title, and granted defendant time till 30 April 2026 to vacate.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE GAUTAM A. ANKHAD

The Bombay High Court quashed FIR RC2192023E0003 registered by CBI against GTL Limited, holding that no prima facie offence under Sections 120-B, 420 IPC or Section 13 PC Act was disclosed. The decisive ground was that CBI failed to identify any accused despite 18-month preliminary enquiry, lodging FIR against unknown directors and bank officials, which the Court termed a fishing expedition. Rejecting CBI's contention of Rs.4760 crore fraud, the Court held that forensic audit by NBS & Co., special audit by T.R. Chaddha & Co., and Joint Lender Forum decisions consistently found no evidence of fund diversion, with lenders removing red-flag status and accepting one-time settlement. Applying the principle that commercial decisions turning sour don't constitute criminality unless dishonest intention exists from inception, the Court distinguished mere business failure from cheating under Section 415 IPC, citing Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar. The Court emphasized that Section 17A PC Act protects public servants from investigation without prior approval, and CBI's failure to identify specific accused despite knowing all parties rendered continuation of investigation an abuse of process, resulting in miscarriage of justice.

JUSTICE R. I. CHAGLA, JUSTICE ADVAIT M. SETHNA

The Bombay High Court held that contractual employees are entitled to maternity benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, quashing the Corporation's refusal as patently illegal. The decisive ground was Section 27's non obstante clause which overrides any agreement or service contract, rendering the respondents' distinction between regular and contractual staff unsustainable. The Court rejected the suppression plea, noting the petitioner had disclosed her pregnancy through applications dated 20 August and 7 October 2024, and fulfilled Section 5(2)'s 80-day requirement before her expected delivery. Following Archana v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 2 Mh.L.J. 697 and Dr. Kavita Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 1 SCC 421, the Bench emphasized that maternity benefits constitute a statutory right under Article 21 read with Article 42, transcending contractual terms. The Corporation's volte-face after agreeing to process payment, recorded in orders dated 23 June and 8 July 2025, demonstrated arbitrary conduct violating Article 14. Consequently, the impugned communication dated 21 October 2024 was set aside with directions to release all statutory benefits within six weeks, holding that denial of maternity leave to contractual women employees constitutes manifest arbitrariness and violates constitutional guarantees of dignity and motherhood protection.

JUSTICE R. I. CHAGLA, JUSTICE ADVAIT M. SETHNA

The Bombay High Court quashed the rejection of a 75% blind candidate for Group-D Level-1 railway post, holding that denial on ground that her “Uttama” certificate is not equivalent to SSC violates the mandate of reasonable accommodation under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The decisive ground is that the State Government Resolution dated 28-2-2007 expressly equates Uttama with SSC matriculation and, more fundamentally, Section 2(y) RPwD Act read with Articles 14 and 21 obliges the State to provide necessary and appropriate modifications as a pre-requisite to assessing eligibility, not as a concession. The Court rejected the Railways’ reliance on Dhiraj Narekar (Full Bench) which confined equivalence to Hindi-teacher appointments and on the alternate-remedy plea under Article 323-A, holding that enforcement of disability rights is a constitutional remedy under Article 226 and cannot be ousted. Following Sujata Bora v. Coal India (2026 SCC OnLine SC 58) and Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services (2025 SCC OnLine SC 481), the Court held that rigid equivalence barriers constitute indirect discrimination defeating substantive equality. It directed respondent No. 2 to consider the petitioner’s candidature within three weeks while keeping one post vacant under Advertisement RRC-01/2019, making the petition absolute.

JUSTICE SHAILESH P. BRAHME

The Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court held that claimants under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are entitled to compensation exceeding the "Foundational Award" and additional compensation for trees, wells and structures, rejecting the Reference Court's restrictive interpretation. The decisive ground is that Section 28-A being beneficent legislation to remedy inequality among similarly situated landowners, its language permits redetermination of compensation without fetters, and sub-section (3) makes Sections 18-28 applicable for fresh adjudication including classification change from dry to irrigated land. The Court rejected the acquiring body's contention that redetermination is limited to the Foundational Award's rates, holding this would frustrate the legislative intent to benefit inarticulate poor landowners who couldn't approach the Reference Court under Section 18. Following Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736 which emphasized purposive interpretation of beneficial provisions, and distinguishing V. Ramkrushnarao v. Singareni Collieries (2010) 10 SCC 650's obiter, the Court ruled that compensation components under Section 23 include all factors like irrigation potential and structures. Appeals in Group I (land classification) are allowed with enhanced rates of Rs. 3,000/- per R for irrigated land plus statutory solatium and interest, while Group II appeals (structures/trees) are remanded for fresh determination of additional compensation components.

JUSTICE SUMAN SHYAM

The Bombay High Court dismissed the State of Goa's appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, upholding the arbitral award dated 08.08.1997 in favour of M/s. U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. The decisive ground was that the arbitration proceedings commenced under the Arbitration Act, 1940, and therefore Sections 12 and 13 of the 1996 Act (governing arbitrator disclosure and challenge) had no application, as held in Shetty’s Constructions Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Konkan Railway Construction (1998) 5 SCC 599 and Thyssen Stah Lunion GMBH v. Steel Authority of India (1999) 9 SCC 334. The Court rejected the appellant's plea of bias against arbitrator Shri Shitala Sharan, noting that his prior role as Managing Director of the respondent-corporation was known to the State at the time of nomination, and no objection was raised then; thus, the principles of waiver and estoppel applied. The award being unanimous and rendered by a three-member tribunal with a neutral Chairman, any alleged bias stood neutralised. The Court reaffirmed the limited scope of judicial interference under Section 37, as reiterated in Reliance Infrastructure Pvt Ltd v. State of Goa (2024) 1 SCC 479, and found no perversity in the Principal District Judge’s reasoned order dated 22.02.2016 rejecting the Section 34 objection.

JUSTICE SUMAN SHYAM, JUSTICE AMIT SATYAVAN JAMSANDEKAR

The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the promotion of Respondent No.3 as Principal of Shree Ganesh Higher Secondary School, holding that the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) correctly applied Rule 86 of the Goa School Education Rules, 1986. The decisive ground was that Respondent No.3, being a Headmaster of a Secondary School under the same management, belonged to the “next below category” under Rule 78 and thus had priority over the petitioner, a Grade-I teacher. The Court rejected the petitioner’s claim of seniority within the same school, emphasizing that Rule 86 mandates consideration of inter-se seniority across common management schools and not merely within individual institutions. It clarified that the post of Headmaster is hierarchically superior to Grade-I Teacher for promotion to Principal, and the DPC’s reasoning—based on merit, experience, and assessment records—was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. The Court distinguished its earlier order dated 26.09.2024, which dealt only with officiating charge, not regular promotion. Reliance was placed on the statutory scheme under the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Act, 1984, and Rules of 1986, particularly Rules 78, 86, and 87-A, which permit common seniority lists and mandate promotion from the next eligible category. The petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.

JUSTICE SUMAN SHYAM, JUSTICE AMIT SATYAVAN JAMSANDEKAR

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal holding that the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act 1963, as the cause of action arose in 1993 when respondents failed to perform the 1990 agreement, and the subsequent suit filed in 2012 was hopelessly time-barred. The decisive ground was that the Supreme Court’s 2012 order dismissing the SLP merely kept questions of law open but did not create a fresh cause of action, distinguishing Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Bala & Co 2025 SCC OnLine SC 48 where limitation was held to run continuously once time began. The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that the period consumed in earlier litigation should be excluded under Order VII Rule 13 CPC, emphasizing that the registered partnership firm, though a different entity from the earlier unregistered one, could not revive a claim whose limitation expired in 1996. The principle that time once begun continues to run unless interrupted by a competent suit was applied, and the plaint was rightly rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC as the suit appeared barred by law.

JUSTICE KRISHNA RAO

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the eligibility criteria in RFP No. CEOWB/2026/e-tender/002 requiring bidders to have executed live election web streaming for at least 1,30,000 cameras at polling stations and 3,000 CCTV cameras at counting centres across India, holding that such conditions were neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. The decisive ground was that the petitioner admittedly lacked the requisite counting centre experience and failed to demonstrate that the conditions were tailor-made to exclude competition, distinguishing Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2119) where location-specific experience was struck down as violating Article 19(1)(g). Rejecting the contention that polling station experience inherently establishes counting centre capability, the Court emphasized that 421 counting halls across 108 centres in West Bengal required specialized deployment expertise distinct from polling station operations. Following Airport Authority of India v. CAPSR (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1334), the Court held that tender conditions are immune from judicial scrutiny unless mala fide or patently arbitrary, and authorities possess discretionary power to prescribe experience requirements commensurate with project complexity. The petitioner's suggestion to relax counting centre experience to merely 400 cameras was found materially inferior to even Kerala's modified criteria, reinforcing that the conditions reasonably ensured technical competence for simultaneous multi-location surveillance across 80,681 polling stations and counting centres.

JUSTICE RAJA BASU CHOWDHURY

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by retired NJMC officers challenging the 40% arrears settlement, holding that acceptance of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) package constituted full and final settlement precluding further claims. The decisive ground was that petitioners, having voluntarily accepted the composite package including 40% arrears on 1997 pay scales and VRS benefits under Cabinet approval, are estopped from challenging its adequacy under the doctrine of approbation and reprobation. The Court rejected arguments that the settlement violated the 27th August 2009 judgment directing implementation of expert committee recommendations on par with clerical staff settlement, distinguishing that the Cabinet note under File No. 17/2/2000 validly provided differential treatment considering NJMC's financial viability as a BIFR-registered sick company under Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The Court applied the principle that governmental decisions on pay revision involve policy considerations immune from judicial interference absent manifest arbitrariness, distinguishing Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304 and Manoj Kumar v. Union of India (2024) 3 SCC 563 as relating to different factual matrices. The dismissal of contempt appeal in CC 81 of 2010 operated as res judicata, confirming substantial compliance with the 2009 directions through implementation of revised pay scales and VRS scheme.

JUSTICE KRISHNA RAO

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the Regional Director's order allowing shifting of registered office from West Bengal to Maharashtra, holding that the second proviso to Rule 30(9) of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 was not violated since the pending appeals before NCLAT were limited to interest claims and no stay order operated against the resolution plan approval dated 14th August 2025. The decisive ground was that NCLAT's orders dated 2nd September 2025 and 26th November 2025 expressly clarified that pendency of appeal shall not obstruct statutory compliance, and the petitioners failed to demonstrate prejudice from the relocation while their appeal merely sought interest under Section 16 of MSMED Act, 2006. Rejecting the contention that pending appeals against resolution plan automatically prohibit office shifting, the Court applied the principle that mere filing of appeal does not operate as stay unless specifically ordered, following Abdul Halim v. West Bengal Central School Service Commission (2019) 18 SCC 39 which held that Article 226 jurisdiction does not permit re-appreciation of administrative decisions. The Regional Director's conditional order dated 4th February 2026, subject to NCLAT's final outcome and protecting employee interests, was held to be in accordance with law as it merely implemented NCLAT's clarification that statutory authorities must decide applications independently despite pending appeals.

JUSTICE OM NARAYAN RAI

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the challenge to the show-cause notice under Section 74 of the West Bengal GST Act, 2017, holding that it disclosed prima facie jurisdictional facts and was not tainted by predetermination, while simultaneously setting aside the 04-11-2025 adjudication order for breach of Section 75(4) and principles of natural justice by denying personal hearing. The decisive ground is that the notice, issued after the Division Bench’s remand in MAT 2100/2024, merely records “reasons to believe” of fraud in the ITC chain and repeatedly uses “prima facie”, signifying an open mind; the Court followed Krishna Wax (2020) 12 SCC 572 and Brahm Datt Sharma (1987) 2 SCC 179 that a show-cause is not a final verdict but an invitation to discharge the burden under Section 155. Rejecting the petitioners’ reliance on Suncraft Energy (2023) 9 Centax 48 (Cal.) and National Plasto Moulding (2024) 21 Centax 182 (Gau.), the Court distinguished that where revenue alleges collusion and supplier non-existence, bona fide purchaser protection does not arise; e-way bills alone are not conclusive of movement. The authority must now afford thirty days for reply and a hearing before fresh adjudication, with the pendency period excluded from limitation.

JUSTICE OM NARAYAN RAI

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging eviction under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, holding that the petitioner's inordinate delay and acquiescence disentitled him to discretionary relief under Article 226. The decisive ground was that despite receiving a caveat on 11.02.2022 referencing the eviction order dated 02.02.2022, the petitioner failed to challenge the same for over three years, instead making partial payments towards arrears without protest, thereby waiving his right to complain. Rejecting the contention of procedural violation regarding notice service, the Court held that the petitioner’s conduct evidenced "unpardonable indolence" - he neither pursued statutory appeal under Section 9 of the 1971 Act nor invoked RTI to obtain the eviction order, despite knowing its adverse impact. Applying the doctrine of laches as enunciated in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley (2024) 15 SCC 215 and U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh (2006) 11 SCC 464, the Court held that writ courts must refuse relief to indolent litigants who sleep over their rights, particularly where acquiescence is established by payment of dues without contesting unauthorised occupation allegations. The Court distinguished Ramesh Kumar & Co. v. Port of Kolkata 2016 SCC OnLine Cal 4455, noting that therein the appellants were vigilant unlike the present petitioner who challenged only the consequential possession takeover, not the substantive eviction order.

JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL, JUSTICE HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA

The Calcutta High Court reviewed and recalled its 18.04.2023 order holding that lands recorded as "Hat" vested absolutely in the State and were non-transferable, finding an error apparent on the face of the record. The decisive ground was that the earlier judgment failed to consider that the erstwhile intermediaries had been allowed to retain these non-agricultural lands under Section 6(1)(c) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 and were deemed tenants under the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, whose tenancies are expressly transferable under Section 8(4)(ii) thereof. Rejecting the State’s contention that classification as "Hat" ipso facto prevents transfer, the Court held that holding a hat or bazaar is merely a mode of user (State of Bihar v. Rameshwar Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1649) and once retention under Section 6 is permitted, the vesting under Section 5(1)(a)(ii) does not bar subsequent transfers. Consequently, all consequential memos, notifications and proceedings issued pursuant to the recalled judgment are quashed and the PIL is restored for fresh hearing; authorities are, however, left free to initiate fresh action strictly in accordance with law without relying on the recalled observations.

JUSTICE RAJA BASU CHOWDHURY

The Calcutta High Court disposed of the contempt application in WPA 8018 of 2025 holding that substantial compliance with the Court's order dated 21st May 2025 had been achieved, rendering the contempt proceedings infructuous. The decisive ground was the alleged contemnor's filing of an affidavit of compliance accompanied by six demand drafts and one cheque totaling Rs.95,54,513/-, which represented the full settled amount payable to the petitioner Union Farmers' Service Cooperative Ltd. Additionally, the contemnor had enclosed a copy of the memorandum of settlement, demonstrating complete adherence to the Court's directions. The Court rejected any contention of continued non-compliance, noting that the payment had been made through multiple banking instruments in favour of the petitioner. The principle that substantial compliance defeats contempt proceedings, rooted in the maxim "substantial compliance is sufficient compliance," was applied. The Court exercised its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to drop the contempt proceedings, emphasizing that contempt jurisdiction is meant to secure compliance rather than punish technical breaches. Consequently, the application was disposed of without further orders, with parties directed to act on the server copy downloaded from the Court's official website, thereby bringing the contempt proceedings to a definitive closure.

JUSTICE DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the criminal revision application challenging the rejection of discharge under Sections 420/468/471/34 IPC, holding that prima facie materials disclosed grave suspicion warranting trial. The decisive ground was the questioned document examiner's report revealing fraudulent symptoms in money receipts where disputed texts Q1/Q2 were later added to original texts S1/S2, coupled with seizure of these documents from petitioner no.1's conscious possession. The Court rejected arguments that Section 463 IPC requires the maker to be the forger, emphasizing that Section 464's second limb covers alteration by cancellation or otherwise without lawful authority. Following Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (2010) 9 SCC 368, the Court held that at the discharge stage, it must evaluate whether materials taken at face value disclose offence ingredients, not conduct mini-trial. The principle from Md. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar (2009) 8 SCC 751 that forgery includes alteration of documents without lawful authority was applied. The Court clarified that petitioner no.2's alleged involvement under Section 34 IPC as joint beneficiary requires trial evaluation, while the examiner's non-examination doesn't vitiate proceedings since Section 311 CrPC empowers summoning witnesses at any stage. The trial court was held justified in rejecting discharge as materials prima facie established forgery ingredients.

JUSTICE JAY SENGUPTA

The Calcutta High Court granted bail to Dr. Santi Prasad Sinha under Section 483 BNSS, holding that prolonged pre-cognizance incarceration of 1 year 8 months without sanction for prosecution under Section 44(1)(b) PMLA outweighs Section 45 rigors, applying the Article 21 doctrine that undue delay vitiates detention. The decisive ground was the State’s evasive refusal to commit on sanction timing despite ED’s November 2024 request, rendering trial commencement speculative, while the petitioner’s Parkinson’s disease at 74 years qualifies as “infirm” under Section 45 proviso. Rejecting ED’s contention of continuing money-laundering under Section 3 explanation, the Court distinguished Supreme Court’s 18.08.2025 bail order in predicate offences where framing of charges was imminent, emphasising that here sanction remains pending and documentary evidence is already seized. Relying on Nathu Singh v. State of UP (2021) 6 SCC 64 recognising inherent power to secure ends of justice even in bail matters, the Court directed the State to decide sanction within reasonable time and imposed stringent conditions including fortnightly IO meetings and passport surrender, warning that justice cannot be held hostage to executive lethargy.