JUSTICE PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JUSTICE ATUL S. CHANDURKAR

The Supreme Court held that an application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is maintainable even after an award is rendered post-expiry of the arbitrator’s mandate, since such an award is merely unenforceable under Section 36 and does not denude the Court’s jurisdiction. The decisive ground is that Section 29A(4) empowers the Court to extend the mandate before or after the expiry of the 12+6 month timeline, and the phrase “if an award is not made” is contextual, not a bar once an award is passed without mandate. Rejecting the High Court’s view that the award is a nullity, the Court emphasised that termination under Section 29A(4) is conditional and transitory, not absolute, and aligns with the legislative intent to ensure arbitral proceedings reach a binding conclusion. The Court approved its earlier observation in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494, that the power to extend time vests exclusively in the Court, not the tribunal, and may be exercised even if an award is pronounced during the pendency of the extension application. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court directed to decide the Section 29A(5) application afresh, considering sufficient cause, costs, and possible substitution under Section 29A(6).

JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH, JUSTICE N. V. ANJARIA

The Supreme Court directed the Central Government to constitute an Inter-State River Water Disputes Tribunal under Section 4 of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, for adjudicating the Pennaiyar river dispute between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, holding that the statutory negotiation process having failed, the Central Government is mandatorily obliged to refer the matter to adjudication. The decisive ground was that despite prolonged negotiations since 2018, including ministerial-level talks, Tamil Nadu’s firm insistence on tribunal adjudication rendered further negotiation futile, triggering the mandatory obligation under Section 4, wherein Parliament deliberately substituted “may” with “shall” to preclude discretion once negotiation is found impossible. Rejecting Karnataka’s contention that the 1892 agreement between Madras and Mysore was a mere political arrangement extinguished by independence, the Court preserved all rights for tribunal determination while emphasizing that unilateral upstream construction without lower riparian consent exacerbates inter-state friction. Relying on T.N. Cauvery Neerppasana Vilaiporulgal Vivasayigal Nala Urimai Padhugappa Sangam v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 440, which held that once the Centre forms the opinion that a water dispute cannot be settled by negotiation, it must constitute a tribunal, the Court ordered notification within one month, disposing of the original suit under Article 131 while keeping all relief questions open for the tribunal.

JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA, JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN

The Supreme Court allowed restoration of Complaint Case No.1125/2022 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, setting aside concurrent orders of dismissal for default passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court in Criminal Revision No.981/2024. The decisive ground was that both courts below failed to exercise judicial discretion properly when refusing restoration, particularly where the appellant's right to prosecute the cheque dishonour complaint remained unadjudicated. The Court rejected the mechanical approach adopted by the High Court in declining interference, emphasizing that dismissal for default should not operate as a bar to substantive justice when no deliberate or contumacious conduct is established. Applying the principles enunciated in R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari (2009) 14 SCC 209 that restoration applications should be liberally considered to advance substantial justice, and reaffirming the mandate of Order 9 Rule 9 CPC read with Section 482 CrPC, the Court held that technical considerations must yield to the broader interests of justice in cheque bounce proceedings. The Court directed immediate restoration of the complaint to the file of Additional Court No.2, Ghaziabad for fresh disposal on merits, while clarifying that this order would not preclude the trial court from imposing appropriate costs for the default.

JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA, JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN

The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal and set aside paragraphs 53-56 of the impugned judgment, holding that since the Court had already granted interim stay of the High Court's order dated 09.08.2016 and the appellant's tenure as MLA for 2012-2017 had expired, it was unnecessary to examine the merits or maintain the adverse observations. The decisive consideration was that the interim stay prevented the implementation of the declaration that the appellant's election from 249 Patti constituency was void under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 for improper rejection of 955 postal ballots and non-compliance with the 1951 Act, 1961 Rules and the 2009 Handbook for Returning Officers. While the High Court had extensively criticized the appellant's delaying tactics and directed denial of legislative benefits and pension, the Supreme Court found these observations unsustainable given the supervening circumstances. The Court emphasized that since the appeal was not being decided on merits due to the lapsed tenure, justice required expunging the prejudicial findings. No costs were imposed. The judgment clarifies that interim protection coupled with expired tenure can render adverse electoral findings academic, following the principle that courts should avoid deciding questions that have become infructuous.

JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA, JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN

The Supreme Court partially allowed K.M. Shaji’s appeal, setting aside Clause 2 of the Kerala High Court’s 09.11.2018 order that had disqualified him for six years under Sections 100(1)(b) and 100(1)(d)(ii) read with Sections 123(3) and 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, holding that the power to disqualify a person found guilty of corrupt practice is vested exclusively in the President of India under Section 8A and cannot be exercised by the High Court; the Court emphasised that once the High Court records a finding of corrupt practice, Section 8A mandates the authority to submit the case to the President within three months, and the President must decide the disqualification period after obtaining the Election Commission’s opinion, a procedural safeguard that upholds the constitutional scheme of separation of powers. Since the 2016-2021 assembly term had already expired and the setting aside of the election no longer obstructed the appellant’s future electoral rights, the Court declined to revisit the validity of the election itself, thereby disposing of connected appeals CA 249/2019 and CA 1230/2019 in identical terms, while leaving intact the High Court’s findings on corrupt practices and the cost award of ₹50,000 in favour of the election petitioner.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court disposed of the criminal miscellaneous petition with directions that no coercive process shall be taken against petitioner Rajeeev Gupta till 05.02.2026, whereupon he undertook to appear physically before the trial court and demonstrate that the earlier coercive order has lost force in view of this Court’s judgment dated 31.10.2025 in CRL.M.C. 7678/2025 quashing twelve FIRs under Section 174 IPC registered at IGI Airport Police Station. The decisive ground is the ratio that Section 174 IPC penalises intentional non-attendance in obedience to a lawful order and does not apply where non-appearance arises from circumstances beyond one’s control, such as lawful custody elsewhere; declaring a prisoner an absconder and registering FIRs on the untenable assumption of wilful evasion amounts to misdirection in law and abuse of process, whereas the structured mechanism under Section 267 CrPC (now Section 349 BNSS) permits issuance of production warrants to secure a prisoner’s presence. Rejecting the trial court’s insistence on physical appearance without considering the subsistence of the quashed FIRs, the Court reaffirmed that the criminal courts must secure presence through production warrants or permit counsel/VC appearance where law allows, and left the petitioners at liberty to seek future exemption applications which the trial court shall consider in accordance with law after hearing both sides.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, affirming that the arbitral award dated 04.07.2024 and the Section 34 judgment dated 05.08.2025 disclose no perversity or patent illegality. The decisive ground is Issue No. 7: execution of the No Demand Certificate dated 20.05.2020 constitutes a complete accord, barring any further monetary claims; intermediate findings under Issues 2 and 3 cannot override this determinative bar. The Court rejected the contention that the award is internally inconsistent, holding that an arbitral tribunal’s operative conclusion must be read holistically and isolated observations cannot be torn out of context. On limitation, the Bench approved the tribunal’s ruling that the claim for interest on delayed running account bills, first raised in 2021, is barred as limitation under Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963, commences when each payment fell due and was made between 2014-2016, not from the final bill date, following Pramod Kumar Jain v. MCD, 2025:DHC:8212-DB. Concurrent findings of fact by the arbitrator and the Single Judge are beyond appellate re-appreciation. No interference warranted; appeal dismissed.

JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition challenging bail granted to respondent Sujata Rao under Sections 328/381 IPC, holding that the trial court's order dated 06.05.2025, though based on non-supply of written grounds of arrest, could not be faulted as it aligned with the prevailing legal position in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254 and Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269, which mandated written communication of arrest grounds as a constitutional safeguard under Article 22(1). The Court rejected allegations of suppression of earlier bail dismissals, attributing omissions to inadvertence and noting the prosecution's own failure to disclose prior orders. Distinguishing the subsequent rulings in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702 and Mohd. Rais v. State (NCT of Delhi) (decided post-bail grant), the Court held that absence of demonstrable prejudice rendered the defect curable, not fatal. Emphasizing that bail was granted after a year of incarceration without any suggestion of witness tampering or flight risk, the Court affirmed that technical irregularities, absent material non-disclosure or abuse of process, cannot vitiate bail orders. The petitioner was relegated to future remedies for any post-release misconduct.

JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN

The Delhi High Court modified the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal's award, enhancing compensation from Rs.69,03,713/- to Rs.76,40,402/- while rejecting Oriental Insurance's challenge to excessive compensation and claimant Manoj Jain's plea for higher disability assessment. The decisive grounds were: (i) income correctly assessed at Rs.2,33,430/- net of tax from ITR and contractor empanelment documents under Vimla Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2019) 2 SCC 186, rejecting the contention that unexhibited ITR was inadmissible; (ii) loss of income during 31-month treatment enhanced from Rs.1,00,000/- to Rs.6,03,028/- applying the established income; (iii) functional disability reduced from 80% to 60% following Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343 three-step test and Mohd. Sabeer v. UPSRTC (2023) 20 SCC 774, holding that 80% limb disability for a self-employed contractor equated to 60% earning capacity loss; (iv) future prospects limited to 40% per Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 for self-employed persons below 40 years; and (v) prosthetic limb costs awarded for seven replacements totaling Rs.19,76,443/- plus Rs.5,00,000/- maintenance till age 70, applying Mohd. Sabeer and Oriental Insurance v. Master Anshu Kumar 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5416. Interest at 9% awarded from petition filing date, with recovery rights against driver/owner restricted to original award amount.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court set aside the CAT order quashing disciplinary action against a government servant for submitting fabricated medical certificates to regularize three years of unauthorized absence, restoring the dismissal penalty as the misconduct of producing false documents to cover prolonged absence constituted grave breach of integrity under CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The decisive ground was that departmental proceedings require proof on preponderance of probabilities, not criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, and the CAT erred in requiring expert opinion or criminal prosecution for what was essentially misconduct of submitting certificates purportedly issued by a doctor who was on leave and not in government service on relevant dates, with certificates lacking serial numbers and beneficiary details, coupled with false statement that the doctor was still in service. Rejecting the respondent's contention that Rule 19 CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972 permitted certificates from any registered practitioner, the Court held that even if true, the certificates were proved false on cumulative evidence including verification that CGHS dispensary never issued them and the doctor was absent. Relying on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1996) 6 SCC 749 limiting judicial review to decision-making process and Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Rajendra D. Harmalkar (2022) 17 SCC 361 holding that producing fake certificates destroys employer's trust, the Court held dismissal not disproportionate where employee remained absent for three years without authorization and attempted to cover it through deliberate misrepresentation, directing restoration of dismissal order dated 18.06.2010.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Division Bench set aside the Commercial Court's summary judgment under Order XIII-A CPC, holding that disputed questions regarding lease termination, possession offer, and consultancy liability necessitated a full trial. The decisive ground was that the defence raised substantial triable issues - whether tenancy obligations ceased upon the appellant's unequivocal vacation offer dated 09.06.2020, whether rent liability persisted for the intervening period until possession handover on 09.02.2021, and whether consultancy fees were payable under an expired agreement without services rendered. Rejecting the respondents' contention that admitted documents warranted summary decree, the Court emphasized that document admission doesn't establish liability when contractual obligations themselves are disputed. The Court distinguished Ramanand v. Dr. Girish Soni (2020:DHC:1963), which addressed rent suspension during possession, from the instant case where the tenant offered to surrender premises. Similarly, reliance on SU-KAM Power Systems Ltd. v. Kunwer Sachdev (2019 SCC OnLine Del 10764) was misplaced as summary judgment requires the Court to confidently resolve disputes without evidence, impossible here where liability turned on contested facts. The appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment set aside, and the suit restored for trial with directions to frame issues and permit evidence led on merits.

JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal and held that the Railway Claims Tribunal erred in denying compensation under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 by relying on unsubstantiated intoxication. The decisive ground was that clinical observations of alcohol smell, without scientific proof like blood alcohol testing, cannot establish intoxication to attract the exception under Section 124A(d). Rejecting the Tribunal's finding of self-inflicted injury, the Court emphasized that the DRM Report and Station Master's statement made no mention of intoxication, while the appellant's traumatic amputation and shock could explain uncooperative behavior. Following Bhola Nath v. Union of India (2019) and Bachubhai Hassan ali Karyani v. State of Maharashtra (1971) 3 SCC 930, the Court held that mere odor of alcohol establishes no causal nexus between consumption and injuries. The Court reaffirmed that the Railways Act is beneficial legislation requiring liberal interpretation, and liability under Section 124A is strict where contributory negligence is no defence, as established in Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (2008) 9 SCC 527. Consequently, the appellant was awarded Rs. 8,00,000/- compensation with 12% interest from the accident date, to be paid within four weeks.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging CAT orders that denied MCD Laboratory Technicians parity with Central Government counterparts in the Rs. 5000-8000 pay scale under the 5th CPC, holding that the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' does not apply where material differences exist in educational qualifications and recruitment criteria. The decisive ground was the admitted distinction that MCD requires only Matriculation while Central Government mandates B.Sc. degree for the same post, constituting a valid intelligible differentia under Article 14. Rejecting the petitioners' reliance on similar nomenclature and duties, the Court emphasized that parity claims require wholesale identity in recruitment, qualifications and responsibilities, not merely designation overlap. Following State of Bihar v. Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee (2019 INSC 680), the Court reiterated that equal pay is a constitutional goal, not a fundamental right, and cannot be claimed where entry-level academic requirements differ fundamentally. The Court also rejected arguments based on pending recruitment rule amendments and feeder-promotional post anomalies, holding that administrative intent does not create enforceable rights and such anomalies fall within the Anomalies Committee's domain. The Tribunal's refusal to issue directions in absence of amended recruitment rules was held neither perverse nor legally untenable, as pay fixation involves complex policy considerations beyond judicial review.

JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA

The Delhi High Court granted interim bail for six weeks to an undertrial under Section 3(1) and 3(4) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, rejecting the State's opposition based on the non-emergent nature of the mother's knee replacement surgery and the pendency of 27 cases including three murder trials, holding that undertrial incarceration cannot be punitive and the humanitarian consideration of a son's presence during his mother's surgery outweighs prosecutorial concerns, particularly where the trial is unlikely to conclude for at least three years and the accused has already suffered five and a half years of incarceration with discharge in three murder cases suggesting possible police fabrication; the Court emphasized that the availability of other relatives to care for the mother does not negate the accused's legitimate desire to be present during her hospitalization and recuperation, and that the State's enthusiasm to oppose liberty must be tempered by the principle that undertrial detention serves the purpose of ensuring trial attendance, not punishment before guilt is proven, thereby allowing interim bail from 11.02.2026 to 04.03.2026 on a personal bond of Rs. 50,000 with surety, with strict directions against contacting prosecution witnesses and mandatory surrender on 05.03.2026 at 10:30 am.

JUSTICE RAJNEESH KUMAR GUPTA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petitioner's challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution against the arbitral tribunal's interlocutory order allowing the respondent to produce a document at the final argument stage, holding that such orders are not amenable to writ jurisdiction unless exceptional circumstances exist. The decisive ground was that the impugned order, being interlocutory and not terminating the arbitration, falls squarely within the tribunal's procedural discretion under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with adequate safeguards including costs of Rs. 25,000 and opportunity for rebuttal evidence having been provided to prevent prejudice. Rejecting the petitioner's contention that this amounted to reopening concluded stages and defeated expeditious resolution, the Court emphasized that the arbitral tribunal is a creature of contract between parties and its case management orders, including document production, are within its domain unless they demonstrate bad faith or perversity, neither of which was established. Following the Supreme Court's binding precedent in S.B.P. and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618, which held that High Courts cannot interfere with every arbitral order under Articles 226/227 as this would defeat the legislative intent of minimal judicial intervention, and this Court's own decision in Hindustan Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. Maa Sheetla Ventures Limited (2024) holding that writ jurisdiction becomes even narrower for tribunal orders relating to arbitration conduct, the Court directed that the petitioner's remedy lies in challenging the final award under Section 34 of the Act, where all contentions regarding the interlocutory order can be raised.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition filed by a newly-married couple seeking protection from alleged parental threats, recording the State’s undertaking to ensure their safety without issuing formal directions. Petitioners, married on 23.01.2026 under Hindu rites, apprehended intimidation from petitioner no.1’s parents residing in Faridabad after the inter-familial alliance turned adversarial. While the Court did not adjudicate on substantive rights, it accepted the learned Standing Counsel’s assurance that petitioners already possess contact details of SHO Sarita Vihar, SI Satish Bhati and the beat officer, who will maintain weekly vigil and respond instantly to any distress call. The bench, presided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Jain, treated the State’s statement as sufficient safeguard of the couple’s life and liberty under Article 21, following the precedent in Lata Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 475, which mandates police protection to consenting adults against khap or parental coercion. No further relief was pressed; the petition was closed with the liberty to approach authorities if threats materialise, reinforcing that constitutional courts will monitor executive compliance even in disposed matters where fundamental freedoms are invoked.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR No. 290/2016 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC on the ground that the fully performed compromise between estranged spouses rendered criminal prosecution purposeless, applying the principle that private disputes amicably settled without public interest implications warrant exercise of inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (successor to Section 482 CrPC). After verifying that the marriage solemnized on 22.07.2012 had irretrievably broken with parties living separately since 19.04.2017, and noting that mediated settlement dated 31.01.2025 under Mr. Balbir Singh's guidance had resulted in mutual consent divorce on 26.07.2025 with Rs. 6 lakhs full and final settlement towards alimony, istridhan and maintenance (Rs. 4 lakhs received, Rs. 2 lakhs tendered via demand draft), the Court emphasized that custody of the sole child having been allocated to father with structured visitation rights, and the complainant expressly declining to pursue charges while proceedings lingered at miscellaneous stage post-chargesheet filing in 2017, continuation of criminal proceedings would constitute abuse of process. The Court relied upon precedents establishing that matrimonial offences compounded through genuine settlement deserve quashing to secure ends of justice, resulting in quashing of FIR and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.

JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, holding that the prosecution failed to prove demand, the sine qua non for the offence. The decisive ground was the inherently improbable and materially corroded evidence of PW2, a tainted complainant who had illegally drawn dearness allowance from both Army and MCD, faced disciplinary proceedings, and never replied to the appellant’s notice requiring vigilance clearance for pension processing, rendering any demand for bribe for clearing the file illogical. The Court rejected the prosecution case as PW10, a loyal prosecution witness, decisively falsified PW2’s presence in the appellant’s office on 22.11.1993, and PW2’s testimony was further shattered by material contradictions between PW2 and PW3 regarding language of conversation, exact words, and location of trap proceedings. Following Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P., (1979) 4 SCC 172, the Court found the sanction order vitiated by non-application of mind as PW1 mechanically reproduced the draft without perusing complaint, seizure memos, or witness statements. Consequently, the appellant was entitled to benefit of doubt as the chain of custody was broken, samples were kept in an unnotified almirah, and the recovered currency notes alone could not sustain conviction in absence of proved demand.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court set aside the dismissal of Ms. Pooja's Criminal Revision Petition No. 424/2023, holding that a revision proceeding cannot be dismissed in default under Section 397 Cr.P.C. merely for non-deposit of cost and non-appearance. The decisive ground was that the learned Revisional Court had dismissed the revision at threshold without issuing notice, thereby violating the mandatory procedure that dismissal in default is impermissible in revision/appeal proceedings. The Court rejected the implication that the revision stood foreclosed, noting that since no notice had been issued and the dismissal was purely procedural, restoration was warranted without touching merits. Following the established principle that default of appearance and cost does not defeat substantive right of revision, the Court restored the petition to its original position, permitting the petitioner to pursue the grievance regarding investigation against public servants under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the appropriate forum. The Court clarified that while the petitioner has been advised to seek remedy before the Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the procedural dismissal shall not create a bar. Consequently, the order dated 28.02.2024 was set aside and the petitioner was directed to appear before the Revisional Court on 12.02.2026, reinforcing that procedural lapses cannot override substantive justice.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court allowed the petitions seeking recall of summoning orders dated 11.07.2019 against petitioner Anil Mithas in two complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, holding that since the cheques in question were drawn in 2018-2019 and the petitioner had resigned as Director of M/s Bulland Realtors Pvt. Ltd. effective 01.09.2017, he could not be vicariously liable for the company's dishonoured cheques. The decisive ground was that the petitioner was neither a signatory to the cheques nor involved in the company's affairs when the offences allegedly occurred, as evidenced by Form DIR-11 filed with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs showing his resignation. The Court rejected any implication of the petitioner as accused No. 2, emphasizing that Section 138 liability requires the person to be in charge of and responsible for the company's conduct at the relevant time. Following the principle established in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla that a director who has resigned cannot be prosecuted for subsequent offences, and noting the complainant's counsel candid admission of no objection, the Court recalled the summoning orders to the petitioner's extent while directing the Trial Court to expeditiously dispose of the complaints against the remaining accused.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR No. 0413/2024 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC against the petitioners, exercising inherent power under Section 528 BNSS, upon finding that the compromise comprehensively settled the matrimonial dispute without any public interest element; the decisive consideration was that respondent No.2, who had initiated the complaint, voluntarily received the entire agreed sum of Rs.5 lakhs in full satisfaction of alimony, istridhan and maintenance, had already secured divorce by mutual consent on 23.12.2025, retained custody of the child, and unequivocally stated she would not press charges, while all petitioners were present and the charge-sheet was yet to be filed. Rejecting continuation of criminal proceedings as serving no useful purpose, the Court applied the well-settled principle from B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana that private disputes amicably settled between parties justify quashing to secure ends of justice, reinforced by Nikhil Merchant v. CBI which emphasises that proceedings driven by compromise and lacking public interest may be quashed sparingly under Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS), thereby promoting finality and sparing parties from protracted litigation. The Court accordingly directed complete quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings.

JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging CIC's order denying RTI access to vigilance clearance records of a bank official facing sexual harassment and criminal charges, holding that service-related documents constitute "personal information" under Section 8(1)(j) RTI Act absent demonstrated larger public interest. The decisive ground was that vigilance clearance certificates, file notings, and DPC records are professional evaluations between employer-employee, disclosure of which would cause unwarranted privacy invasion without serving public interest, following Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay where Supreme Court held performance evaluations, ACRs and disciplinary proceedings are personal information entitled to protection. The Court rejected petitioner's contention that information sought was routine public record, emphasizing that public interest means general welfare warranting disclosure, not mere public curiosity, as clarified in Central Public Information Officer v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal where Court distinguished between "interest to public" and "public interest" requiring balancing constitutional rights to privacy versus information. The Court found petitioner failed to establish how disclosure would serve larger public interest particularly when criminal proceedings were ongoing through proper channels, and mere allegation of impropriety in promotions pending complaints cannot override statutory privacy protection unless larger public interest is demonstrated through objective satisfaction by competent authority.

JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of appellant Manoj Kumar, Sub-Inspector, under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, holding that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that he demanded and accepted ₹4,000 as illegal gratification from PW1 to forego action in Crime No. 187/95. The decisive findings were: (i) PW1’s unshaken testimony, corroborated by recovery of treated currency notes from Head Constable Prem Pal Singh at the appellant’s instance, and (ii) the match-box on which the appellant himself wrote the lawyer’s name and chamber for money delivery, duly seized and identified by independent witnesses PW3 and PW4. Rejecting the plea of non-examination of crucial witnesses, the Court relied on Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 2408, that a complainant is not an accomplice and his evidence can be acted upon without corroboration if credible. Minor contradictions, non-forensic examination of voice samples or failure to produce the audio cassette at the earliest were held to be investigative lapses not vitiating the trial, following State of Rajasthan v. Ramsarai, AIR 1964 SC 1361. The statutory presumption under Section 20 PC Act was held to have been rightly invoked and unrebutted.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR No. 95/2024 under Sections 498-A/406/34 IPC arising from matrimonial discord, invoking its inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) on the ground that the parties have fully settled their disputes through a Memorandum of Understanding dated 23.09.2025, culminating in mutual consent divorce on 18.12.2025 and a complete monetary settlement of Rs. 40 lakhs towards istridhan, alimony and maintenance, with daughter’s custody exclusively with respondent No.2 and no visitation rights to petitioners, and the complainant having expressly stated before the Court through video-conferencing, duly identified by counsel and Investigating Officer, that she does not wish to pursue the criminal proceedings, rendering continuation of prosecution an empty formality since the offence is essentially private in nature and involves no public interest or element of seriousness affecting society at large, following the principles laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 that the High Court can quash criminal proceedings where dispute is predominantly personal and compromise is genuine, voluntary and without coercion, ensuring that the settlement terms shall be binding on both sides and any breach would revive remedies in civil law.

JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

The High Court acquitted the appellant of offences under Sections 366/376/323 IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Applying the binding precedents in Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary (1982) 2 SCC 538 and Court on its Own Motion v. State of NCT (2024 SCC OnLine Del 4484), the Court treated the prosecutrix as having attained 16 years in November 2010 because radiological ossification reports have a two-year margin of error and statutory consent under the un-amended Section 375 IPC required sixteen years. The decisive consideration was the implausibility of forcible confinement or lack of consent when she admitted leaving Delhi voluntarily, resided with the appellant’s family for a month, moved alone outside the house, never sought help and no external injury was noted on medical examination. Further, the cousin “S” who accompanied them to the village was withheld, recovery witnesses denied the girl’s presence and the father delayed lodging the FIR; these anomalies entitled the appellant to the benefit of doubt under Article 20(1) of the Constitution, resulting in complete acquittal.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR No.590/2016 under Sections 498-A/406/34 IPC arising from matrimonial discord, exercising inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (erstwhile Section 482 CrPC), as the parties achieved complete settlement through mutual consent divorce on 15.10.2025 where respondent No.2 received Rs.4 lacs as full and final settlement for alimony, istridhan and maintenance, with Rs.2 lacs secured via FDR in their minor son's name while custody remains exclusively with the complainant-wife. The decisive consideration was that continuing criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose when the dispute is essentially private in nature devoid of public interest, particularly when the complainant expressly disavowed further prosecution after achieving comprehensive settlement. Following the principle in Nikhil Merchant v. CBI that criminal proceedings should be quashed when parties arrive at bona fide settlement in matrimonial disputes, and relying upon B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana which permits quashing to prevent abuse of process and secure ends of justice, the Court emphasized that such settlement must be voluntary, fair and complete. The Court recorded satisfaction that respondent No.2 appeared in person through counsel, confirmed settlement terms, and expressly consented to quashing, thereby rendering continuation of prosecution an empty formality.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR No. 586/2025 under Sections 109(1)/3(5) BNS (corresponding to Section 307/34 IPC) exercising inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 Cr.P.C.) after parties compromised, with respondent Monu receiving Rs. 6,00,000 compensation. The decisive factors were: (i) simple injuries on vital parts though initially charged under Section 118(1)/3(5) BNS (Section 324/34 IPC); (ii) private dispute lacking public interest where complainant refused to press charges; (iii) history of respondent's prior acquittal in petitioner's brother's murder case; (iv) petitioners' undertaking against future misconduct. Following Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 and Naushey Ali v. State of U.P. (2025) 4 SCC 78, the Court held that continuing non-compoundable proceedings would be futile when settlement demonstrates no meaningful purpose in prosecution, especially where justice requires considering compromise to prevent further hostility. Each petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 25,000 to Delhi High Court Staff Welfare Fund within two weeks, with proceedings against absconding co-accused Jaideep Kanojia (BAIL APPLN. 412/2026) also disposed of.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR No. 65/2021 under Sections 498-A/406/34 IPC and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, exercising inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS (formerly Section 482 CrPC), holding that continuation of criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose where parties have amicably settled their matrimonial disputes through mutual consent divorce. The decisive ground was that respondent No.2, who had initially lodged the complaint, voluntarily filed an affidavit stating she has no objection to quashing and has accepted Rs. 5 lakhs as full and final settlement towards alimony, istridhan and maintenance, with the balance Rs. 1.5 lakhs being paid through demand draft during proceedings. Following the principles laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Court held that where offences are essentially private in nature not involving public interest, and parties have genuinely settled their disputes, criminal proceedings can be quashed to secure ends of justice. The Court directed petitioners to deposit Rs. 20,000 with Delhi High Court Staff Welfare Fund within two weeks, emphasizing that since charges were yet to be framed and complainant does not wish to press charges, continuation would be an exercise in futility.

JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

The Delhi High Court held that a Tibetan refugee born in Dharamshala on 15.05.1966 is an Indian citizen by birth under Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, and consequently entitled to an Indian passport. The decisive ground was that the petitioner’s birth in India between 26.01.1950 and 01.07.1987 squarely satisfies the statutory criteria, with no disqualifications under Section 3(2) attracted. Rejecting the Union’s reliance on SRO 1108 of 1950 and the argument that holding an Identity Certificate amounts to renunciation under Section 9, the Court held that mere self-description as “Tibetan national” in administrative forms is legally inconsequential and does not constitute voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship under Section 9 or renunciation under Section 8. Following the binding precedent in Namgyal Dolkar v. Union of India (2010 SCC OnLine Del 4548), the Court reaffirmed that citizenship under Section 3(1)(a) is automatic and cannot be defeated by executive instructions or inter-ministerial minutes. The Swiss “passport for aliens” was held to be a mere travel document, not evidence of foreign nationality. The Court directed the respondents to issue the passport within four weeks, subject to usual formalities under the Passports Act, 1967.

JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

The Delhi High Court held that arbitral proceedings must be deferred pending adjudication of contempt petition CONT.CAS(C) 1744/2024 where respondent allegedly sold fifteen flats in violation of Section 9 injunction dated 02.06.2023, since compelling petitioner to proceed would force him to abandon specific performance claims and seek damages instead, thereby permitting respondent to enjoy fruits of contempt. The decisive ground was that prima facie findings of willful disobedience under Section 2(b) Contempt of Courts Act would irreversibly prejudice petitioner's substantive rights and evidence, following DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (1996) 4 SCC 622 which held contemners cannot benefit from their wrongdoing. Rejecting respondent's contention that deferment lacks statutory basis, the Court held that Article 226 jurisdiction permits intervention where bad faith conduct undermines arbitral fairness, citing Bhaven Constructions v. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 75 for the proposition that arbitration must be both fair and efficient. The Court directed that arbitral proceedings be stayed until contempt adjudication, with both parties to diligently prosecute CONT.CAS(C) 1744/2024 without unnecessary adjournments, while clarifying these observations shall not prejudice final contempt outcome.

JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

The Delhi High Court dismissed multiple writ petitions concerning Raj Vidya Kender (RVK), holding that disputes regarding internal management of societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The decisive ground was that Sections 3, 4, 12, 12A, 13, 14 and 19 of the Act confer no supervisory, adjudicatory or disciplinary powers upon the Registrar of Societies over internal affairs; the Registrar's role is limited to registration and maintaining annual returns. Rejecting the petitioner's allegations of fictitious membership, unauthorized property transfers and 22-year governance vacuum, the Court emphasized that such grievances raise disputed questions of fact requiring civil court adjudication, as expressly contemplated in Sections 13 and 14. Reliance was placed on Dinesh Kumar v. Registrar of Societies, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2814 and Supreme Court Bar Association v. Registrar of Societies, 2012:DHC:2422, which held that inter se disputes between members and management, validity of amendments, and challenges to elections cannot be resolved through writs or mandamus absent statutory duty. Consequently, the Court vacated the interim status quo on RVK properties and directed reconsideration of the impugned notice dated 30.07.2025 after affording proper hearing, leaving the petitioner to pursue civil remedies.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court quashed FIR No. 767/2022 registered at P.S. Govind Puri for offences under Sections 325/341/506/34 IPC and Section 3(i)(r) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, exercising inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The decisive consideration was the complete amicable settlement between the parties, evidenced by the complainant's affidavit dated 07.01.2026 and Memorandum of Understanding, wherein he unequivocally stated that the FIR was lodged due to misunderstanding, that all disputes have been settled, and that he has no grievance against any petitioner. While rejecting the State's implicit opposition through its mere presence, the Court emphasized that continuing criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose when the dispute is primarily private in nature and the complainant, who sustained grievous injuries, does not wish to press charges. Following the principles established in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, whereby the Supreme Court held that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process when parties have genuinely settled their disputes, especially in cases involving young offenders with no previous involvement, the Court directed quashing of the FIR subject to each petitioner depositing Rs. 5,000/- with the Delhi High Court Staff Welfare Fund within two weeks.

JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition directing Ramagundam Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd (RFCL) to refund Rs 47.50 lakhs forfeited as EMD-BG, holding that once the Appellate Authority of co-respondent Engineers India Ltd (EIL) revoked the three-year holiday-listing order dated 21.12.2016 vide order dated 26.05.2017, the sole allegation of submitting a forged GGEL experience certificate stood extinguished and the continued retention became arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Rejecting RFCL’s plea of independent forfeiture under GCC clause 36.8.1 and the objection of alternative arbitration remedy, the Court relied on ABL International Ltd v ECGC (2004) 3 SCC 553 and M.P. Power Management Co Ltd v Sky Power (2023) 2 SCC 703 to reiterate that writ jurisdiction inheres against State instrumentalities when action is arbitrary or suffers from breach of natural justice, and observed that the petitioner’s persistent representations since 2017 coupled with EIL’s own advice against retention negated any bar of laches; consequently RFCL was directed to refund the amount within four weeks.

JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

The Delhi High Court upheld the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports' recognition of the Indian Pickleball Association (IPA) as the National Sports Federation for pickleball, rejecting the All India Pickleball Association's challenge that IPA violated the National Sports Development Code of India, 2011. The decisive ground was that the Ministry's relaxation of Clauses 3.3 (three-year existence) and 3.10 (50% district-level affiliations) under Clause 16 of the 01.02.2021 notification was a valid policy decision for promoting nascent sports, distinguishing Rajasthan Equestrian Association v. Union of India (2025 SCC OnLine Del 14) as pre-dating the Division Bench's strict compliance directive in Rahul Mehra v. Union of India (2022 SCC OnLine Del 2438). The Court rejected arguments that exemptions were arbitrary, emphasizing that the Sports Code's non-statutory nature permits contextual flexibility for emerging sports, provided core governance principles (elections, transparency, age/tenure limits) are satisfied. Following Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India (1997 1 SCC 444), the Court held that relaxation power is reviewable but not interfered with unless manifestly unreasonable, noting IPA's superior compliance (26 state affiliations, Global Pickleball Federation alignment) versus petitioner's deficiencies. Recognition being annually renewable, the Court directed no interference but allowed future reappraisal by MYAS.

JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

The Delhi High Court dismissed both writ petitions filed by Satya Prakash Ravidas, holding that the issues raised regarding the authorization of advocates to represent Raj Vidya Kender (RVK) in CS(OS) 470/2019 and the alleged professional misconduct of Advocate Dr. Karnika Seth and others were res judicata and lacked merit. The decisive ground was that the question of authorization to institute the suit on behalf of RVK falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court seized of the matter, as previously held by a Coordinate Bench in W.P.(Crl) 3931/2024 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in SLP(Crl) Nos. 8151–8152/2025. The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the advocates acted without lawful authorization, noting that the Bar Council of Delhi had already dismissed Complaint Nos. 285/2023 and 146/2025 against the advocates for lack of professional misconduct. The Court emphasized that the petitioner had repeatedly suppressed material facts and abused the writ jurisdiction by re-litigating issues already decided by competent forums, including orders dated 08.02.2024, 05.03.2024, and 06.05.2024 in the civil suit, and the dismissal of his criminal writ petition and SLP. The petitions were dismissed with observations on the petitioner’s propensity for vexatious litigation.

JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

The Delhi High Court held that passport authorities must renew passports of persons facing criminal proceedings when competent courts have expressly permitted such renewal, rejecting the authorities' narrow interpretation that courts must specifically grant "permission to depart from India" under GSR 570(E) dated 25.08.1993. The decisive ground was the Supreme Court's authoritative ruling in Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India (2025 INSC 1476) which established that Section 6(2)(f) of the Passport Act, 1967 is subject to the exemption mechanism under Section 22 and GSR 570(E), and that courts' orders permitting passport renewal—even without using the exact phrase "permission to depart"—satisfy the notification's requirements when coupled with undertakings to appear before courts as required. The Court rejected the authorities' approach of treating Section 6(2)(f) as creating a near-permanent disability to hold passports, emphasizing that where courts retain control over foreign travel through bail conditions while permitting renewal, the statutory concern of securing accused persons' presence is adequately addressed. Applying these principles, the Court directed renewal of passports for petitioners in W.P.(C) 6612/2025, 1215/2025 and 3597/2025 for periods specified in respective court orders (ten years where specified, one year by default under GSR 570(E) where unspecified), while requiring the petitioner in W.P.(C) 701/2025 to first seek appropriate court permission since no such orders existed in his case.

JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

The Division Bench dismissed the appeals holding that the Supreme Court's order dated 08.05.2025 in Civil Appeal Nos. 10255-10256/2024 did not permit the appellants to file fresh applications under Order IX Rule 13 CPC after earlier such applications had been dismissed by the Single Judge and affirmed by the Division Bench; the decisive ground was that Paragraph 2 of the Supreme Court order expressly declined to interfere with the Division Bench judgment dismissing the earlier Order IX Rule 13 applications, while Paragraph 3 merely granted liberty to pursue "any other permissible proceedings" with benefit of Section 14 Limitation Act, 1963 for prior wrong forum, which the appellants misconstrued as license to re-agitate the identical remedy. Rejecting the contention that the Supreme Court's non-obstante clause in Paragraph 3 overrides Paragraph 2, the Court held that if the Supreme Court had intended a fresh hearing on Order IX Rule 13 it would have allowed the civil appeals and remanded the matter instead of affirming the Division Bench judgment. The principle applied is that once a statutory remedy under Order IX Rule 13 has been exhausted and finally rejected by the highest court in the hierarchy, the doctrine of merger and finality precludes its revival under the guise of fresh proceedings, and the appellants are relegated to remedies independent of Order IX Rule 13.

JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

The Delhi High Court quashed the IBBI's order suspending an insolvency professional for one year, holding the penalty disproportionate where his Authorisation for Assignment had already remained suspended for nearly a year owing to the Disciplinary Committee's inordinate, unexplained delay in disposing of the show-cause reply, a procedural lapse attracting the Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness. While Clause 25C r/w Circular IP/004/2018 mandates that support-service agencies raise invoices in their own name and receive payment directly, the Court accepted that no personal enrichment was established; the petitioner, holding 90% shareholding in Quantuum, merely disbursed the CoC-approved ₹2.85 lakh monthly to team members rather than through the corporate entity and disclosed the consolidated receipts in Forms CIRP-2 and III without protest from stakeholders, so the deviation related only to mode of disbursement. Citing Sandeep Kumar Bhatt v. IBBI, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2102, which emphasised proportionality and mitigation, the Court reduced the substantive suspension to the term already undergone and directed the registration to revive from the judgment date, leaving untouched the procedural finding of non-compliance.

JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

The Delhi High Court quashed the Sentence Review Board’s mechanical twelve-fold rejection of the convict’s bid under the 2004 remission policy, directing his immediate release after over 25 years in custody; the decisive ground is the Board’s irrational fixation on the irreversible heinousness of the 2003 rape-robbery while blanking the statutorily mandated trio of redeeming factors—loss of criminal propensity (evidenced by an official “nil” classification, spotless jail record, two-dozen flawless parole cycles), capacity for societal re-integration, and the family’s socio-economic plight—thereby breaching Article 14 and natural justice by issuing un-speaking cyclostyled orders. Reliance on irrebuttable gravity converts life to civil death, flouts the policy’s 25-year ceiling and the Laxman Naskar v Union of India (2000) 2 SCC 595 five-fold formula, and is invalid per Rajo v State of Bihar 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1068 and Satish @ Sabbe (2021) 14 SCC 580 which forbid perpetual exclusion once redemption is manifest. The Court, invoking Article 226 to stop the executive’s kafkaesque re-assessment charade, held that when incarceration exceeds the outer limit plus two decades of institutional reform, remission is the only just remedy.

JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

The Delhi High Court appointed a sole arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, holding that prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement suffices at the referral stage and rejecting objections based on unsigned agreement, non-compliance with pre-arbitral amicable settlement clause, and territorial jurisdiction. The Court found that since parties had acted on the Marketing Agreement dated 14.12.2021 and entered into a settlement, absence of signatures was inconsequential; Clause 13.1 requiring amicable settlement was merely directory, not mandatory, following Jhajharia Nirman Ltd. v. South Western Railways, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7133, which relied on Demerara Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. v. Demerara Distilleries Ltd. and Ravindra Kumar Verma v. BPTP Ltd.; and exclusive jurisdiction vested in Delhi courts once New Delhi was designated as seat and venue under Clause 13.2, per BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC, (2020) 4 SCC 234 and Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678. The Court emphasized the limited scope of Section 11 inquiry post In re: Interplay between Arbitration Agreements & Indian Stamp Act and SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, deferring frivolity and merit issues to the arbitral tribunal, and appointed Mr. Saurabh Seth, DIAC empanelled advocate, to adjudicate the Rs. 1.20 crore dispute under DIAC rules, keeping all rights and contentions open.

JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Section 11(6) petition holding that Clause 29 of the Purchase Order dated 08.02.2024 does not constitute a valid arbitration agreement, the decisive ground being the expression “Arbitrators, if needed” which renders the clause conditional and lacking consensus ad idem. Rejecting Winfra’s contention that the mere use of the word “arbitrators” suffices, the Court held that the clause first vests finality in the respondent’s Contracts Head and only tentatively envisages arbitration, thereby requiring fresh consent and negating a binding obligation. Applying the principles culled in BGM & M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1471, Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007) 5 SCC 719 and Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. IVRCL Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 1, the Court reiterated that an arbitration agreement must evince an unequivocal intention to refer present or future disputes to a private tribunal whose decision shall be binding; clauses contemplating future determination or using permissive language such as “if needed” or “if parties so determine” are merely agreements to agree and fall foul of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Consequently, no arbitrator can be appointed and the petition fails.

JUSTICE R. I. CHAGLA, JUSTICE ADVAIT M. SETHNA

The Bombay High Court quashed the Pune Municipal Corporation's 11 December 2025 promotion order denying petitioners elevation to Superintending Engineer, holding that the Departmental Promotion Committee's reliance on initial joining date rather than feeder-cadre seniority violated the mandatory "seniority-cum-merit" principle under Rule 4 of the 2014 Service Rules read with Government Resolution dated 1 August 2019. The decisive ground was that the final seniority list of 11 September 2024, which ranked the petitioners higher than private respondents in the Executive Engineer feeder cadre, had attained finality and could not be retrospectively disturbed by invoking the 7 May 2021 GR (struck down in State of Maharashtra v Vijay Ghogre) or non-statutory clarificatory letters dated 16 February 2019 and 21 February 2020, which lack executive instruction status as held in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra v State of Orissa. Rejecting the Corporation's plea of past mistake, the Court emphasised that crystallised seniority rights cannot be unsettled after years of acceptance, echoing Ved Prakash v State of Haryana and Union of India v C Jayaprakasan, and directed implementation of the 2024 list within two weeks, subject to the Supreme Court outcome in SLP 28306/2017 concerning reservation benefits.

JUSTICE AMIT BORKAR

The Bombay High Court quashed the order dated 26 April 2014 demanding deficit stamp duty of Rs.1.96 crores on a 2004 development agreement, holding it barred by limitation and passed without jurisdiction. The decisive ground was that Respondent No.3’s 2006 order rejecting the audit objection and recording that proper stamp duty had been paid attained finality under Section 32 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, creating a deeming fiction that the instrument was duly stamped; consequently, any revisional action under Section 53A had to be completed within six years from August 2006, whereas the impugned recovery order of April 2014 was ex facie time-barred. The Court rejected the State’s reliance on Section 33A, emphasising that the provision empowers only the Registering Officer who registered the document (here Respondent No.4) to impound post-registration, and Respondent No.3, being a different officer, lacked statutory competence. Following Sony Mony Electronics Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (WP 2757/2012) that both initiation and final order under Section 53A must fall within six years, and reiterating that fiscal statutes must be strictly construed, the Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the demand, and directed refund of the deposited amount with accrued interest.

JUSTICE MILIND N. JADHAV

The Bombay High Court held that a teacher's illegal termination after nine years of continuous service mandates reinstatement with full backwages, setting aside the School Tribunal's award of mere six-month compensation. The decisive ground was that the Management's termination dated 06.03.2019, effected retrospectively from 28.02.2019 without any departmental inquiry, show-cause notice, or charges, violated the mandatory provisions of Section 9 read with Section 5 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Act, 1977. Rejecting the Management's plea of temporary appointment, the Court found that continuous service, EPF registration, statutory duties as Board examiner, and unblemished record established permanency under the MEPS Rules. Following the Supreme Court's ratio in Constable Uma Shankaran v. Union of India (2026) that illegal termination entitles employees to full backwages when no alternate employment is shown, the Court directed reinstatement with 9% interest on backwages from 28.02.2019 till reinstatement, emphasizing that compensation cannot substitute for reinstatement where termination is stigmatized and procedurally flawed. The criminal complaint filed against the teacher was dismissed as vague and unsubstantiated, incapable of constituting special circumstances to deny reinstatement.

JUSTICE MILIND N. JADHAV

The Bombay High Court allowed the appeal and granted interim injunction restraining Defendants 19-20 from dealing with the suit land, holding that the trial court erred in rejecting Exhibit 5 application since plaintiffs had prima facie established their case under the twin agreements dated 10.02.2010 and 26.02.2013. The decisive ground was that despite Defendants 1-16 (original landowners) receiving Rs.3.12 crores from plaintiffs through banking channels over seven years (2013-2020) pursuant to the chain of agreements, they executed a tripartite agreement with Defendants 19-20 in 2023 without any due diligence, rendering the latter's claim of bona fide purchaser untenable. Rejecting the contention that the 2010 agreement was speculative as the land was merely anticipated, the Court held that CIDCO's 2007 letter and LOI clearly identified the property, and the subsequent MOU dated 26.02.2013 validly created third-party rights as permitted under the 2010 agreement. Distinguishing Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand (2025) which held that mere receipt of consideration cannot confer title without conveyance, the Court emphasized this was prima facie stage where bank statements proved substantial payments, balance of convenience favoured plaintiffs who faced irreparable loss, and Defendants 19-20 failed to establish their bona fides despite executing tripartite agreement within five months of lease deed. The status quo order was continued till suit disposal.

JUSTICE AMIT BORKAR

The Bombay High Court quashed the orders permitting registration of a cooperative society at the developer’s instance, holding that the Assistant Registrar created a fait accompli by allowing the later proposal to open a bank account while the petitioner-flat purchasers’ prior application under the first proviso to Section 10(1) of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 was pending, and then relying on that very step to reject the earlier claim, thereby violating the principles of natural justice and fair adjudication. The decisive ground was that once the authority was apprised of the petitioner’s 12 March 2025 proposal, it was bound to decide it on merits before entertaining any subsequent proposal; instead, it permitted consequential steps that rendered the statutory remedy of the purchasers nugatory. The Court rejected the developer’s plea of majority support and initial right under Sections 10-11, emphasising that the proviso confers an independent substantive right on purchasers upon promoter’s default, which cannot be defeated by allowing preliminary formalities to be completed behind their back. Applying the ratio of Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56, the Court directed the District Deputy Registrar to restore Application No. 36/2025, conduct a de novo inquiry into competing claims, verify signatures, ascertain genuine flat purchasers, determine the correct extent of 26,000 sq m land, and pass a reasoned order within eight weeks, while freezing the bank account opened on 9 June 2025 and initiating disciplinary proceedings against the Assistant Registrar for possible abuse of quasi-judicial power.

JUSTICE AMIT BORKAR

The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging membership grant to respondents, holding that statutory directions under Section 79A Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act prevail over contractual lease conditions. The decisive ground was that while the 1963 lease required prior written consent and payment of lease premium as conditions precedent to transfer, these contractual stipulations must yield to statutory ceilings on transfer charges fixed under Section 79A. The Court rejected the society's contention that respondents breached Clause 14 by executing assignment without prior NOC, reasoning that the society's 05 April 2013 communication merely outlined conditional formalities without granting unconditional consent. Following Mont Blanc Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2007) which established that societies cannot demand premium exceeding statutory limits, the Court held that amounts claimed beyond Section 79A ceiling cannot constitute "dues" under Section 154B-1(12). The revisional authority correctly found that respondents had complied with documentary requirements and tendered statutory-compliant fees, thus satisfying Section 154B-7 conditions. The proviso to Section 154B-7 does not permit lease terms inconsistent with statutory directions. The petition was dismissed as authorities acted within jurisdiction in directing membership after verifying compliance with statutory dues and formalities.

JUSTICE SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN

The Bombay High Court set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, holding that the tribunal's finding of Rs 48 lakhs cash investment by respondent Sachde was based on incoherent voice recordings that evidenced only rampant cash dealings, not any specific investment, rendering the award perverse and contrary to public policy. The decisive ground was that enforcing a partnership operating entirely through parallel cash economy and unreliable triple-book keeping would violate the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio and the Supreme Court's rulings in Narayanamma v. Govindappa (2019) 19 SCC 42, Kedar Nath Motani v. Prahlad Rai 1959 SCC OnLine SC 16 and Immani Appa Rao v. Gollapalli Ramalingamurthi (1962) 3 SCR 739 that courts must refuse active assistance to claims rooted in illegal transactions where both parties are pari delicto. The Court rejected the tribunal's acceptance of the MOU's Rs 1.17 crore minimum liability and its acceptance of incoherent transcripts as proof of cash contribution, directed no costs considering mutual illicit conduct, and held that the award's enforcement would outrage basic notions of justice and morality by legitimising a business model that completely evaded statutory accounting and tax obligations.

JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE URMILA SACHIN JOSHI- PHALKE

The Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court quashed criminal proceedings against the applicant-director under Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, holding that vicarious liability under Section 49(1)(a)(ii) Legal Metrology Act, 2009 is not attracted absent specific averments that he was “in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business.” The decisive ground was the complaint’s failure to (i) array the company as an accused, (ii) allege the applicant’s role in day-to-day affairs, and (iii) record the magistrate’s prima facie satisfaction before issuing process, rendering the summons void. Rejecting the State’s bald plea that directorship per se suffices, the Court emphasised that criminal law cannot be set in motion on vague allegations and the complainant must expressly invoke the vicarious-liability clause. Following Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 and Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Food Inspector, (2011) 1 SCC 176, it reiterated that a magistrate must apply mind and spell out how the director is personally liable; mere nomenclature without managerial control is inadequate. Consequently, Summary Criminal Case No.1129/2015 and all subsequent orders against the applicant were quashed, liberating him from prosecution.

JUSTICE SHREERAM VINAYAK SHIRSAT

The Bombay High Court partly allowed the appeal, confirming conviction under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC but acquitting the appellants under Section 504 IPC and Section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act, 2003. The decisive ground was that the injured victim’s testimony, corroborated by medical evidence and consistent eyewitness accounts, established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants assaulted the minor with an iron rod. The Court rejected the defence of false implication due to property disputes and held that minor discrepancies in timing did not discredit the natural testimony of witnesses. Applying Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. and Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, the Court emphasised that an injured witness’s evidence carries a built-in guarantee of presence and reliability. It further held that the isolated assault, though involving a child, lacked the sustained cruelty or exploitative intent required to constitute “child abuse” under Section 2(m)(i) read with Section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act. While maintaining conviction under Section 324 IPC, the Court directed the Children’s Court to consider grant of probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, in light of the appellants being first-time offenders and the incident being a solitary one.

JUSTICE JITENDRA SHANTILAL JAIN

The Bombay High Court dismissed the interim application seeking condonation of 645-day delay in filing review petition against disposal of First Appeal No.1106/2018, holding that the explanations tendered constitute mere excuses devoid of “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The decisive ground is that Article 124 prescribes a mandatory 30-day period for review; vague assertions of searching for trust-law expertise, summer vacation, family wedding and belated settlement efforts (first letter issued only after expiry of one year) are unsupported by documents and fail to explain how each day of delay beyond 30 was unavoidable. The Court rejected the contention that 20-year pendency of the main appeal relativises post-judgment delay, emphasised that legislative fixation of 30 days already accounts for consultation time, and held that the purported importance of the question of law (remand under Order XLI Rule 23A CPC versus Section 70 Maharashtra Public Trusts Act) rather militates against laches. Relying on Shivamma (Dead) By LRs. v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, which reiterates that “sufficient cause” must be cogent and not a make-believe narrative, the Court concluded the application discloses no cause and consequently dismissed the review petition as non-surviving.

JUSTICE SANDEEP V. MARNE

The Supreme Court held that a notice invoking arbitration need only intimate that disputes will be referred to arbitration and cannot be quashed merely because it does not expressly call upon the borrower to join in appointing the arbitrator. The decisive plank is that Section 21 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act is procedural and not jurisdictional; once the lender communicated on 27 May 2025 that the debt dispute “shall be referred to arbitration,” arbitral proceedings validly commenced and limitation began to run. The Court rejected the borrowers’ plea that commencement of SARFAESI enforcement barred recourse to arbitration, distinguishing Vidya Drolia which applies only to institutions notified under the Recovery of Debts Act. Following BGS-SGS-Soma JV v. NHPC (2020) 4 SCC 234, the clause stipulating that arbitration “be held in Mumbai/Delhi/Kolkata/Chennai” at the lender’s choice designates those cities as exclusive seats; therefore this Court has territorial competence under Section 11. Consequently the Court appointed Ms. Pooja Khandeparkar, Advocate, as sole arbitrator and granted ad-interim Section 9 injunction restraining the borrowers from alienating the mortgaged Raipur land and directing demarcation with a Court Receiver, holding that inability to identify the security owing to amalgamation constituted a prima facie case of irreparable harm.

JUSTICE MADHAV J. JAMDAR

The Bombay High Court rejected the Court Receiver's application for discharge under Rule 596 of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1980, holding that the Receiver's appointment dated 10th March 2025 was merely conditional upon the petitioner's failure to vacate premises by 10th March 2026, not an immediate appointment triggering compliance obligations. The decisive ground was that Rule 596 and the Administrative Judges' Committee decision of 28th June 2013 (clauses a-b) mandating service of certified order copies and matter lodgement within specified periods apply only after actual appointment, which occurs only if the contingency materialises. The Court reasoned that since the Receiver's appointment was expressly made contingent upon non-vacation after 10th March 2026, the petitioner might still comply, rendering appointment unnecessary, and thus procedural compliance under Rule 596 would be required only if and when the Receiver is actually appointed. Rejecting the Receiver's contention that non-lodgement entitled him to seek discharge with costs of Rs.5,000, the Court emphasised that premature invocation of discharge provisions would defeat the conditional nature of the appointment order. Consequently, the Receiver's Report No.33 of 2025 was disposed of as withdrawn with no order as to costs, clarifying that Rule 596 obligations crystallise only upon actual appointment after the specified date.

JUSTICE MADHAV J. JAMDAR

The Bombay High Court dismissed the anticipatory bail application under Section 438 CrPC, holding that Pranay Mehta, former Assistant Manager of Ashtavinayak Investment Company, was prima facie complicit in a ₹75 crore fraud involving illegal loan sanctions and money laundering. The decisive ground was the recovery of ₹8.33 crores in his personal account from 17 investors, his continued role post-employment in luring investors, and acquisition of five luxury vehicles after FIR registration, evidencing active concealment and benefit from proceeds of crime. Rejecting his victimhood plea, the Court found his conduct consistent with Section 420 IPC read with Section 3 of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors Act, 1999, and noted his absconding status obstructed investigation. Applying the eight-factor test from Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, the Court emphasised gravity, pre-planning, and risk of evidence tampering. Reliance was placed on Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 730 to deny pre-arrest bail to absconding accused, and Nikita Jagganath Shetty v. State of Maharashtra (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1489, reiterating that anticipatory bail is an exceptional remedy not to be granted in serious economic offences where custodial interrogation is imperative to trace laundered assets.

JUSTICE R. I. CHAGLA

The Bombay High Court quashed the bifurcation order dated 3-11-2018 and the deemed conveyance dated 5-11-2020, holding that the State’s exemption under Section 7 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 to form “Jay Anand Bungalow CHS” with only three members was ultra vires once the original society had already received deemed conveyance of the entire plot on 27-5-2016; Section 7 applies only to registration of new societies, not to fragmentation of an existing society, and the competent authority ought to have proceeded under Section 157 which mandates hearing the society concerned, rendering the 8-12-2017 exemption void for breach of audi alteram partem and non-compliance with the 10-3-1995 notification requiring minimum ten flats not exceeding 700 sq ft and nil balance FSI. Consequently the bifurcation under Section 18 read with Section 17, lacking the prerequisite exemption and the requisite three-fourths majority resolution or proof of public interest, was without jurisdiction; the deemed conveyance granted thereafter under Section 11(3) of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 to the splinter group was equally unsustainable as the authority’s jurisdiction extinguished once conveyance in favour of the original society was executed. The Court rejected the plea of concurrent remedy and contempt, finding the development agreement expressly excluded the disputed 330.30 sq m from FSI calculation, and allowed both writ petitions, setting aside the impugned orders and restoring the society’s undivided title.

JUSTICE RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, JUSTICE ABHAY J. MANTRI

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition directing the college management to forthwith forward the pension papers with a No Dues Certificate and gratuity with 10% interest, holding that withholding pension on the basis of an un-adjudicated demand after three years of retirement violates the constitutional guarantee under Article 300-A. The decisive ground is that pension is not a bounty but a vested right crystallising into property, which cannot be extinguished without due process; the management’s belated claim of Rs 2,49,016/- for delayed submission of 2015-16 examination bills was never put to the petitioner through a charge-sheet or inquiry, rendering the denial of No Dues Certificate arbitrary. Rejecting the plea that the trust is not “State” under Article 12, the Court emphasised that even private managements must respect the procedural safeguards implicit in Article 300-A before depriving an employee of retirement benefits. Reliance is placed on State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava (SLP (C) 1427/2009, 14-08-2013) where the Supreme Court declared pension to be property and recovery impermissible without a speaking order after reasonable opportunity. Consequently, the impugned demand letters dated 2-5-2022 and 21-7-2022 are quashed, and Respondents 5-6 are mandated to submit the pension and gratuity proposals within 21 days, which Respondents 2-3 shall clear within 30 days thereafter.

JUSTICE N. J. JAMADAR

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petitions under Article 227, quashing the Executing Court's orders that froze compensation awarded under Section 28A(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 solely because respondents Nos. 2–5 belatedly disputed the petitioner's status as daughter of Pandu @ Pandurang Patil. The decisive ground is that a Reference Court has jurisdiction limited to the specific matter referred under Sections 18 or 30, and the Collector having never referred apportionment, the executing forum could not require a fresh civil suit; moreover the respondents' unqualified admissions in land-reference pleadings and joint heirship applications executed in 2008 amount to judicial admissions precluding them from later impeaching the petitioner's title. The Court rejected the argument that P. K. Sreekantan (2006) justified relegation as the ratio demands a prior Section 30 reference whereas here the dispute arose only after deposit. Applying the principle from Pramatha Nath Mullick that jurisdiction is confined to the objection actually referred and relying on Madan v. State of Maharashtra distinguishing Sections 18 and 30 circumstances, Justice Jamadar held that the inordinate delay and mala-fide denial of succession after five years of inaction should not prejudice an octogenarian claimant and invoked its plenary writ power under Maharashtra Chess Association v. Union of India to direct immediate release of 50 % of the enhanced compensation to the petitioner on indemnity bond and nationalised-bank guarantee, while clarifying that the civil suit filed later will be decided de novo on merits.

JUSTICE RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, JUSTICE ABHAY J. MANTRI

The Bombay High Court held that a permanently paralyzed teacher is entitled to 6th Pay Commission pension benefits, quashing BMC's rejection dated 13.11.2019. The decisive ground was that the petitioner, on approved leave from 24.03.2004 till voluntary retirement on 05.08.2008, could not be branded “absent” under Clause 13(2) of the 30.09.2011 circular which requires conjunctive reading of “suspended and absent” (र्वी). Rejecting BMC’s plea that leave without pay from 12.01.2006 disentitled her, the Court held that sanctioned leave, whether with or without wages, is not absence; the circular, issued post-retirement, is prospective and cannot govern past service. Applying the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, the Court emphasised empathetic treatment of employees who acquire disability while in service. Precedents on beneficial construction of pension rules and disability rights were invoked. Directions: (i) BMC shall submit pension proposal within one month; (ii) State shall compute and disburse pension under 6th Pay Commission within one month thereafter; (iii) arrears from 05.08.2008 shall carry 5% simple interest; (iv) gratuity shall be refixed with statutory 10% interest; (v) payments after set-off of 5th Pay Commission amounts already drawn.

JUSTICE RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, JUSTICE ABHAY J. MANTRI

The Bombay High Court quashed the petitioner's disqualification from CISF recruitment on the ground of 'subtle lisp', holding that the 2015 Guidelines for Recruitment Medical Examination in CAPFs and Assam Rifles disqualify only "stammering" and expressly list "slight stammering" as a minor acceptable defect after 4-5 sentences, whereas "subtle lisp" is not enumerated as a disqualifying condition. The decisive reasoning was that while Clause 5(d) mandates speech without impediment and prohibits stammering, Clause 7(f) treats slight stammering as acceptable, and since the undisputed medical finding confirmed the petitioner suffers from a mere articulation disorder affecting S/Z pronunciation without stammering, no guideline prohibition applied. The Court rejected the respondents' contention that effective command necessitates disqualification, emphasising that the petitioner is otherwise able-bodied and future promotional medical assessment can evaluate speech efficacy when actual command duties arise. Following the principle that exclusionary conditions must be strictly construed in employment matters, the Court directed the authorities to permit the petitioner to undergo remaining selection rounds while clarifying that he may pursue speech therapy and that the Forces retain liberty to medically re-evaluate if command responsibilities subsequently necessitate clear articulation.

JUSTICE KAMAL KHATA

The Bombay High Court dismissed the defendants' application for a preliminary decree under Order XXXIV Rule 7 CPC, holding that capitalized interest assumes the character of principal and that contractual interest at 21% per annum must be enforced in this commercial mortgage foreclosure suit. The decisive ground was that the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India v. Ravindra (2002) 1 SCC 367 unequivocally held that "interest once capitalized, sheds its colour of being interest and becomes a part of the principal," thereby overruling Union Bank of India v. Dalpat Upadyay AIR 1992 Bom 482 to the extent it suggested otherwise. Rejecting the defendants' plea for discretionary reduction of interest under Order XXXIV Rule 11, the Court emphasized that such discretion must be exercised sparingly and that commercial bargains between arm's length parties must be enforced according to their terms, especially where the defendants, guarantors to a high-risk borrower rated CARE 'C', have engaged in dilatory tactics for over a decade while prime Juhu property appreciates. The Court granted decree on admission for Rs.44,05,62,418/- with contractual interest, restrained alienation of the mortgaged property, and directed payment within four weeks, holding that equitable relief is unavailable to parties who neither discharged principal nor serviced interest for ten years.

JUSTICE GAURANG KANTH

The Calcutta High Court (Commercial Division) allowed the Section 9 petition holding that prima facie the subsequent disbursements of ₹2.93 crore were traceable to the 25.07.2023 Facility Agreement whose arbitration clause (Clause 15.1) therefore governs the dispute, and ordered respondents 1-3 to maintain a joint balance of that amount in their PNB accounts. The decisive ground was that the agreement envisaged multiple tranches against buyer invoices, the admitted repayments in AP (Com.) 39/2023 did not conclusively establish novation, and in the absence of any fresh written contract the characterisation of later advances as either restructuring or independent transactions raised triable issues exclusively for the arbitral tribunal. Rejecting the contention that the loan account closure extinguished the arbitration agreement, the Court observed that under Section 9 it need only satisfy itself of a live arbitration clause and likelihood of rendering the award nugatory without security, principles reiterated in Sundaram Finance v. Abdul Samad (2018) 3 SCC 622 and ICICI Bank v. SIDCO Leathers (2021) 2 CHN 713. Observations are prima facie, liberty to seek variation before the tribunal is reserved, and petitioner is directed to forthwith constitute the arbitral tribunal and intimate this judgment to the branch manager.

JUSTICE DEBANGSU BASAK, JUSTICE MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI

The Division Bench set aside the arbitral award dated 17-09-2023 and the single-judge order rejecting the Section 34 petition on the ground that the Managing Director of Bihar State Power Generation Company Ltd. and the Chairman of Bihar State Power Holding Company Ltd., against whom the award was made, were neither parties to the arbitration agreement nor disclosed principals under Section 230 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Court held that a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013 is a juristic person distinct from its officers, and contracts must be enforced against the corporate entity in its registered name; consequently, the individual officials cannot be subjected to arbitration or liability for corporate breaches. Distinguishing Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasia (2022) 2 SCC 355 and OPG Power Generation Pvt. Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. (2025) 2 SCC 417, the Bench ruled that the former dealt with criminal complaint nomenclature under the Negotiable Instruments Act and the latter with non-signatory group-companies, neither sanctioning imposition of award on mere agents of a fully disclosed principal. Absent consent to arbitrate or any basis to pierce the corporate veil, the reference and resultant award were coram non judice and are quashed; the appeal is allowed without costs.

JUSTICE KAUSIK CHANDA

The High Court dismissed the revenue's review application holding that a Senior Joint Commissioner cannot invoke Section 85 suo motu revisional power against an order passed under Section 86 by a Joint Commissioner, both exercising delegated authority from the Commissioner under the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The decisive ground was that once revisional jurisdiction under Section 86 is exercised by a delegatee, the order assumes the character of the Commissioner himself and cannot be treated as an order of a subordinate officer under Section 6(1) amenable to further revision under Section 85, as this would create an impermissible cycle of successive revisions. Rejecting the revenue's contention that administrative hierarchy between Joint and Senior Joint Commissioners justifies re-revision, the Court emphasized that both officers derive power from the same source and one delegatee cannot revise another's order rendered on behalf of the Commissioner. Relying on Ashwin Industries v. Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Baroda (1979 SCC OnLine Guj 93), where the Gujarat High Court held that revisional power once exercised by a delegatee is exhausted and cannot be reinvoked, the Court affirmed that the only remedies against an order under Section 86 are rectification or recourse to the Appellate and Revisional Board under Section 87, while clarifying that dismissal of the review does not preclude the revenue from pursuing other legal remedies against the January 7, 2015 order.

JUSTICE DEBANGSU BASAK, JUSTICE MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI

The Division Bench set aside the single judge's order granting NOC to respondent under Section 634 of the Companies Act, 1956, holding that the executing court lacked jurisdiction to decide debt satisfaction when proceedings under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RDDBFI Act) were pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) and Section 13(2) notice under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) had been issued; relying on Punjab & Sind Bank v. Frontline Corporation Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine SC 470) which bars civil court jurisdiction over matters cognizable by DRT, and Pegasus Assets Reconstruction P. Ltd. v. Haryana Concast Ltd. (2016) 4 SCC 47 which establishes SARFAESI Act primacy over Companies Act, 1956, the Court ruled that whether respondent paid ₹8.22 crores under the January 14, 2009 sanctioned scheme must be determined by DRT in OA 86/2005, not by executing court, since Sections 18 and 34 RDDBFI Act and Section 34 SARFAESI Act oust civil jurisdiction where secured creditor can enforce rights; consequently appeal allowed, impugned judgment set aside, and parties left to pursue remedies before DRT.

JUSTICE DEBANGSU BASAK, JUSTICE MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal against refusal of interim protection, holding that guarantors cannot claim discharge under Section 139 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 merely because the liquidator, acting under Section 35(1)(k) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, withdrew suit MS 35 of 2019 pursuant to a Stakeholders Consultation Committee resolution. The decisive ground was that the corporate debtor’s liquidation under the Code does not extinguish or reduce guarantors’ independent liability; their right to step into the corporate debtor’s shoes is not self-executing and cannot be asserted through a suit seeking injunction against the liquidator’s statutory conduct. The Court rejected the contention that the withdrawal, allegedly engineered by creditor-banks, constituted bad faith impairment of securities, distinguishing Sardar Kahn Singh v. Tek Chand Nanda (1968 SCC Online J&K 4) and State Bank of Saurashtra v. Chitranjan Ranganath Raja (1980) 4 SCC 516 as decided on final facts without considering the IBC interplay. Observing that any grievance against the liquidator’s compliance with the Committee decision must be agitated before the NCLT where liquidation proceedings are pending, the Bench found no prima facie case warranting interference with the single Judge’s discretionary refusal of interim relief, and dismissed APOT/330/2025 without costs.

JUSTICE RAVI KRISHAN KAPUR

The Calcutta High Court set aside the Deputy Controller's rejection of Topotarget's patent application for an HDAC cancer composition under sections 15, 25(1) and 3(d), holding the order vitiated by non-application of mind and hindsight reconstruction; the decisive flaw was the Controller mechanically endorsing the Examiner's view without independently analysing the invention as a multi-component pharmaceutical composition comprising PXD-101 with arginine/meglumine as basic in situ salt formers that unexpectedly enhanced both solubility and dilution stability, treating it instead as a new form of a known substance under section 3(d) sans therapeutic efficacy analysis. Rejecting the Controller's reliance on nine prior arts never cited in the FER and cobbled together for the first time in the hearing notice, the Court emphasised that D1-D9 neither disclose nor suggest the specific combination nor teach away from its synergistic advantages; reliance on Novartis AG v Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1 for strict section 3(d) scrutiny was misplaced since the claims concern a composition, not a derivative of PXD-101. The judgment clarified that section 10(4) does not demand exemplification of every embodiment and that obviousness must rest on a coherent technical thread, not hindsight selection. Following Groz-Beckert KG v Union 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 111 and Guangdong Oppo 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 6650, the matter was remanded to a fresh Controller for de novo adjudication within three months without expressing on merits.

JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL)

The Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the Hindustan Steel Provident Fund Trust possesses locus standi to espouse its members’ claim for higher pension under the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995. The decisive ground is that rejection of joint-option applications dated 05.02.2025 by EPFO was premised solely on the Trust’s un-amended internal rules capping pensionable salary, thereby directly stigmatising the Trust and impairing its statutory duty under Section 17(1) of the EPF Act, 1952 to administer exempted fund benefits; this constitutes an aggrieved status. The Court rejected the objection that only individual employees or the establishment could maintain the writ, emphasising that procedural rigour must yield to substantive justice where a trustee discharges exempted obligations and members’ benefits are thwarted by reference to the Trust’s own rules. Relying on Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund (1976) 3 SCC 607 for liberal locus standi in matters of public concern and Krishna Kumar Agarwala v. Kelvin Jute 2002 SCC OnLine Cal 901 (trustees responsible for statutory discharge are aggrieved), the Court quashed the impugned order and directed EPFO to accept all joint options submitted by 31.01.2025, permit remittance of differential contribution with interest, and disburse higher pension from the succeeding month, placing exempted employees on par with those in WPA 15459/2025.

JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL)

The Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the Board of Trustees, Durgapur Steel Plant Provident Fund Trust, holding that the Trust possesses the requisite locus standi to espouse the cause of its members whose joint option applications for higher pension under the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995 were rejected by the EPFO on 27.02.2025 solely on the ground that the Trust’s un-amended rules contained a wage cap. The decisive ground is that the rejection order imputes a statutory failure to the Trust by attributing the denial of higher pension to the internal rule cap, thereby directly stigmatising the Trust and impeding its statutory duty under Section 17(1) of the Employees’ Provident Funds Act, 1952 to administer an exempted fund in harmony with the Supreme Court’s mandate in EPFO v. Sunil Kumar B., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1521. Rejecting the EPFO’s hyper-technical plea that only the employer-employee duo can agitate the grievance, the Court invoked the principle crystallised in Union of India v. Jyoti Chit Fund, (1976) 3 SCC 607 that processual rigours must yield where public authorities shift blame onto statutory trusts, and followed Krishna Kumar Agarwala v. Kelvin Jute Co., 2002 SCC OnLine Cal 901 which recognised trustees as persons aggrieved when denial of benefits is traced to trust rules. Consequently, the impugned order dated 27.02.2025 is quashed; all joint option forms submitted on or before 31.01.2025 are to be accepted; and higher pension shall be disbursed upon remittance of differential contributions with applicable interest.

JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL)

The Calcutta High Court quashed the PF Authority’s 28.02.2025 order rejecting joint-option claims for higher pension under EPS-95, holding that the Board of Trustees of an exempted establishment under Section 17(1) of the PF Act, 1952 possesses locus standi to espouse its members’ cause since the rejection was premised solely on the Trust’s un-amended rules, thereby directly stigmatising the Trust. Distinguishing the EPFO’s plea that only the employer-employee duo can agitate pension disputes, the Court applied Jyoti Chit Fund (1976) 3 SCC 607 and Kelvin Jute 2002 SCC OnLine Cal 901: where trustees discharge statutory duties over an recognised fund, procedural technicality must yield to substantive justice and the trustees are “persons aggrieved” when their rules are invoked to defeat members’ rights. Following the Supreme Court’s matrix in Sunil Kumar B. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1521, the Court directed the EPFO to accept all joint options submitted up to 31.01.2025 and, upon remittance of differential contribution with interest, disburse higher pension from the succeeding month, equating exempted and un-exempted establishments for EPS purposes.

JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA ROY

The Calcutta High Court allowed the defendant's application under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC seeking extension to file written statement, holding that the application filed on the 109th-110th day was within the 120-day mandate and the Court retained jurisdiction. The decisive ground was that procedural rigor must yield to substantive rights, as filing written statement is a valuable right rooted in natural justice principles that cannot be forfeited for procedural laches when sufficient cause is demonstrated. Rejecting the plaintiff's contention of functus officio, the Court distinguished Veeline Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (where application was filed beyond 120 days) and held that pendency of the extension application within the statutory period preserves the Court's power to grant relief. The Court found the defendant's explanation of delay bona fide and diligent, particularly noting the pending revocation application under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent which expressly preserved the defendant's right to file written statement without prejudice. Following the principle that substantive rights override procedural technicalities, the Court permitted filing subject to Rs.20,000 costs payable to State Legal Services Authority within one week, with liberty to file by the next day and clear direction that non-payment would render the suit undefended, thereby balancing the plaintiff's interest with the defendant's fundamental right to defend.

JUSTICE GAURANG KANTH

The High Court dismissed the Section 34 petition, holding that the arbitral award of Rs 20,41,495/- for breach of jute supply contracts was neither perverse nor patently illegal, and fell within the narrow scrutiny permitted by Section 34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. Gaurang Kanth J. found the arbitrator reasonably computed damages by taking the market price four months post-breach, consistent with Section 73 Contract Act, after finding that immediate resale of the unsold 5,152 quintals was unfeasible for a State agency. The decisive ground was that assessment of loss is not immutable as of breach-date but may reflect a reasonable mitigation period when prompt disposal is commercially impracticable. The Court rejected the plea that assessment must rigidly follow Muralidhar Chiranjilal (1961 SCC 100) or H.J. Baker (2023) 9 SCC 424, explaining those precedents applied to suits, not to the limited supervisory jurisdiction under Section 34, and distinguished Sitaram Srigopal (1979) 4 SCC 351 where no reliable contemporaneous market data existed. It observed Clause 12.1 independently entitled JCI to recover damages irrespective of security deposit forfeiture, storage costs at Rs 25/quintal/month were contractually stipulated, and the difference of Rs 165/quintal (contract minus four-month market) plus carrying charges reflected a plausible, evidence-based methodology which courts cannot re-appreciate once two interpretations are possible: Delhi Airport Metro 2022 (1) SCC 131; Reliance Infra 2024 (1) SCC 479; OPG Power 2025 (2) SCC 417. Accordingly, the award with 10% post-award interest was upheld.

JUSTICE GAURANG KANTH

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the Section 34 petition and upheld the arbitral award holding Premium Agro liable for Rs 12,58,746 plus interest for repudiating two jute-supply contracts, the decisive ground being that the arbitrator’s loss-computation four months post-breach at Rs 165/quintal differential plus contractual storage charges of Rs 25/quintal/month was a plausible, evidence-based estimate consistent with Section 73 Contract Act and Clause 12.1 of the agreements, and did not suffer patent illegality. Rejecting the plea that damages must be fixed strictly at the 08-11-2006 market rate, the Court held that immediate resale was commercially impossible for a State agency, four months was a reasonable mitigation period, and the Jute Balers Association price list furnished contemporaneous data; thus the award neither re-wrote the contract nor offended public policy. Following Delhi Airport Metro Express 2022 1 SCC 131, Reliance Infrastructure 2024 1 SCC 479 and OPG Power 2025 2 SCC 417, the Court reiterated that Section 34 jurisdiction is supervisory, not appellate, and an arbitrator’s reasonable view on facts or law cannot be interfered with merely because another view is conceivable; Muralidhar Chiranjilal 1961 Supp 1 SCR 680 and Sitaram Srigopal (1979) 4 SCC 351, arising from plenary civil appeals, were distinguished.

JUSTICE MD. SHABBAR RASHIDI, JUSTICE DEBANGSU BASAK

The Division Bench set aside the trial court's decree holding Amazon jointly liable with Kuehne & Nagel for brokerage dues, ruling that no concluded contract ever arose between Amazon and Pioneer Property Management under Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The decisive ground was that the Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement, though negotiated and signed by Pioneer, was never executed by Amazon; acceptance was neither communicated nor completed, negating the trial judge’s inference of deemed acceptance from silence. Rejecting the argument that Kuehne & Nagel acted as Amazon’s agent, the Court construed the Master Service Agreement as establishing an independent principal-to-principal relationship, fortified by Clause 4’s indemnity and Clause 6’s express negation of agency, and held that Pioneer dealt with K&N as an autonomous service provider. Applying the maxim consensus ad idem and the precedent that unsigned documents intended to be signed cannot bind parties, the Court held Amazon owed no brokerage or damages. Consequently, it allowed AD-COM 8 of 2024, set aside the impugned judgment, and directed that no costs shall follow; connected applications stand disposed of.

JUSTICE RAVI KRISHAN KAPUR

The High Court dismissed the State's applications for extension of time to pay arbitral award interest, holding that the default clause in its 21 April 2025 order had indisputably triggered when payment was made 7 months late on 17 December 2025. The decisive ground was that the State, having consciously taken a calculated risk by not meeting the 30 May 2025 deadline, could not now seek modification under Chapter 38 Rule 46 of the Original Side Rules when the concession expressly provided for 15% interest from 8 September 2021 upon default. Rejecting the State's plea for discretionary relief, the Court emphasized that an award of Rs.1.25 crores (Rs.1.38 crores in EC/133/2012) made in 2009 had already ballooned to over Rs.6.5 crores through the State's "commercially imprudent" delay, noting that interest constitutes the lifeline of commercial transactions and astronomical rates of 15-24% reflect the premium on time value. Following Periyakkal v. Dakshyani (1983) 2 SCC 127 and Compack Enterprises v. Beant Singh (2021) 3 SCC 702, the Court held that modification cannot be granted for the mere asking when no cause exists, while directing that copies be served on the Advocate General to apprise how public funds are being frittered away through such litigation strategy.

JUSTICE RAVI KRISHAN KAPUR

The High Court dismissed the State's applications for modification/extension of time, holding that the seven-month delay in paying Rs.52,86,219/- (and Rs.60,58,506/- in the companion case) triggered the default clause in its April 2025 order, requiring compound interest at 15% on the interest component from 8 September 2021 till actual payment; the Court refused to exercise discretion under Chapter 38 Rule 46 of the Original Side Rules once the concession stood withdrawn, emphasising that an original arbitral award of Rs.1.25 crores (2009) has already cost the exchequer over Rs.6 crores and may escalate further. Rejecting the plea for extension without adequate cause, the Court reinforced the principle that in commercial matters interest is as valuable as principal and the State cannot fritter public funds through deliberate procrastination, citing Compack Enterprises (India) (P) Ltd. v. Beant Singh (2021) 3 SCC 702 for the proposition that modification of consent orders requires strong grounds and Periyakkal v. Dakshyani (1983) 2 SCC 127 on strict compliance with undertakings. Consequently, the State must now satisfy the enhanced liability under the default clause and a copy of the order is directed to be served on the Advocate-General to apprise the State of the commercially imprudent conduct.

JUSTICE RAVI KRISHAN KAPUR

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the condonation application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, holding that the appellant's 951-day delay in filing an appeal under Section 91 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 against abandonment of its 2006 trademark application was inexcusable. The decisive ground was that the appellant's narrative—that its attorney died in 2014, his office burned, and it only learned of the 2 December 2022 abandonment order in 2025—was implausible, unsupported by any affidavit from the attorney's staff, and belied by respondent's evidence that the firm continued operating at the same address. Rejecting the plea, the Court emphasized that limitation serves public policy by terminating litigation and protecting accrued rights, and that a litigant must diligently prosecute its own cause. Relying on Pathapati Subba Reddy (2024) 12 SCC 336, it reiterated that "sufficient cause" under Section 5 must be established with bona fides and vigilance, not laxity; and on Shivamma 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, it cautioned that administrative lethargy can never excuse delay. Consequently, the Court refused to disturb the Registrar's abandonment order and dismissed both the condonation application and the appeal as non-maintainable.