JUSTICE PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JUSTICE ATUL S. CHANDURKAR

The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court's dismissal of Contempt Petition No.315 of 2003, holding that the 17.01.2003 order in Writ Petition No.3412 of 1992 contained unambiguous directions requiring the Special Land Acquisition Officer to deliver possession of Gat No.78 lands to the petitioner on 22.01.2003, with MIDC-directed compensation for utilized portions and return of unutilized land. The decisive flaw in the High Court's reasoning was its erroneous conclusion that the order was ambiguous and capable of dual interpretation, when the operative directions expressly mandated possession delivery to all petitioners including the appellant's predecessor. Rejecting the respondents' defence of prior acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Court emphasized that contempt jurisdiction requires examining whether wilful disobedience occurred, not re-litigating underlying disputes. Applying the principle that orders must be read holistically to give effect to their manifest intent, the Court found the 17.01.2003 directions created binding obligations that warranted contempt inquiry given specific allegations of non-compliance. The matter was remanded for fresh consideration of whether wilful breach occurred, with liberty to examine merits of rival submissions regarding possession and compensation claims, while clarifying that no opinion was expressed on the substantive land acquisition dispute itself.

JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA, JUSTICE K.V. VISWANATHAN

The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeals and affirmed that leasing residential premises as hostel accommodation to students and working professionals qualifies for GST exemption under Entry 13 of Notification 9/2017-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, holding that the three cumulative conditions—(i) supply of renting service, (ii) of a residential dwelling, and (iii) for use as residence—were satisfied since the 42-room property was municipally classified as residential, leased for eight-month average stays, and actually used as residence by ultimate occupants. The decisive ground is that Entry 13 is activity-specific, not person-specific: it does not require the immediate lessee (DTwelve Spaces Pvt. Ltd.) itself to reside, and reading such a condition would rewrite the entry and defeat the legislative intent of sparing residential rentals from 18% IGST, a benefit that would otherwise be passed on to students. Rejecting the revenue’s plea to restrict exemption to cases where the first recipient personally resides, the Court applied the purposive-construction principle that beneficial exemptions are strictly construed at the threshold but liberally once conditions are met, following Union of India v. Wood Papers Ltd. (1990) 4 SCC 256 and Mother Superior Adoration Convent v. State of Kerala (2021) 5 SCC 602, and clarified that the 2022 amendment withdrawing exemption for letting to registered persons cannot be applied retrospectively.

JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA, JUSTICE SANDEEP MEHTA

The Supreme Court dismissed BPL's appeal against the arbitral award enforcing 36% compound interest on defaulted bill-discounting facilities, holding that party autonomy under Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 overrides any residual discretion once parties contractually fix interest. The decisive ground is that the sanction letters dated 27.12.2002 and 11.06.2003 expressly provided for concessional 22.5% p.a. interest withdrawable on default, triggering the agreed 36% p.a. with monthly rests; this is a conditional primary obligation, not a penal clause governed by Section 74 Contract Act. Rejecting contentions of usury, unconscionability and lack of notice, the Court distinguished Usurious Loans Act, 1918 as inapplicable to commercial bill-discounting transactions between corporates of equal bargaining power. Following Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 and Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd. v. DMRC (2022) 9 SCC 286, it held that a higher post-default rate protecting legitimate business interest in prompt repayment is commercially justified and not exorbitant. The contra proferentem maxim has no place in bilateral commercial contracts; the arbitrator was bound to give effect to the express terms. The award is neither opposed to public policy nor patently illegal; limitation was rightly extended by acknowledgements and part-payments. The Court thus upheld the concurrent findings of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench, directing BPL to pay the decreed sums with interest.

JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA, JUSTICE PRASANNA B. VARALE

The Supreme Court, while upholding the appellants’ conviction under Section 326 IPC and Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992, reduced their sentence to the period already undergone—two years and three months—citing compromise between private parties and substantial sentence served. The decisive ground was the Court’s limited notice confined to quantum of sentence, coupled with the appellants’ incarceration exceeding half the five-year term imposed by the Salem Sessions Court and affirmed by the Madras High Court. Rejecting the State’s opposition, the Court invoked its power under Article 142 to do complete justice, emphasizing that criminal courts may, in exceptional circumstances, reduce sentence where parties have settled and substantial incarceration has already been endured, without disturbing the conviction. The principle that compromise and conduct cannot obliterate guilt but may mitigate sentence was applied, drawing upon the precedents of State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688, which held that sentence can be altered post-conviction if justice so demands, and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, affirming the Court’s inherent power to mould relief. The appellants were directed to be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.

JUSTICE SAURABH BANERJEE

The Delhi High Court dismissed the landlord's revision petition and upheld the Rent Controller's order granting tenant leave to defend under Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, holding that the landlord's failure to explain why four vacant shops in the same building were unsuitable for his alleged bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) raised triable issues. The decisive ground was that despite claiming four-fold requirement for different family members, the landlord maintained complete silence regarding premises nos.31/5 to 31/8, admittedly lying vacant in the same building, thereby violating the principle that bona fide requirement must be sincere, honest and genuine as established in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 and Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778. Rejecting the landlord's contention that he was the best judge of his needs relying on Sudesh Kumar Soni v. Prabha Khanna 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1128, the Court held that when alternative suitable accommodation is available, the landlord must demonstrate why such premises are unsuitable, following Santosh Devi Soni v. Chand Kiran (2001) 1 SCC 255. The Court emphasized that in supervisory jurisdiction under Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119 and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua (2022) 6 SCC 30, it would not substitute findings absent glaring errors, as the Rent Controller's well-reasoned order properly considered material pleadings and documents showing triable issues regarding bona fide requirement and alternative accommodation availability.

JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA, JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging CAT orders that rejected the petitioner's claim for retrospective promotion to Vaid/Medical Officer (Ayurveda) from 1988, holding that his acceptance of prospective appointment through direct recruitment via Lok Adalat settlement dated 12.11.2005 operated as an unconditional accord extinguishing his independent promotion claim. The decisive ground was that the consent order contained no reservation of rights regarding promotion, and applying State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raj Kumar (2023) 3 SCC 773, the Court ruled that employees have no vested right to consideration under repealed recruitment regulations, as the "rule in force" on the date of consideration alone governs promotion claims. The Court rejected reliance on Amir Raza Zaidi v. MCD (W.P.(C) 2414/1998) and Kuldip Singh v. MCD (W.P.(C) 419/2008) since those cases involved age-barred employees facing stagnation, whereas the petitioner lacked five years' qualifying service when 1975 Regulations were amended in 1984 to make the post 100% direct recruitment, and ultimately secured appointment through that very process. Distinguishing the petitioner from similarly situated persons granted promotional benefits, the Court noted he had already received notional appointment from 1989 without arrears, making interference unwarranted.

JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA, JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

The Delhi High Court dismissed KVS's challenge to the CAT order directing appointment of respondents as Primary Teacher (Music), holding that "Sangeet Prabhakar" from Prayag Sangeet Samiti is equivalent to "Bachelor Degree in Music" under Advertisement 15/2022. The decisive ground was that the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya M.S.E.S.K.K. Mahasangh (2005) 9 SCC 129 had accepted Justice S.C. Agrawal Commission's report treating "Sangeet Prabhakar" as graduate qualification in music, which binding precedent governs despite KVS's contention that equivalence requires UGC/CBSE recognition. Rejecting KVS's argument that qualification determination is exclusively within employer's domain, the Court held that since the advertisement contemplated equivalence exercise, KVS was bound to consider the established equivalence recognized by CBSE, Delhi University and BHU for music teacher appointments. The Court affirmed that higher qualifications (MA Music) subsume essential requirements and that identical situations cannot be treated differently, following T. Valsan v. K. Kanagaraj (2023) 7 SCC 614. Consequently, the Tribunal's direction to consider respondents' appointment on notional basis was upheld, with KVS directed to complete the exercise within eight weeks, while emphasizing that judicial interference is warranted where manifest arbitrariness is demonstrated in equivalence determinations.

Justice Anish Dayal, Justice Nitin Wasudeo Sambre

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree for Rs 11,85,701/- with 7% interest, holding that the defendant’s admissions in the written statement, evidence affidavit and cross-examination conclusively established the sale of T-shirts and the outstanding balance. The decisive ground was that once the plaintiff discharged his initial burden under Section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the onus shifted to the defendant to prove the alleged deductions—fake invoice, returned goods, discount and inferior quality rebate aggregating Rs 8,04,544/-—which he failed to do; the Court applied Mohd. Abdullah Azam Khan v. Nawab Kazim Ali Khan (2022) 20 SCC 233 and Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana (2016) 12 SCC 288 to hold that facts neither challenged in pleadings nor in cross-examination must be accepted as established and that the burden of proving a specific fact lies on the party who asserts it. The Court rejected the defendant’s contention regarding money lying in the separate GST entity M/s Shreya Traders as sub-judice, found the unsigned debit note and oral testimony of DW-2 unsupported by Section 65-B certificate or GST reversal documents worthless, and held that abstract allegations of hurried judgment do not vitiate a reasoned commercial decree passed after due appreciation of evidence.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court quashed the BSF's conviction and dismissal of Constable Shantanu Saha under Section 46 BSF Act for alleged sexual harassment, holding that the General Security Force Court's failure to examine available CCTV footage despite the petitioner's repeated requests under Section 89(1) BSF Act and Rules 63-64 constituted a fatal procedural irregularity violating principles of fair trial under Article 21. The Court emphasized that once authorities acknowledged CCTV coverage of Gate No.2 where the alleged incident occurred, they were statutorily bound to summon this primary evidence under Section 165 Evidence Act rather than shifting the onus to the accused, attracting adverse inference under Section 114 illustration (g) IEA for withholding best evidence. Following Prakash Chand Sharma v. Union of India (2025) and B.C. Chaturvedi v. UOI (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Court held that judicial review under Article 226 permits interference where findings are perverse or procedurally unfair, particularly where conviction rests solely on uncorroborated testimony without examining material evidence. The Court rejected the respondent's plea that the accused should have procured the footage himself, holding that authorities' statutory duty to ensure fair trial under Rule 108 BSF Rules was non-delegable. Consequently, the petitioner was reinstated with consequential benefits but without back wages for the intervening period.

JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA, JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition and upheld the CAT order quashing the termination of a probationary Principal, holding that termination under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 was punitive and stigmatic because it was founded on the finding that the respondent had submitted a fabricated experience certificate, not merely motive for assessing general suitability. The decisive ground was that the employer’s verification concluded the document was fake and this finding, recorded without giving the respondent any notice or hearing, constituted the foundation of the impugned order dated 04.03.2024, attracting Article 311(2) and principles of natural justice. Rejecting the plea that fraud vitiates everything and that no inquiry is mandated during probation, the Court emphasised that even a fraud plea must be established lawfully; fraus omnia corrumpit cannot justify condemning a person unheard. Reliance on Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd., (1999) 2 SCC 21 and Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI, (2002) 1 SCC 520 was misplaced as those cases involved pure assessment of unsuitability, whereas Ratnesh Kumar Chaudhary v. Indira Gandhi Institute, (2015) 9 SCC 345 squarely applies where verification records a misconduct finding. The Tribunal’s direction of reinstatement with all consequential benefits within four weeks was affirmed, liberty reserved to the Department to initiate disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law.

JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO, JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR

The Delhi High Court dismissed Revenue's appeals, affirming that Clifford Chance Pte Ltd. had neither a service PE nor a virtual service PE in India for AYs 2020-21 and 2021-22 under Article 5(6)(a) of the India-Singapore DTAA. The decisive ground was that actual rendition of services within India through employees physically present is essential; mere virtual provision from abroad does not suffice. The Court rejected Revenue's contention that aggregate service continuity sans physical presence constitutes a PE, holding that "within India" and "through employees" mandate territorial nexus and physical footprint. It excluded 36 vacation days, 35 business development days, and 5 common days from the 120-day physical presence, reducing billable service days to 44, below the 90-day threshold. The Court distinguished ABB FZ-LLC and Verizon Communications as dealing with different treaty provisions or obiter, and refused to read in a "virtual service PE" absent express treaty language, emphasising that courts cannot supply omissions in negotiated treaties. Following E-Funds IT Solutions Inc. (SC) and DIT v. Morgan Stanley, it held that services must be furnished "within India" by personnel present therein, and that until Article 5(6) is renegotiated, digital supply without physical presence is not taxable.

JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL

The Delhi High Court dismissed ITC's interim injunction application against Adyar Gate Hotels' use of 'DAKSHIN' trademark, holding that plaintiffs failed to establish territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC, Section 134 Trade Marks Act and Section 62 Copyright Act, and consequently could not demonstrate prima facie case for passing off. The decisive ground was that defendant's standalone Chennai restaurant's online listings on Zomato/Instagram merely enabled table reservations without concluding commercial transactions in Delhi, distinguishing Banyan Tree Holdings v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy (2009) which requires intentional targeting and actual harm within forum state. Rejecting plaintiffs' 'dynamic effect' theory, the Court held that negative reviews of defendant's Chennai restaurant caused no demonstrated goodwill injury to plaintiffs' Delhi operations, following Impresario Entertainment v. S&D Hospitality (2018). On merits, both parties being registered proprietors since 1989 under Section 28(3) Trade Marks Act, the suit must proceed on passing off principles, where defendant's continuous independent use since 2015 (Rs.12.38 crores turnover) and plaintiffs' acquiescence for nine years constituted complete defence under Section 33. The Court directed defendant to not expand beyond Chennai pending final adjudication, observing that balance of convenience favoured maintaining status quo of defendant's 35-year continuous operation.

JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petitions under Article 227 challenging refusal to allow amendment of written statements after trial commencement, holding that Order VI Rule 17 CPC's proviso bars such amendments unless due diligence is demonstrated. The decisive ground was that petitioner, having purchased a flat in 2004-05 and filed a separate suit in 2017 regarding unauthorized constructions, was fully aware of demolition orders since 1985 and SDMC's 12.10.2021 order but inexplicably delayed seeking amendments until July/November 2022, nearly a year after trial began on 20.09.2021. Rejecting arguments that amendments were necessary to determine real controversy regarding mesne profits quantification, the Court held that liberal amendment principles yield to due diligence requirement post-trial commencement, following Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand (2008) 5 SCC 117 and Basavaraj v. Indira (2024) 3 SCC 705 which establish that burden lies on amendment applicant to prove despite due diligence the matter could not have been raised earlier. The petitions were dismissed as frivolous with costs of Rs.25,000 each to be deposited with www.bharatkeveer.gov.in within one week.

JUSTICE RAJNEESH KUMAR GUPTA

The Delhi High Court affirmed the conviction under Section 376 IPC but modified the sentence to the period already undergone (5 years 5 months), holding that the prosecutrix’s sole testimony, corroborated by her Section 164 CrPC statement, torn hymen in MLC Ex. PW-7/A and FSL detection of semen on vaginal swab, was sufficient notwithstanding absence of fresh external injuries, since injury is not sine qua non for rape (Lalliram v. State of M.P., (2008) 10 SCC 69) and consent is irrelevant as birth records proved her age below 16 years on 11-09-2009. Rejecting the defence of consensual relationship and false implication due to family enmity, the Court applied Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) SCC OnLine 1610 that conviction can rest on the prosecutrix’s credible solitary evidence without corroboration unless compelling reasons exist, and minor contradictions cannot discredit her. Considering the 16-year delay since incident, appellant’s satisfactory jail conduct, deposit of fine, and societal need for re-culturisation over retribution (Mohammad Giasuddin v. State of A.P., (1977) 3 SCC 287), the substantive sentence was reduced while maintaining conviction, directing immediate release and communication of judgment to trial court and jail superintendent.

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA

The Delhi High Court partly allowed the intra-court appeal and held that the appellant’s two-year debarment under Rule 151(iii) GFR for submitting a fabricated Turnover Certificate was disproportionate, reducing the period to the approximately one year and eight months already undergone. The decisive ground was that NDMC failed to weigh mitigating factors mandated by Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Western Telecom Project BSNL, (2014) 14 SCC 731: the appellant, on its own motion, conducted an internal inquiry, terminated the erring employees and launched criminal proceedings, confessed the wrong, had no prior misconduct history, and cooperated throughout. The Court rejected the Single Judge’s view that vicarious liability and the Pre-Integrity Pact justified the maximum penalty, observing that “it is not permissible to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut” (Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn., (2007) 4 SCC 669). Applying the proportionality doctrine, it found the maximum two-year exclusion permissible only where no mitigating circumstances exist. Precedents emphasise that debarment must balance gravity with corrective steps taken. Consequently, the Court quashed the remaining tenure of the 07.06.2024 blacklisting order and directed that the appellant be treated as eligible for future tenders.

JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal challenging the trial court's refusal to grant interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, holding that the plaintiff-appellant lacked prima facie case and urgency. The decisive ground was that the plaintiff, having executed a registered gift deed in 2015 and effected mutation, admitted that the same property was subject matter of pending RFA 341/2024 challenging the rejection of his earlier suit CS 920/2023 under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC for being barred by limitation. The Court rejected the contention that constructions by defendant necessitated status quo, observing that the plaintiff's remedy lay in moving appropriate application in the pending appeal rather than instituting a fresh suit on identical property. The principle of res judicata and judicial discipline precluded parallel litigation when the earlier suit's rejection was under challenge. Following the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium," the Court held that allowing fresh suit would permit circumvention of the appellate process. The Court emphasized that interim relief cannot be granted when the plaintiff's title itself is sub judice and the maintainability of the substantive suit depends on outcome of RFA 341/2024, rendering the appeal devoid of merit.

JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court allowed the habeas corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, directing the immediate release of the fifteen-year-old minor girl to her mother. The decisive ground was the girl’s unequivocal statement in court expressing her desire to reside with her parents, coupled with the mother’s willingness to resume custody. The Court rejected any implicit suggestion that the shelter home should retain custody merely because the minor was found pregnant after being traced on 29.11.2025, noting that the statutory scheme of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, read with the mandate of Article 21, prioritises the child’s best interests which, in this case, coincided with family reunification. Following the precedent in Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2011) 5 SCC 1, that restoration to the family is the preferred outcome unless cogent reasons exist to the contrary, and reiterating the principle that the writ of habeas corpus is granted the moment unlawful detention is established, the Court recorded that respondent no. 4 has already been arrested in connection with FIR No. 598/2025 and directed the girl’s handover to the petitioner, disposing of the petition with no further orders.

JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL

The Delhi High Court decreed the suit under Order XIII-A read with Order XII Rule 6 CPC, holding that defendant No.1’s liability of ₹16,77,73,384/- stood admitted through unequivocal admissions in its written statement, ledger accounts, and the Tripartite Escrow Agreement, leaving no real prospect of successful defence. The decisive ground was that paragraphs 3, 9 and 11 of the written statement, read with the ledger filed by defendant No.1 in the appeal, expressly acknowledged the outstanding principal; the Escrow Agreement further recorded that defendant No.1 had “taken supply of school bags worth ₹57,09,06,723/-” and undertook to deposit its receivables to discharge the dues, thereby constituting clear admissions within the expansive scope of Order XII Rule 6 as interpreted in Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India (2000) 7 SCC 120 and Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust (2010) 4 SCC 753. The Court rejected the plea of a proceeds-sharing or back-to-back payment arrangement for want of evidence, emphasising that escrow mechanisms secure creditors but do not render payment contingent on recovery from third parties, following National Projects Construction Corporation v. Harvinder Singh & Company 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9573. Applying Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd. v. Kunwer Sachdev 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10764, it held that summary disposal was proportionate since admissions enabled findings of fact without trial. The suit was decreed for the admitted sum; trial shall proceed for remaining reliefs.

JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal challenging probate of a Will dated 14.09.1998, holding that the propounder had discharged the burden under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act by examining attesting witnesses PW-2 and PW-4 who deposed to due execution in the testator’s presence while he was in sound disposing state of mind. The decisive ground was that respondent no. 4 failed to prove his plea of prior sale for ₹1 lakh on 30.04.1998, admitted absence of any document evidencing payment, and relied on unregistered instruments which confer no title; the testator having cancelled those documents on 27.10.1998 and filed suit for possession, retained dominion over the property. Rejecting the contention that the beneficiary’s presence and minor inconsistencies in attesting witnesses’ depositions created suspicion, the Court applied Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan (2023) 9 SCC 734 and Pentakota Satyanarayana v. Pentakota Seetharatnam (2005) 8 SCC 67 to hold that mere presence of beneficiary does not taint the Will unless vitiating circumstances are pleaded and proved, and that the propounder need only satisfy the prudent mind test. No undue influence, fraud or unsoundness was pleaded or established; the mother and sister’s no-objection reinforced the testator’s conscious exclusion of the objector. Consequently, the appeal under Section 299 ISA was dismissed and probate confirmed.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court quashed the CISF's cancellation of petitioner's appointment as Constable/GD, holding that honourable acquittal in criminal proceedings cannot constitute disqualification when the complainant herself deposed the complaint arose from misunderstanding. Following Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471 and Ravindra Kumar v. State of UP (2024) 5 SCC 264, the Court emphasized that mere institution of criminal cases cannot automatically disqualify candidates; authorities must examine whether acquittal was honourable, on benefit of doubt, or due to hostile witnesses. The decisive factor was the JMFC's judgment revealing that complainant Mamoni Parihar explicitly stated before the Criminal Court that she lodged the complaint out of misunderstanding and harboured no allegations against petitioner, thereby eroding the proceedings' substratum. Rejecting the Standing Screening Committee's mechanical approach of treating pendency of proceedings as automatic disqualification without holistic appreciation of the acquittal order, the Court held such cancellation constituted complete travesty of justice. The Court directed respondents to issue fresh appointment order within four weeks, reinstating petitioner's candidature pursuant to the December 20, 2024 offer, while clarifying that courts must examine acquittal orders holistically rather than being influenced merely by phrases like "benefit of doubt" or "beyond reasonable doubt".

JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

The Delhi High Court granted regular bail to Shashank Pathak under Section 483 read with Section 528 BNSS, arrested since 10.03.2025 for allegedly channeling Rs.20 lakhs of a Rs.2.62 crore cyber-fraud through his proprietorship account, holding that once the charge-sheet is filed and custodial interrogation is no longer required, continued incarceration becomes punitive. The decisive ground was the parity with co-accused Mandeep who has already been enlarged on bail, coupled with the complete absence of any material showing the petitioner’s conscious involvement in the larger conspiracy: no WhatsApp messages attributed to him, no CDR linking him to the complainant, and no evidence that he derived any benefit from the transit transactions. Rejecting the prosecution’s plea of complicity merely on the basis of account ownership, the Court invoked the principle from State of Kerala v. A. Pareed Pillai, (1972) 3 SCC 661 that bail is the rule and jail the exception, and followed Rekha Jain v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 18 SCC 174 to reiterate that an accused who joins investigation on Section 35 BNSS notice and has deep roots in society is entitled to liberty unless flight risk or tampering is demonstrable. Bail was ordered on furnishing a personal bond of Rs.35,000 with one surety, coupled with conditions of appearance, mobile tracking, non-intimidation of witnesses and prior intimation of change of residence.

JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA, JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that a government servant who voluntarily accepts appointment to a lower post cannot claim protection of the higher Grade Pay attached to his previous substantive post, the decisive ground being that FR 22(B) protects only the position in the time-scale of the new service and not the Grade Pay of the abandoned post. Rejecting the plea that Rule 3(8) of the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2008 mandates protection of “Basic Pay” comprising pay in the pay band plus Grade Pay, the Court reasoned that the three components are distinct and the protection under FR 22(B)(2) is limited to the pay band of the post joined; the subsequent upgradation of the District Court post to Grade Pay ₹4,800/- under Mirza Zahid Beg v. Union of India, 2008:DHC:1528-DB and Civil & Sessions Court Stenographers Assn. v. District & Sessions Judge, 2015:DHC:5384-DB cannot be imported after the petitioner had voluntarily relinquished that cadre. The analogy of FR 15(a) and O.M. 21.10.2009 was held apposite to deny Grade Pay protection on voluntary downward move. Distinguishing Bahadur Singh v. Jaspreet Kaur Talwar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1077, the Court emphasised that parity with deputationist-absorbed employees governed by O.M. 17.06.2010 was unsustainable, leaving the petitioner entitled only to pay band protection from 24.12.2009 with no further monetary directions.

JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court granted bail to the applicant-husband in a dowry death case under Sections 498A/304B/34 IPC after five years of incarceration, holding that prolonged pre-trial detention violates Article 21 when trial completion is remote. The decisive factors were that only 5 of 17 witnesses had been examined and no speedy trial was foreseeable, rendering continued custody punitive rather than preventive. Rejecting the State's opposition based on gravity of offences, the Court emphasized that the presumption of innocence under Section 113B Evidence Act and the seven-year minimum sentence under Section 304B IPC cannot justify indefinite detention. Relying on Sajid Khan v. State of Rajasthan (SLP (Crl.) 2290/2023) where bail was granted after 15 months when vital witnesses were examined, and Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (AIR 2021 SC 712) holding that courts must enlarge accused on bail when timely trial is impossible after significant incarceration, the Court held that the State's inability to ensure speedy trial obliges grant of bail irrespective of offence seriousness. Following Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (Crl.A. 2787/2024) that Article 21 applies to all crimes and presumption of innocence cannot be lightly brushed aside, bail was granted on conditions including ₹20,000 personal bond, non-tampering with evidence, court appearance, and prior permission for foreign travel.

JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court granted bail to Rishipal and Vakil Ray under Section 37 NDPS Act, holding that the 25.98 kg and 3.86 kg ganja recoveries respectively were rendered prima facie suspect by non-joinder of independent witnesses despite ample opportunity, absence of rental documentation linking Rishipal to the raided premises, and denial of e-Sakshya video copies to the defence, thereby breaching fair-trial guarantees. Rejecting the State’s contention that commercial quantity attracted the twin conditions, the Court found the prosecutorial lapses, coupled with discontinuous videography and unrecorded trap calls, sufficient to raise reasonable grounds of non-guilt at this stage; Vakil Ray additionally benefited from parity with co-accused Mukul who was already enlarged on bail for intermediate quantity. Following Bantu v. State (2024:DHC:5006) that absence of public witnesses and improper videography in pre-planned raids casts credible doubt, the Court held that previous NDPS antecedents and 220 telephonic interceptions could not, sans corroborative recovery, justify continued incarceration when charge-framing was remote and interim-bail conduct was unblemished. Each applicant was ordered released on ₹25,000 personal bond with two sureties, subject to standard conditions: non-tampering, territorial surrender of passports, appearance on every date, prior intimation of address or device change, and 24-hour mobile traceability, without the observations being treated as trial merits.

JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court disposed of the habeas corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 as having become infructuous after the State reported recovery of the minor daughter and her restoration to parental custody. The decisive development was the status report filed by learned Standing Counsel Mr. Sanjay Lao revealing that the missing child traced by police had already been handed over to the petitioner, rendering the prayer for production redundant. The Court noted that although the petitioner had alleged initial police inaction despite FIR No. 434/2025 dated 09.08.2025 being registered under Section 154 CrPC (now BNSS) against Respondents 9-10 for torture of the minor, the subsequent recovery satisfied the substantive relief sought. Acknowledging the petitioner’s express prayer for no further relief, the Bench of Justices Vivek Chaudhary and Manoj Jain applied the principle of lis pendens and the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium to terminate proceedings that had lost their purpose, while implicitly confirming that the State’s constitutional obligation under Article 21 to trace missing children had been fulfilled, thereby rendering the petition “not pressed” and liable to be dismissed as having served its purpose.

JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court granted pre-arrest bail to the applicant-accused under Sections 420/34 IPC, holding that custodial interrogation was unwarranted where the accused had demonstrated bona fides by depositing ₹5,00,000 of the allegedly cheated amount with the Court Registry and consistently cooperated with investigation since interim protection was granted on 31.07.2025. The decisive consideration was that criminal proceedings cannot be wielded as a recovery mechanism, particularly when the essence of the allegation pertains to a commercial transaction where the applicant, a builder, had refunded the principal amount through Court deposit, thereby negating flight risk and demonstrating willingness to face trial. Rejecting the complainant's objection regarding a disputed ₹1,00,000 receipt, the Court emphasized that veracity of such allegations cannot be pre-judged at the bail stage, applying the principle that bail is the rule and jail the exception where cooperation is established. Following the ratio of Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40 that deprivation of liberty should be avoided when investigation can proceed without custody, the Court imposed stringent conditions including personal bond of ₹50,000 with two sureties, prohibition on leaving India without permission, continuous cooperation with IO, and directed release of the remaining ₹1,00,000 to complainant against undertaking to refund if applicant succeeds, clarifying that these observations are trial-neutral.

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petitioner's challenge to the Family Court's order closing her right to further cross-examine her husband in divorce proceedings, holding that cross-examination cannot continue indefinitely and litigants cannot expect supervisory courts to monitor ongoing trials. The decisive ground was that the petitioner had already availed the opportunity granted on 04.08.2025 based on her assurance of cooperation, yet failed to conclude cross-examination on 22.09.2025 and 24.09.2025, leading the Local Commissioner to seek directions. Rejecting the argument of procedural unfairness, the Court emphasized that interference is permissible only where perversity exists, citing the principle that courts must ensure trial proceedings are conducted expeditiously without endless examination. The Court noted with disapproval that the petitioner subsequently failed to appear for her evidence, resulting in closure of her right to lead evidence on 28.11.2025, though this order was not challenged. Following the precedent that discretionary jurisdiction under Article 227 should be sparingly exercised in interlocutory matters, the Court held the Family Court's action justified in preventing abuse of process. The petition was dismissed with liberty to challenge the 28.11.2025 order separately, while reminding that assurances given to courts must be scrupulously honored.

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH, JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

The Delhi High Court deprecated the Customs Department's deliberate non-compliance with its August 22, 2025 order directing release of a 45-gram gold chain duty-free and an iPhone 15 Pro on payment of applicable duty, holding such defiance contemptuous and actionable under the judicial arm's inherent powers under Article 226 read with Section 482 CrPC. The decisive ground was the Department's admitted failure to implement the mandate despite the limitation for filing an SLP having lapsed, coupled with the petitioner's futile visits on August 27 and September 17, exposing the mala fide tactic of citing "legal review" to indefinitely withhold passengers' bona fide goods absent any allegation of fraud or smuggling. Rejecting the excuse of contemplated appeal, the Court invoked its authority in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388, to enforce compliance and reminded the Department that statutory timelines bind the revenue as much as the citizen, lest the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniut be rendered nugatory. Consequently, the Commissioner was directed to release the items within one week, failing which Rs 20,000 costs would be payable, and the nodal officer, Superintendent Mukesh Gulia, was tasked to facilitate the petitioner's appearance on December 9, 2025, with a copy to be marked to the CBIC OSD (Legal) to ensure institutional accountability and prevent future contumacious delays.

JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court granted bail to Sahil Sharma alias Maxx under Section 437 CrPC read with Section 37 NDPS Act, holding that two years of undertrial incarceration without trial commencement outweighs statutory rigours where commercial quantities are alleged, the decisive consideration being that charges were framed only in 2025 and next evidence date is fixed for March 2026, making speedy trial illusory. Rejecting the State’s plea that the applicant is kingpin of a Flipkart-fronted syndicate and has a prior NDPS conviction, the Court noted the appeal is pending, sentence suspended, and earlier recovery was small quantity; mere bank transactions, absence of independent witnesses or videography, and field-kit/FSL discrepancy regarding MDMA/methamphetamine create reasonable doubt at this stage. Following Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT) 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352 and Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109, the Court held that prolonged pre-trial detention imperils Article 21 and Section 436A overrides Section 37 embargo when trial is unduly delayed, conditional liberty being the norm. Bail was ordered on ₹25,000 personal bond with two sureties, coupled with conditions: no tampering with witnesses, prior intimation before leaving India, appearance on every hearing date, disclosure of residence and mobile number to IO, and automatic review if fresh FIR arises.

JUSTICE NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE, JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the Delhi Cooperative Tribunal's order rejecting the appeal against an arbitral award, holding that the petitioner had failed to substantiate his claims of overcharging and embezzlement by the cooperative society. The decisive ground was that the petitioner, despite extensive litigation since 2009, had produced no evidence to support his allegations of excess charges for land, construction, and maintenance costs, with both the District Consumer Forum and State Commission having previously dismissed identical claims for lack of proof. The Court rejected the argument that the Tribunal had wrongly applied Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, noting that Section 70(5) of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003 expressly incorporates the A&C Act provisions, and that the Tribunal correctly refused to re-appreciate evidence under the limited scope of interference established in Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd. (2019) 20 SCC 1. Following Ajay Singh v. Kacheru (2025) INSC:9, the Court emphasized that Article 226 jurisdiction cannot be exercised to re-evaluate evidence unless findings are perverse or jurisdictional errors exist, finding neither in the arbitrator's reasoned conclusion that the petitioner's wide-ranging claims were unsubstantiated, particularly since the crystallized dues of Rs.80,205 had been finally settled by the Division Bench's 2019 order.

JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner accused of rape under BNS Section 64(1) holding that the four-year consensual relationship culminating in family meetings and an engagement ring prima facie disclosed a breach rather than a false promise of marriage. The decisive ground was that the prosecutrix continued sexual relations even after the petitioner’s parents refused their alliance on 21.02.2025, negating the allegation that consent was vitiated by deception from the inception. Rejecting the State’s submission that the undertaking to marry was a mere stratagem, the Court applied the twin test laid down in Prithvirajan SLP(Crl.) 12663/2022: the accused must have promised marriage without any intention to perform it ab initio and the prosecutrix must have yielded solely because of that misrepresentation. Reliance was also placed on Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (2019) 9 SCC 608 and Mahesh Damu Khare (2024) 11 SCC 398 to emphasize that prolonged cohabitation without protest indicates consensual intimacy; whether the promise was fraudulent or merely unfulfilled is triable without custodial interrogation. The petitioner, who had joined investigation thrice, was directed to be released on a personal bond of ₹25,000 with conditions of co-operation and non-contact with the complainant.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition directing constitution of a Review Medical Board (RMB) for the petitioner, accepting his medical incapacity on the scheduled date. The decisive ground was the petitioner's submission supported by documentary evidence—a government doctor's prescription dated 25 September 2025 confirming fever—which substantiated his inability to attend the RMB on 25 September 2025, coupled with his contemporaneous email communication to respondents on 28 September 2025. Rejecting any implied suggestion of malingering or non-compliance, the Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to secure the petitioner's fundamental right to adequate medical evaluation for service-related purposes. The Court's approach reflects the principle that procedural technicalities must yield to substantive justice when genuine medical grounds exist, echoing the ratio in State of U.P. v. Manoj Kumar Sharma (2021) where the Supreme Court emphasized that medical boards must accommodate reasonable requests for rescheduling. The petition was disposed of with mandamus directing respondents to conduct fresh RMB on 20 December 2025 at 11 AM, with intimation to be sent to petitioner's counsel's email, thereby balancing administrative convenience with individual rights while ensuring the petitioner receives fair medical assessment without prejudice from his prior absence.

JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petitioner's challenge under Article 227 against the trial court's order permitting forensic examination of document Ex.PW1/1, holding that the document was neither "foreign" nor improperly exhibited. The decisive ground was that Order VI Rule 2 CPC requires pleadings to state only material facts, not evidence, and paragraph 15 of the plaint specifically reserved the right to rely on "evidences & admissions" including documents like Ex.PW1/1, which was duly filed at the appropriate stage. Rejecting the petitioner's contention that an exhibited document stands proved, the Court clarified that exhibit numbers merely identify documents and do not constitute proof under the Evidence Act. The Court noted that an identical objection raised during PW1's examination on 16.01.2019 was rejected and remained unchallenged, and the petitioner's own reply Ex.PW1/4 admitted executing the impugned affidavit. Following the principle that forensic examination is a legitimate means of proof when document authenticity is disputed, as established in State of Maharashtra v. Praful Desai, the Court found no perversity warranting interference. The petition was dismissed as frivolous with costs of Rs.10,000/- payable to DHCLSC within one week, emphasizing that parties cannot obstruct legitimate proof through technical objections.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union's writ petition challenging the Armed Forces Tribunal's award of disability pension to an Army officer with Type-II Diabetes Mellitus, affirming that DM-II cannot be denied as a lifestyle disorder without considering service-related aggravation. Following Supreme Court precedents in Dharamvir Singh (2013) 7 SCC 316 and Bijender Singh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 895, the Court held that the Re-Medical Board's reasoning—that DM-II is merely a lifestyle disorder with no close temporal association with military stress—constitutes an error of law apparent on the face of the record, as it disregards the established principle that disability pension must be granted when ailment manifests during service unless positively shown to be unrelated to service conditions. Reiterating its consistent position in 71 similar DM-II cases including Union of India v. GP Capt. S Kumaran 2025 SCC OnLine Del 7589, the Court emphasized that certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot reopen factual findings but can correct legal errors where tribunals misapply binding precedents, particularly where the AFT correctly applied the legal principle that 19.6 years of unblemished service creates a presumption of service-connection for disabilities manifesting during tenure. The impugned judgment was affirmed with compliance directed within twelve weeks.

JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the husband's revision petition challenging interim maintenance of Rs 11,000 monthly awarded to his wife and minor daughter under Section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, holding that concurrent findings of courts below revealed no illegality. The decisive ground was that the petitioner-husband's own affidavit disclosed monthly expenses of Rs 18,500 against claimed income of Rs 16,667, compelling adoption of notional income of Rs 21,756 based on minimum wages for postgraduates under the Minimum Wages Act 1948, following Tasmeer Qureshi v Asfia Muzaffar (2025 SCC OnLine Del 7272) which authorizes such assessment when husbands withhold financial particulars. The Court rejected contentions that the divorced wife, being highly qualified, was disentitled despite talaq, emphasizing that even divorced wives can claim maintenance and that her present unemployment while sole caregiver of 4-year-old daughter cannot be termed willful idleness, distinguishing Mamta Jaiswal v Rajesh Jaiswal. It observed that absence of details regarding tuition students rendered claimed income unreliable, while wife's brief employment attempt at HM Global School failed due to childcare responsibilities. The maintenance quantum was held commensurate with parties' status, clarifying that these prima facie observations shall not bind final adjudication on merits after evidence.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union of India's writ petition challenging the Armed Forces Tribunal's award of disability pension to Ex-SGT Mohammad Yamin for primary hypertension, holding the petition barred by gross delay and devoid of merit under certiorari jurisdiction. The decisive ground was that the petition, filed in November 2025 against an August 2023 AFT order, remained unexplained, attracting the Supreme Court's disapproval of belated writ remedies in Thirunagalingam v. R. Lingeswaran (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093). On merits, the Court found the RMB's sole reason—that the disability "occurred in peace unit"—identical to 204 earlier cases of primary hypertension where disability pension was granted, including Union of India v. Ex. SGT Manoj K L Retd (2025 SCC OnLine Del 8442), and no specialist opinion negated service attribution. Reiterating that certiorari under Article 226 cannot reassess evidence but only correct jurisdictional errors or errors of law apparent on the record, the Bench applied Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1964 SC 477) to hold the AFT's findings neither perverse nor unsupported, thereby affirming the award and dismissing the petition both for laches and on merits in limine.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union of India's writ petition challenging the Armed Forces Tribunal's award of disability pension to GP Capt Agnihotri for CAD, holding that the Release Medical Board's reasoning—that the disease manifested in a peace area and diagnosis was prompt—was legally insufficient under Dharamvir Singh (2013) 7 SCC 316 and Bijender Singh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 895, which obligate the Board to identify an alternative non-service cause for cardiac disabilities in military personnel, stress and strain being inherent to service even outside field postings. Rejecting the Union's plea of RMB finality and five-year delay in filing the original application, the Court reaffirmed that certiorari under Article 226 cannot be foreclosed and delay had already been accounted for by the Tribunal relying on Union of India v Tarsem Singh 2008 (8) SCC 648. Emphasising the limited scope of Syed Yakoob v K S Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477, the Bench found no jurisdictional error or legal flaw on the record warranting interference with the Tribunal's appreciation that the RMB had failed to attribute the CAD to any cause independent of service, and accordingly affirmed the disability pension in toto.

JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court disposed of the habeas corpus petition under Article 226 read with Section 528 BNSS filed by Om Prakash seeking production of his minor daughter, as the child was recovered and produced before the Child Welfare Committee on 28/11/2025 where her statement under Section 183 BNSS was recorded revealing her voluntary marriage despite being a minor born on 06/01/2009, whereupon the petitioner's counsel acknowledged the status report and expressly declined to press the petition further while reserving rights to pursue alternative remedies, resulting in the Court's disposal of both the main petition and any pending applications. The decisive consideration was the factual recovery of the minor and her production before the competent statutory authority under the juvenile justice framework, coupled with the petitioner's conscious decision to not pursue the extraordinary constitutional remedy, thereby rendering the habeas corpus proceedings infructuous while preserving the petitioner's substantive rights to seek appropriate relief through other legal fora concerning the minor's welfare and the validity of her marriage, the Court having satisfied itself through the status report that the child was safely in protective custody following due process under the BNSS provisions governing statements of minors.

JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court granted leave to appeal under Section 378(1) Cr.P.C. against the acquittal of Inder Pal in Sessions Case No. 1933/2016, holding that the trial court erred in extending benefit of doubt based on trivial contradictions in the prosecutrix's testimony. The decisive ground was that while the prosecutrix had consistently supported the prosecution's case regarding offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC, the trial court had mechanically applied the doctrine of benefit of doubt without appreciating that minor inconsistencies in a sexual assault victim's deposition cannot be allowed to overshadow the substantive truth of her testimony. Rejecting the respondent's absence as inconsequential, the Court emphasized that at the leave-granting stage, it need only be satisfied that prima facie grounds exist for interference, not undertake meticulous re-evaluation of evidence. Following the principle in State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh (2004) 1 SCC 421 that contradictions which do not go to the root of the case should not be given undue weightage in sexual assault cases, the Court directed registration of the petition as Criminal Appeal with respondents to appear before the Joint Registrar on 18.12.2025 for executing personal and surety bonds of Rs. 25,000 each.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union's challenge to the Armed Forces Tribunal's award of disability pension for Diabetes Mellitus Type-II, holding that where a soldier declares no pre-service ailment and the Release Medical Board records "neither attributable nor aggravated by service" without identifying any alternate cause, the benefit of liberal interpretation under Article 226 must prevail. The decisive ground is the binding precedent in Union of India v Ex Sub Gawas Anil Madso, 318 (2025) DLT 711, which mandates that such a bald RMB entry is insufficient to rebut the presumption of service-connection once the enrolment medical clearance is uncontroverted; the Court reiterated that the employer must positively establish non-service etiology. Rejecting the plea that 20% disability bars pension, the bench applied Bijender Singh v UOI, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 895, which holds that any disease manifesting after clean enlistment is presumed attributable and attracts 50% disability pension by broad-banding. Exercising certiorari jurisdiction within the parameters of Syed Yakoob v K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, the Court found no jurisdictional error or patent legal flaw in the AFT's appreciation of evidence. The petition is disposed of with a direction to grant disability pension at 50% for life, with arrears within twelve weeks, while modifying the cutoff date for broad-banding to align with Union of India v Ram Avtar, 2014 SCC OnLine SC 1761.

JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the bail application under Sections 20 and 29 of the NDPS Act, holding that the twin conditions of Section 37(1)(b) are not satisfied where 81.270 kg ganja (four times commercial quantity) was recovered. The decisive ground is the prosecution's prima facie case comprising: (i) 11.90 kg found on applicant and co-accused Akash; (ii) 71.062 kg disclosed from their Jamia Nagar flat; (iii) incriminating WhatsApp chats, CDR connectivity and bank transfers to absconding suppliers Badnayini Jogulu and Chandan Kumar; (iv) applicant’s confession of long-standing ganja trade with Akash and husband Sabir Ali; and (v) videographed seizure in presence of independent witnesses whose testimony is yet to be recorded. Rejecting the defence that rent deed lacks applicant’s signature and no personal belongings linked her to the flat, the Court relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal (Crl.A. 1001-1002/2022) that circumstantial evidence—financial trails, call records, contemporaneous chats—must dissuade bail when commercial quantity is involved. Given violation of earlier interim bail, likelihood of tampering with evidence and fleeing, and reasonable grounds to believe guilt, the rigours of Section 37 prevail; mere 12-month incarceration does not override statutory bar. Observations are trial-neutral.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union's petition challenging the Armed Forces Tribunal's award of disability pension to Havildar Lalu Pappachan (Retd), holding that primary hypertension contracted after 21 years of unblemished service attracts the benefit in view of the liberal canon that a soldier is presumed sound at enlistment and any subsequent deterioration is presumed service-related unless the employer positively traces an extra-service cause. Following its binding coordinate-bench rulings in UOI v Ex Sub Gawas Anil Madso, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2355 and UOI v WO Binod Kumar Sah (Retd), the Court held that the Release Medical Board's bare endorsement "NANA conceded as per para-43, Chap-VI GMO 2008" is insufficient where the veteran's self-declaration shows no pre-existing ailment and the Commanding Officer certified absence of negligence; para-43 of GMO 2008, properly read, obliges the Board to examine whether field/HAAS/CIOPS service aggravated the condition. Reiterating the Supreme Court's exposition in Bijender Singh v UOI, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 895 that disability pension is a beneficial provision and the burden to rebut attributability lies entirely on the employer, the Court found no jurisdictional error warranting certiorari under Syed Yakoob v K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, and directed compliance with the AFT order granting 50% disability pension within twelve weeks.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the rejection of the petitioner’s withdrawal of his voluntary retirement application under Rule 27 of the Coast Guard (General) Rules, 1986, holding that he retained locus poenitentiae as the withdrawal dated 23.12.2024 preceded the effective retirement date of 31.01.2025. The decisive ground was the material change in circumstances—improvement in his and his wife’s health, children’s education and marriage expenses, and an outstanding ₹10 lakh loan—satisfying the Balram Gupta v. Union of India, 1987 Supp SCC 228, threshold that even dissuasion by colleagues can constitute sufficient variation. Following JN Srivastava v. Union of India, (1998) 9 SCC 559, the Court reaffirmed that an employee may revoke an accepted voluntary retirement notice any time before it takes effect, and distinguished Union of India v. Wg Cdr Subrata Das, (2020) 12 SCC 784, as clarified in Kande Mahender v. Union of India, WP(C) 2320/2025. The respondents’ “pick and choose” policy vis-à-vis an identically placed officer violated Article 14, and the simpliciter rejection order breached principles of natural justice. The petitioner is reinstated with continuity of service and consequential monetary benefits (excluding back wages), subject to refund of voluntary retirement sums already received.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the wife's appeal and affirmed the Family Court's decree dissolving the marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground of cruelty, holding that her sustained pattern of false allegations, criminal complaints, and professional defamation caused grave mental anguish rendering cohabitation intolerable. The decisive findings were: (i) wife deserted matrimonial home within one month of marriage on 07.03.2005 as consistently deposed by husband and admitted by her father in connected civil suit; (ii) she failed to discharge burden of proving non-consummation or any cruelty by husband; (iii) her subsequent filing of unsubstantiated FIR under Sections 498-A/406 IPC, DV Act complaint, opposing and seeking cancellation of bail, circulating copies of FIR and bail orders to husband's professional associates, and levelling false dowry demand of Rs. 70 lakhs constituted calculated mental cruelty. Rejecting contention that these proceedings were bona fide, the Court applied Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh and Raj Talreja v. Kavita Talreja to hold that patently false accusations exposing spouse to criminal litigation and social humiliation amount to cruelty; mere filing does not suffice, but baseless allegations proven false establish cruelty. The Court affirmed that subsequent events showing acquittal and dismissal of all complaints vindicate husband and demonstrate continuing hostile conduct, making continued marital tie a fiction.

JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the victim's appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC, affirming the trial court's judgment that significant evidentiary gaps precluded conviction under Sections 325/341 IPC. Justice Amit Mahajan held that the prosecution's case collapsed under the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, emphasizing that conviction cannot rest on surmises or conjecture. The decisive infirmities were: (i) material contradictions in the complainant's narrative regarding contacting his advocate and borrowing a phone, which struck at the credibility of the first version; (ii) the inexplicable omission of CW-3/Ravinder as an eyewitness from both the complaint and CW-1's deposition, coupled with his non-examination after charge-framing, denying the accused cross-examination rights; and (iii) the complete absence of medical evidence corroborating alleged injuries from fist and leg blows. Following Joseph Stephen v. Santhanasamy (2022) 13 SCC 115, the Court reiterated that appellate interference in acquittal appeals requires substantial and compelling reasons, and when two views are possible, the view favoring the accused must prevail. The prosecution's evidence, marred by contradictions and embellishments on material particulars, failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, warranting affirmation of the acquittal.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal under Section 37(1)(c) Arbitration and Conciliation Act read with Section 13(1A) Commercial Courts Act as barred by limitation, rejecting the condonation application under Section 5 Limitation Act for 101-day delay. The decisive ground was that the 60-day limitation period under Section 13(1A) CC Act for commercial disputes of "Specified Value" commenced from the original order dated 13.02.2024, not from the subsequent correction order dated 16.05.2024 which merely rectified clerical errors regarding counsel's name and judgment date without substantively altering the award. Following Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd (2021) 6 SCC 460 and Dilshad Khan v. Govt of NCT (2025) SCC OnLine Del 5636, the Court held that condonation is exceptional for short delays where bona fides and absence of negligence are established. The appellant's explanations - geographical location in Haridwar requiring deliberation time and counsel's unspecified personal exigencies - constituted self-induced delay lacking exceptional circumstances, as the decision to appeal was communicated only in July 2024, well after limitation expired. The Court emphasized that commercial arbitration requires strict adherence to timelines for commercial certainty, and vague unsubstantiated difficulties cannot excuse delay.

JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL, JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court set aside the Single Judge’s direction awarding full 5 marks to a Class-XII student for an unchecked Geography answer, holding that writ courts cannot arrogate the examiner’s academic function; the decisive ground is that judicial review of evaluation is permissible only when a statutory rule permits re-evaluation and a clear, non-inferential material error is demonstrated, neither being present here. Rejecting the plea that tick marks without entered marks entitle the student to the benefit of doubt, the Court emphasised that sympathy cannot substitute expert assessment and upward revision without merit visit manifest injustice upon multitudes displaced in the merit list. Following Vikesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 2 SCC 309 and CBSE v. Khushboo Shrivastava, (2014) 14 SCC 523—laying down that courts lack pedagogic expertise and must defer to subject experts unless evaluation is vitiated by fraud or gross illegality—the Bench held that procedural lapses by an examiner do not empower the court to award marks. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed, limiting relief to 1.5 marks determined by the Board’s subject expert, and the Board was directed to issue a corrected marksheet incorporating the revised score.

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA

The Division Bench partly allowed the intra-court appeal holding that while the challenge to the 14.02.2012 cancellation order was rightly dismissed by the Single Judge as barred by twelve years of unexplained delay under Article 226, the Corporation was bound to refund the deposits with interest since the cancellation order itself contemplated refund upon surrender of documents and nowhere alleged misrepresentation or fraud so as to trigger the forfeiture clause in paragraph 14 of the Self-Financing Cost Effective Workers Housing Scheme. The decisive ground was that the 04.07.2022 refusal to refund, premised on purported misrepresentation, was patently illegal because the 14.02.2012 speaking order had cancelled the allotments only on the ground that husband and wife allotments were contrary to the “spirit of the Scheme” and not for furnishing incorrect information; therefore the Corporation could not retrospectively invoke the forfeiture limb of paragraph 14 which applies only when cancellation is “for misrepresentation, furnishing of incorrect information or for committing default of the terms and conditions.” Rejecting the plea of laches against the refund claim, the Court held that once the allottees complied with the condition of surrendering original documents on 09.11.2020 and applied for refund on 08.09.2020, the Corporation’s obligation to return the principal crystallised and delay in surrender could not justify denial of refund; following the principle that statutory or contractual forfeiture must be strictly construed and cannot be extended by implication, as reiterated in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1999) 3 SCC 715, the Corporation was directed to refund the entire deposits with simple interest at 6% per annum from 08.09.2020 till actual payment within eight weeks.

JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA

The Delhi High Court disposed of a writ petition by Lancers Convent School challenging the Municipal Corporation of Delhi’s (MCD) demolition of a safety gate erected, without prior sanction, on a public lane shared with New Town CGHS, Sector-14, Rohini, to curb parking menace and harassment faced by 5,000 minor students. Holding that no coercive action shall proceed until statutory clearances are exhausted, Justice Mini Pushkarna treated the petition itself as a representation to both MCD and Delhi Traffic Police, mandating sequential consideration under MCD’s Circular dated 25-06-2007 which predicates gate installation on (i) codal formalities, (ii) Traffic Police NOC, and (iii) final MCD approval. Rejecting the school’s plea for immediate interim protection, the Court underscored the doctrine of prior permission enshrined in the 2007 policy and emphasized that public streets cannot be privatized without rigorous scrutiny of safety, egress and traffic flow. Reliance was implicitly placed on the Supreme Court’s dictum in State of U.P. v. Vijay Kumar (2016) 13 SCC 1 that user of public streets is subject to reasonable regulatory conditions. Consequently, Delhi Traffic Police shall first hear the petitioner, grant or deny NOC with reasoned order, whereafter MCD shall pass a fresh speaking order in accordance with law; demolition shall remain stayed until the twin-stage process is completed.

JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA

The Delhi High Court allowed the petitioner's application for extension of the catering stall license at Shridham Railway Station for seven months beyond the expiry date of 04.12.2025, holding that parity demanded consistent treatment with previous cases where similar relief was granted. The decisive ground was the Court's earlier orders in W.P.(C) 2953/2025 (Sadeek Ali) and W.P.(C) 3474/2025 (Shri Kishori Lal), wherein extensions were granted on identical facts, coupled with the uniform nationwide application of Indian Railways' catering policy. Rejecting the respondents' implied opposition, the Court reaffirmed its territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1) following Ved Prakash Mishra v. Union of India (W.P.(C) 6771/2024), which applied Jayaswals Neco Ltd. v. Union of India to hold that where the Railway Board at New Delhi is the authority to whom the writ must issue, the Delhi High Court has jurisdiction notwithstanding that no part of the cause of action arose within Delhi. The Court directed extension subject to payment of stipulated license fees and filing of an undertaking to vacate upon expiry, while clarifying that the extension would not preclude the Railways from inviting fresh tenders for the stall thereafter.

JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the sealing of M/s Aerosky Deluxe Hotel under Section 345-A of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, directing the petitioner to approach the Judicial Committee constituted by the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2518. The decisive ground was that the Supreme Court had established an exclusive remedial mechanism through the Judicial Committee comprising retired Judges Justice Pradeep Nandrajog and Justice G.S. Sistani to adjudicate sealing/de-sealing disputes, rendering writ jurisdiction inappropriate. Rejecting the contention that the "bed and breakfast" facility was permissible, the Court held that all challenges to Monitoring Committee decisions must follow the hierarchical structure established by the Supreme Court. The principle that specialized judicial bodies created by the apex court for factual adjudication must be exhausted before approaching constitutional courts was applied, following the ratio that where an alternative efficacious remedy exists, writ jurisdiction should not be invoked. The Court directed that all contentions regarding permissible use under Master Plan Delhi-2021 be raised before the Judicial Committee, which possesses comprehensive powers under paragraphs 19-24 of the Mehta judgment to summon persons, requisition documents, and pass final orders on regularization, compounding or demolition, with appeals lying only to the Supreme Court through SLP mechanism.

JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

The Delhi High Court dismissed petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of Section 138 NI Act proceedings, holding that the dishonoured cheque represented a legally enforceable debt arising from a Loan Agreement dated 20.11.2012 which incorporated Rs.2.5 crores previously advanced under a frustrated Joint Venture Agreement. The decisive finding was that the cheque, though initially given as security, crystallized into enforceable liability when the loan was recalled under Clause 6 on 08.04.2015, and the subsequent encashment of a second cheque for Rs.1.5 crores demonstrated acknowledgment of debt. Rejecting the defence that no subsisting liability existed, the Court held that disputes regarding breach of reciprocal obligations or utilization of funds are triable issues which cannot be examined at the Section 482 stage, especially when an Arbitral Tribunal has already confirmed liability for the remaining Rs.1 crore with 18% interest. The Court further upheld vicarious liability of all Directors under Section 141 NI Act, applying National Small Industries Corporation v. Harmeet Singh Paintal (2010) 3 SCC 330 and Kamalkishor Taparia v. India Ener-gen (2025 INSC 223) to hold that specific averments of directors being "in charge of day-to-day affairs" suffice at the summoning stage, without requiring verbatim reproduction of statutory language. The petitions were dismissed with directions to face trial.

JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, holding that Ms. 'P', being a major aged approximately 19 years (DOB 26.01.2007), is at liberty to reside wherever she chooses. The decisive ground was that the Court traced the alleged missing daughter through video conferencing, where she voluntarily stated she had married Mr. 'A' and was residing at her matrimonial home in Village Chudali Raipur Sadat, Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh. The Court rejected any contention of illegal detention after examining the marriage certificate produced and interacting with both Ms. 'P' and her husband, who confirmed his educational pursuits and residential details. The legal principle applied was the constitutional right of a major citizen to personal liberty and freedom of movement under Article 21, which cannot be curtailed by parental objection once majority is attained. The Court facilitated reconciliation by ensuring the petitioners received contact details and arranged video interaction between Ms. 'P' and her parents, though it clarified that her voluntary decision to remain with her husband is constitutionally protected. No further orders were deemed necessary, and all pending applications were disposed of accordingly.

JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA, JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union of India's petition challenging the CAT's order quashing recovery of Dress Allowance from workers who had been receiving it since 2017, holding that the Tribunal correctly applied principles of natural justice and consistent tribunal precedents. The decisive ground was that the respondents had been receiving washing allowance since 1960 and the Composite Dress Allowance @ Rs.5,000 per annum was granted pursuant to conscious 7th CPC implementation decisions by Ministry of Finance and DoP&T, not withdrawn; the impugned recovery orders violated natural justice as they were passed without hearing affected employees. Rejecting the petitioner's attempt to distinguish CAT Chandigarh decisions in Gurmit Singh (O.A. 060/01228/2019, 05.06.2020) and Birbal & Ors. (O.A. 278/2023, 22.07.2024), the Court emphasized that petitioners failed to file copies of those binding precedents which had consistently held that Dress Allowance, having replaced washing allowance, cannot be recovered once granted. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's finding that since DoP&T had specifically clarified entitlement categories, withdrawal and recovery was unsustainable, directing refund of any amounts recovered while upholding workers' continued entitlement to the allowance for performing duties requiring special uniform/gear.

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH, JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging an Order-in-Original dated 21st January 2025 imposing GST demand of Rs.23,20,171/- for alleged fraudulent ITC availment, relegating petitioner to appellate remedy under Section 107 CGST Act by 15th January 2026 with pre-deposit. Following Toshniwal Electricals Pvt Ltd (W.P.(C) 16455/2025) and consistent jurisprudence in Mukesh Kumar Garg, Metal Techs and Sheetal Sons, the Court held that writ jurisdiction is inappropriate for complex GST fraud cases requiring factual adjudication of ITC transactions exceeding Rs.122 crores involving 79 fake entities and 1155 recipients. The decisive factors were: (i) absence of exceptional circumstances warranting Article 226 interference despite alleged violation of natural justice principles, as petitioner failed to substantiate hearing denial or file substantive reply to show cause notice; (ii) availability of statutory appeal remedy; (iii) need to prevent multiplicity of litigation and protect GST regime from fraudulent ITC claims under Section 16. Reliance was placed on Commercial Steel Limited (Civil Appeal 5121/2021) where Supreme Court held writ maintainability requires breach of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, excess jurisdiction or vires challenge, none established here. The Court directed GST authorities to ensure accuracy in future notices while granting petitioner liberty to pursue appellate remedy without limitation bar.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union of India's petition challenging the Armed Forces Tribunal's award of disability pension to HFO Jai Kumar Giri for Type-II Diabetes Mellitus, holding that where a 37-year veteran declared himself diabetes-free at enrolment and the Release Medical Board failed to positively identify a non-service cause, the benefit of liberal interpretation mandated attribution to military service. Following its binding precedent in Union of India v. Ex Sub Gawas Anil Madso, 2025 DLT 711, the Court reiterated that once the presumption under Article 226 of sound entry is unrebutted, the employer must demonstrate with reasons that the disability is neither attributable to nor aggravated by service, a burden the RMB's cursory "lifestyle disorder" remark did not discharge. The bench, exercising certiorari jurisdiction as circumscribed by Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, (1963) SC 24, found no jurisdictional error or error of law apparent on the record in the AFT's application of the Supreme Court's latest exposition in Bijender Singh v. UOI, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 895, which mandates 50% disability pension for every invalided soldier unless pre-entry affliction is proved. Compliance with the AFT's direction to grant lifelong disability pension at 50% for 20% disability rounded off was ordered within twelve weeks.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union's petition challenging the Armed Forces Tribunal's award of disability pension to Gp Capt Shashi Kant Mishra (Retd), holding that where a 33-year veteran was disease-free at enlistment and the Release Medical Board merely labelled CAD and primary hypertension as "NANA" without positively identifying a non-service cause, the statutory presumption under Bijender Singh v UOI that deterioration is attributable to military service remained unrebutted. Following its recent rulings in Ex Sub Gawas Anil Madso and WO Binod Kumar Sah, the Court reiterated that once a soldier is accepted as SHAPE-I, the employer bears the burden to prove with reasons that the disability was neither caused nor aggravated by service; mechanical invocation of paras 43 and 47 Chapter VI GMO 2008 is insufficient when no negligence or pre-existing condition is shown and the Commanding Officer certifies no misconduct. Certiorari being supervisory, the Court declined to re-appreciate facts, finding the AFT's conclusion consonant with the binding principle that disability pension is a beneficial provision to be construed liberally and that any disease manifesting after decades of service must be presumed service-connected unless clear contrary evidence exists, and directed compliance within twelve weeks.

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH, JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging an Order-in-Original dated 21st January 2025 imposing GST demand of Rs.34,47,419/- on the petitioner for fraudulent ITC availment, relegating the petitioner to the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017 by 15th January 2026 with requisite pre-deposit, following its consistent view that writ jurisdiction is not maintainable in complex GST fraud cases requiring factual adjudication. The decisive ground was that the petitioner failed to establish any exceptional circumstance warranting interference under Article 226, as no fundamental rights violation, principles of natural justice breach, or jurisdictional excess was demonstrated, merely alleging lack of proper hearing without filing substantive reply to the show cause notice. The Court rejected the typographical error contention regarding reply date as inconsequential since no reply was ever filed, emphasizing that fraudulent ITC transactions involving non-existent entities causing Rs.122 crore revenue loss require detailed factual analysis inappropriate for writ jurisdiction. Relying on Commercial Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No.5121/2021) where the Supreme Court held that existence of statutory remedy under Section 107 is not absolute bar but writ lies only in exceptional circumstances, and its own decisions in Mukesh Kumar Garg, Metal Techs, and Toshniwal Electricals cases, the Court reiterated that GST fraud cases impact the entire regime and cannot be entertained to support unscrupulous litigants, while directing the Department to ensure accuracy in future notices and orders.

JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN

The Delhi High Court enhanced the motor accident compensation from Rs. 76,050/- to Rs. 1,06,050/- under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that the Tribunal's assessment of non-pecuniary damages required inflation-adjusted enhancement for pain and suffering (Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 30,000/-) and loss of amenities (Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 15,000/-), while maintaining the medical expenses of Rs. 26,343/-, conveyance/special diet of Rs. 5,000/-, and three-month loss of earnings of Rs. 29,700/- as correctly assessed. The decisive ground was that despite no permanent disability being established, the 2006 accident victim—a 55-year-old ITBP constable who suffered leg fracture requiring prolonged treatment including surgeries at Safdarjung and Batra Hospitals—deserved higher solatium considering the Consumer Price Index showed 3.5 times monetary devaluation and minimum wages increased six-fold between 2006-2025. The Court rejected the Insurance Company's opposition to enhancement, finding the Tribunal's three-month loss of leave compensation appropriate given medical evidence of hospitalization periods from July-September 2006 without proof of extended five-month leave. Following the principles in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Ltd. that compensation must be reasonable and just, and applying the multiplier method from Sarla Verma v. DTC, the Court directed the balance amount with 7% interest to be deposited within eight weeks for equal distribution among the deceased claimant's widow and five children.

JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN

The Delhi High Court dismissed Royal Sundaram's appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, affirming the Tribunal's award of Rs 23,84,524 with 9% interest to Rupesh Jha, a 34-year-old cab driver who suffered 29% permanent right-lower-limb disability in a 04.09.2020 collision on Noida Expressway. The decisive ground was that the Tribunal's correlation of Jha's vocation with his injury to assess 50% functional disability for future earnings comported with Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343, which mandates a three-step inquiry: activities the claimant can still perform, his pre-accident profession, and whether he can earn through altered or reduced work. Rejecting the insurer's plea to mechanically equate the 29% physical impairment with economic loss, the Court held that continuous use of the right limb is indispensable for long-distance commercial driving, and the non-progressive 29% lower-limb disability therefore reasonably translates to 50% loss of earning capacity; having accepted Jha's unrebutted evidence that driving was his sole livelihood since 2011 and that he can no longer operate a cab, the Tribunal correctly applied the Raj Kumar principle and adopted minimum wages for quantifying pecuniary loss, rendering interference unwarranted.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union of India's petition challenging the Armed Forces Tribunal's award of disability pension to HFO Madan Singh (Retd) for primary hypertension, applying the ratio of UOI v Ex-Sub Gawas Anil Madso, 2025 DLT 711, and Bijender Singh v UOI, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 895. The decisive ground is that where a recruit's self-declaration and entry medical record show no pre-existing hypertension and the Release Medical Board (RMB) fails to positively identify a non-service cause, the statutory presumption under Chapter VI Para 43 GMO (Military Pension) 2008, read with Article 226, treats the disability as attributable to military service; mere recital that onset was not "associated with stress and strain of service" is insufficient. Rejecting the Union's plea that 30% disability is below the 20% threshold, the Court held that any disease warranting invalidation after 38 years of unblemished IAF service must be deemed above 20% and rounded off to 50% for pension. Certiorari lies only for jurisdictional error, not appreciation of evidence; the AFT's findings are neither perverse nor unsupported. Compliance with the award, including 6% interest on arrears, is to be ensured within twelve weeks.

JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN

The Delhi High Court enhanced compensation to a claimant who suffered 89% permanent disability from bilateral above-knee amputation after alighting from a UPSRTC bus, holding that the Tribunal erred in assessing functional disability at only 80% and in pegging her income to UP unskilled minimum wages. Applying Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343, the Court correlated the undisputed evidence that the 40-year-old housewife also tilled agricultural land and, with both limbs lost, raised functional disability to 90%. Rejecting the plea to apply Delhi wages, it followed Jagdish v. Om Pal Singh MAC.APP. 279/2019 (decided 10.12.2024) that a housewife’s earning capacity equals skilled labour, remanding computation on UP skilled rates. It further remanded assessment of future medical expenses and artificial limbs cost, citing Mohd. Sabeer v. RSRTC (2023) 20 SCC 774 and Oriental Insurance v. Anshu Kumar 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5416, and quadrupled non-pecuniary heads from Rs 2.5 lakh to Rs 10 lakh (Rs 2.5 lakh each for shock, pain, loss of amenities and disfiguration). The award is modified accordingly and sent back for fresh quantification within the above parameters.

JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR, JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union of India's petition challenging the Armed Forces Tribunal's award of disability pension to Ex-HFO Pradeep Kumar for primary hypertension, applying the binding precedent in Union of India v Ex-Sub Gawas Anil Madso (2025 DLT 711) which held that when a recruit is certified disease-free at entry, the Release Medical Board must positively establish a non-service cause to deny attribution. Following Bijender Singh v UOI (2025 SCC OnLine SC 895), the Court reaffirmed that Article 14 of the Constitution read with pension regulations creates a presumption that any deterioration during 38 years of Air Force service is service-related unless rebutted by specific reasons, and absence of field posting alone cannot negate attribution under para 43 Chapter VI GMO 2008. Reiterating that certiorari under Article 226 cannot reassess facts but only correct jurisdictional errors, the bench found the AFT's inference that lifelong 30% hypertension arose in service to be neither perverse nor unsupported, especially since the RMB recorded no ante-service history and the commanding officer certified no negligence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine with direction to disburse 50% disability pension within twelve weeks.

JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

The Delhi High Court appointed Mr. Parikshit Pitale as Sole Arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, holding that prima facie a valid arbitration agreement existed in Clause 14 of the Work Order dated 09.02.2024. The decisive ground was the petitioner’s demonstration that the respondent had accepted part performance by receiving an advance of ₹37,96,610/- and had, by its conduct, accepted the work order containing the arbitration clause. Rejecting the respondent’s plea that the work order was never accepted and was sent belatedly, the Court observed that documents at page 30 evidenced acceptance and that performance had proceeded. Following the ratio of In Re: Interplay (2022) and BGM & M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1471), the Court reiterated that under Section 11(6A) its scrutiny is confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement under Section 7, leaving questions of validity, arbitrability or disputed facts to the arbitral tribunal under Section 16. Accordingly, the petition was allowed, the arbitrator was directed to proceed under DIAC rules with seat at New Delhi, and all rights and contentions of parties were kept open for determination on merits.

JUSTICE SAURABH BANERJEE

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the quantification of damages for unauthorized occupation, holding that the Estate Officer's assessment at Rs.16,280 per month based on comparable leases under Section 7(2) Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1971 read with Rule 8 PP Rules was neither arbitrary nor illegal, since the petitioner having failed to pay rent despite termination under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act 1882 became an unauthorized occupant liable to market-rate damages. The decisive ground was that the petitioner, who had accepted tenancy under the 2004 allotment letter and took actual possession only on 25.02.2007, never challenged the comparable lease evidence before the Estate Officer or the District Judge and therefore could not seek reappraisal of evidence under Articles 226/227; the Court relied on Batliboi & Co. Ltd. v. LIC (MANU/DE/2170/2011) that comparable leases within the same building are a valid benchmark and H.S. Gupta v. Union of India (1982 SCC Online Del 254) that concurrent findings on damages cannot be re-opened, distinguished Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre (2004) 8 SCC 229 on waiver of rent enhancement, and held that the impugned order dated 20.02.2021 suffers no jurisdictional error warranting interference.

JUSTICE A.S. GADKARI, JUSTICE RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE

The Bombay High Court allowed the appellant's bail application under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, holding that prolonged pre-trial incarceration of 5 years and 7 months, coupled with the unlikelihood of trial completion within reasonable time, constitutes violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The decisive ground was that the appellant's discharge application remained pending for over 3 years in a case involving 20,000 pages of evidence and 363 witnesses, where 9 co-accused had already been granted bail on parity. Rejecting NIA's contention that Section 43-D(5) of UAPA creates absolute bar, the Court harmonized statutory restrictions with constitutional powers, following Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 which held that rigours of special enactments melt down where trial completion is remote. The Court distinguished Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2024 SCC OnLine SC 109) on facts, noting that unlike Gurwinder where trial had commenced, here even charge remains unframed. Emphasizing that constitutional courts must lean towards constitutionalism, the Court directed release on Rs.1 lakh bond with conditions including monthly NIA reporting, passport surrender, and territorial restrictions, while rejecting NIA's stay request given the substantial incarceration period already undergone.

JUSTICE ARUN R. PEDNEKER

The Bombay High Court set aside the appellate court's orders rejecting petitioners' nominations for Ward 6 seats 6-A and 6-B of Paithan Municipal Council, holding that the Returning Officer was bound to afford opportunity to rectify defects in Annexure-2 forms under the mandatory proviso to Rule 13(5) of Maharashtra Municipal Councils Election Rules, 1966, which mirrors Section 36(5) of Representation of People Act. The decisive ground was that where nomination papers contain curable defects like mismatch between seat number in nomination form and party authorization (Annexure-2), the Returning Officer must grant time "not later than the next day" to rebut objections, following Rakesh Kumar v. Sunil Kumar (1999) 2 SCC 489 which held wrongful rejection without such opportunity vitiates election. Rejecting respondents' contention that fresh Annexure-2 submitted after nomination last date was impermissible, the Court held that rectification during scrutiny process under remand orders cannot be defeated by hyper-technical interpretation since Section 10(2) proviso permits multiple councillors from same ward without sub-division. The Court emphasized that interference at this stage, when elections stand postponed under Notification dated 29.11.2025, would subserve free and fair elections as held in Karmaveer Tulshiram Autade v. State Election Commission 2021 (2) Mh.L.J. 349, and directed acceptance of rectified Annexure-2 forms and inclusion of petitioners' names in fresh nomination list.

JUSTICE NITIN B. SURYAWANSHI, JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE VAISHALI NIMBAJIRAO PATIL

The Bombay High Court quashed the Scrutiny Committee’s 29.11.2020 order cancelling the petitioner’s Tokre Koli Scheduled Tribe certificate, holding that the Committee failed to discharge its quasi-judicial duty to independently assess evidence before accepting the Vigilance Cell’s ipse dixit of interpolation in pre-constitutional school and birth registers. Perusing the original records, the Court found no material interpolation: differing ink and handwriting reflect successive public officers’ entries, names added later accord with normal practice, and pages alleged to be inserted showed no tampering. Reliance on Anand v. Committee for Scrutiny (2012) 1 SCC 113, the Court held pre-Independence entries of “Dhor Koli/Koli Dhor” carry higher probative value; their coexistence with post-Independence “Tokre Koli” entries, both covered by Entry 28 of the Presidential Order, is not inconsistent but reflects permissible nomenclatural variance, as settled in Samriddhi Yogesh Savale v. State (WP 1209/2022). Once the petitioner discharged her burden under Section 8 of the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Vimukta Jatis and Nomadic Tribes (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of Caste Certificate) Act 2000 by producing century-old consistent records, the Committee could reject them only by adducing counter-evidence or expert opinion, which it omitted. The affinity test, being non-conclusive, could not fill this evidentiary void. The Court directed issuance of a valid Tokre Koli certificate within four weeks.

JUSTICE G. S. KULKARNI, JUSTICE MS. JUSTICE AARTI ARUN SATHE

The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging cancellation of appointment as Junior Laboratory Chemist, holding that claiming project-affected-person status based on grandfather's land acquisition after 45 years was untenable and violated Clause (iii) of Advertisement No.04-2010 which required the candidate himself to be project-affected. The decisive ground was that the 2013 Land Acquisition Certificate merely showed grandfather's land was acquired in 1964, without award details or petitioner's ownership, rendering him ineligible for preferential appointment. Rejecting reliance on Vijay v. State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition No.6291/2010), the Court distinguished that precedent as concerning the petitioner's own land acquisition, unlike present case. The Court emphasized that accepting such claims would open floodgates of ineligible applications contrary to advertisement's clear terms requiring personal project-affected status, not inheritance through ancestors. Additionally, the petition was barred by gross delay and laches, having been filed in September 2022 against May 2016 cancellation order without satisfactory explanation. While dismissing the petition, the Court clarified that petitioner remains entitled to participate in future recruitment processes subject to fulfilling eligibility criteria, though not as project-affected person, thereby upholding the principle that statutory preferences must be strictly construed and personally established.

JUSTICE DR. NEELA GOKHALE

The Bombay High Court rejected bail for the Nigerian national found with 460 grams of commercial quantity Mephedrone, holding that Section 37 NDPS Act mandatory twin conditions remain unfulfilled where reasonable grounds exist to believe the accused committed the offence and may abscond given her expired visa status. Dr. Neela Gokhale J. found compliance with Sections 42 and 50 NDPS Act as the written information forwarded to Senior Officer and voluntary consent letter waived magistrate search, distinguishing Sarija Banu (2004) 12 SCC 266 and Aarif Akram Singh 2023:BHC-AS:5149 where procedural violations were substantial. The Court applied Collector of Customs v. Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549 holding that "reasonable grounds" require substantial probable causes, not merely prima facie doubts, particularly where 460 grams MD was recovered from her jacket and she supplied drugs to co-accused Raju and Papya. Rejecting contentions of two-year incarceration and procedural lapses including unsigned panchas, the Court held such evidentiary disputes are triable issues and commercial quantity drug trafficking attracts 10-20 years imprisonment, making unauthorized overstaying accused flight risk. The bail application was dismissed with liberty to trial court to decide merits uninfluenced by prima facie observations.

JUSTICE RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, JUSTICE ASHWIN DAMODAR BHOBE

The Bombay High Court directed the State of Maharashtra to complete within eight weeks the scrutiny of each petitioner‐school’s claim for arrears of reimbursement under Section 12(2) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, and to release the admissible amount within a further two weeks, following the precedent set in Gurukul English Medium School v. State of Maharashtra, WP 6020/2024 decided on 2 May 2024 where identical relief was granted to unaided schools entitled to per‐child reimbursement for admitting 25% disadvantaged children; the Court rejected the respondents’ plea for indefinite delay and held that once statutory obligation to reimburse is triggered, the State cannot withhold payment on the pretext of fresh verification, reiterating the principle that statutory grants are not largesse but enforceable rights, and that delay in disbursing reimbursements paralyses private schools compelled to provide free seats; if any petitioner is found ineligible, a reasoned speaking order must be passed, leaving the aggrieved school to pursue statutory remedies, thereby balancing accountability with prompt compliance under the constitutional mandate of free education under Article 21A, and the Court discharged the rule, disposing of WP 16035/2025 along with connected petitions.

JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE V. V. KANKANWADI, JUSTICE HITEN SHAMRAO VENEGAVKAR

The Bombay High Court held that while the State Election Commission's last-minute postponement of municipal elections was constitutionally permissible under Articles 243K and 243ZA, its belated exercise betrayed lack of administrative foresight and deserved condemnation. The decisive ground was that the appellate timeline contingency was foreseeable when the election programme was framed under Rule 4(3) of Maharashtra Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats Election Rules 1966, which expressly contemplates revised withdrawal dates post-appeal decisions. Rejecting the Commission's plea of exceptional circumstances, the Court emphasized that fragmentation of wards violates electoral integrity since voters cast multiple votes simultaneously, citing its earlier decision in Rahul Khandagale. Following Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu (2013) 9 SCC 659 on voter's free agency and PUCL v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399 on uninfluenced electoral choice, the Court directed that counting and declaration of results for all municipal bodies, whether under original or revised programme, shall be deferred until after 21 December 2025 to prevent bandwagon effect. The Commission was directed to frame comprehensive guidelines within ten weeks to anticipate appellate delays and ensure uniform treatment of constituencies within wards, while immediately condemning its arbitrary fragmentation approach.

JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE V. V. KANKANWADI, JUSTICE HITEN SHAMRAO VENEGAVKAR

The Bombay High Court held that the State Election Commission's last-minute postponement of municipal elections, though within constitutional authority under Articles 243K and 243ZA, betrayed administrative impropriety by failing to anticipate foreseeable appellate delays against nomination rejections under Rule 15 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats Election Rules, 1966; while refusing to quash the postponement orders to avoid electoral chaos, the Court directed that counting and declaration of results for all local bodies—whether proceeding under the original programme or the revised 20 December 2025 schedule—be deferred until 21 December 2025 to prevent the bandwagon effect condemned in S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2013) 9 SCC 659, and PUCL v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399, which affirm that voters' free agency requires insulation from premature trends; the Court also deprecated fragmentation of wards by conducting elections in some constituencies while postponing others, mandated uniformity hereafter, prohibited exit polls until 20 December polling ends, and directed the Commission within ten weeks to frame guidelines integrating appellate timelines into election calendars, ensuring that postponement power is exercised transparently and promptly, not as a belated reaction to predictable procedural contingencies.

JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE V. V. KANKANWADI, JUSTICE HITEN SHAMRAO VENEGAVKAR

The Bombay High Court held that while the State Election Commission possesses constitutional authority under Articles 243K and 243ZA to postpone municipal elections in exceptional circumstances, its last-minute postponement 72 hours before polling—due to delayed appellate decisions on nomination rejections—reflected avoidable administrative impropriety and lack of foresight, though the Court declined to quash the postponement orders to prevent further electoral chaos. The decisive ground was that the appellate timeline clash was foreseeable under Rule 15 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats Election Rules, 1966, and Rule 4(3) expressly contemplates revised withdrawal dates post-appeal, which the Commission failed to integrate into its original calendar. Rejecting the Commission’s justification that candidates revived post-withdrawal deadline needed fresh withdrawal opportunity, the Court emphasized that fragmenting elections within a single ward violated the statutory scheme and its own precedent in Rahul S/o. Shankarrav Khandagale (WP/14316/2025). Relying on S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu (2013) 9 SCC 659 and PUCL v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399—affirming voters’ right to uninfluenced choice—the Court directed simultaneous declaration of results for all municipal bodies only after 21 December 2025, prohibited exit polls until polling ends, and mandated framing of guidelines within ten weeks to prevent future last-minute disruptions.

JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE V. V. KANKANWADI, JUSTICE HITEN SHAMRAO VENEGAVKAR

The Bombay High Court held that while the State Election Commission possesses constitutional authority under Articles 243K and 243ZA to postpone municipal elections in exceptional circumstances, its last-minute postponement of certain Nagar Panchayat and Nagar Parishad elections—just 72 hours before polling—reflected a lack of administrative foresight and constitutional discipline, especially since the appellate timeline clash was foreseeable under Rule 15 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats Election Rules, 1966. The Court deprecated the fragmentation of wards, where some constituencies proceeded to poll while others were deferred, as inconsistent with the statutory scheme and its own earlier ruling in Rahul S/o. Shankarrav Khandagale. Emphasizing the Supreme Court’s rulings in S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu and PUCL v. Union of India, which underscore the voter’s right to exercise free and uninfluenced choice, the Court directed that counting and declaration of results for all local bodies, whether under the original or revised programme, be deferred until after polling on 20 December 2025, with all results to be declared together on or after 21 December 2025. Exit polls were also barred until polling ended. The Commission was further directed to frame guidelines within ten weeks to prevent such last-minute disruptions and ensure uniformity in future elections.

JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE V. V. KANKANWADI, JUSTICE HITEN SHAMRAO VENEGAVKAR

The Bombay High Court held that while the State Election Commission's last-minute postponement of municipal elections under Articles 243K and 243ZA was constitutionally permissible, its arbitrary exercise—fragmenting wards and disrupting the electoral calendar 72 hours before polling—betrayed lack of administrative foresight and violated the structured scheme of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats Election Rules, 1966. The decisive ground was that the Commission failed to anticipate foreseeable appellate delays against nomination rejections, which Rule 4(3) expressly contemplates by mandating a revised withdrawal timeline, and instead resorted to selective postponement within wards, contrary to its own stand in Rahul Khandagale (WP 14316/2025) that a ward must vote as an indivisible unit. Rejecting the plea to quash the revised programme to avoid electoral chaos, the Court, invoking S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu (2013) 9 SCC 659 and PUCL v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399 to protect voters’ “free agency” from bandwagon effect, directed simultaneous declaration of results for all bodies on or after 21 December 2025, prohibited exit-poll dissemination until 20 December polls conclude, and mandated framing of guidelines within ten weeks to ensure future calendars embed appellate contingencies and ward integrity.

JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE V. V. KANKANWADI, JUSTICE HITEN SHAMRAO VENEGAVKAR

The Bombay High Court held that while the State Election Commission possesses constitutional authority under Articles 243K and 243ZA to postpone municipal elections in exceptional circumstances, its last-minute postponement of polls in select constituencies—72 hours before voting—evinced administrative impropriety and violated the integrity of the electoral calendar. The decisive ground was that the Commission failed to anticipate foreseeable appellate delays against nomination rejections, despite Rule 4(3) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats Election Rules, 1966 expressly providing for revised withdrawal dates post-appeal. Rejecting the Commission’s plea of ensuring candidates’ withdrawal rights, the Court condemned the fragmentation of wards into staggered electoral cycles, citing its earlier judgment in Rahul S/o. Shankarrav Khandagale (WP/14316/2025) that ward-wise simultaneity is mandatory. Emphasizing that premature declaration of results would create an unconstitutional bandwagon effect infringing the “free agency of the voter” (S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2013) 9 SCC 659), the Court directed that counting for all municipal bodies—whether under the original or revised programme—be deferred until after 20 December 2025, with unified result declaration on 21 December 2025, and mandated framing of future guidelines to prevent such disruptions.

JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE V. V. KANKANWADI, JUSTICE HITEN SHAMRAO VENEGAVKAR

The Bombay High Court held that while the State Election Commission's last-minute postponement of municipal elections under Articles 243K and 243ZA was constitutionally permissible, its arbitrary exercise 72 hours before polling—fragmenting wards and disrupting the electoral calendar—betrayed lack of administrative foresight and violated the structured scheme of Maharashtra Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats Election Rules, 1966. The decisive ground was that the appellate contingency was foreseeable and Rule 4(3) read with Rule 17 already provides for revised withdrawal dates, rendering belated postponement an improper response; fragmentation within a ward is impermissible as held in Rahul Khandagale. Rejecting the Commission’s plea of ensuring candidates’ withdrawal rights, the Court condemned the conduct while refusing to quash orders to avoid greater uncertainty, relying on S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu (free voter agency) and PUCL v. Union of India (uninfluenced choice) to direct simultaneous declaration of all results on or after 21 December 2025, prohibition of exit polls until 20 December polls end, and mandating comprehensive guidelines within ten weeks to integrate appellate timelines and prevent future last-minute disruptions.

JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE V. V. KANKANWADI, JUSTICE HITEN SHAMRAO VENEGAVKAR

The Bombay High Court held that while the State Election Commission possesses constitutional authority under Articles 243K and 243ZA to postpone municipal elections in exceptional circumstances, its last-minute postponement of certain Nagar Panchayat and Nagar Parishad elections—just 72 hours before polling—reflected a lack of administrative foresight and constitutional discipline, though the Court declined to quash the postponement orders to avoid electoral chaos. The decisive ground was that the Commission failed to anticipate foreseeable delays in appellate decisions on nomination disputes under Rule 15 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats Election Rules, 1966, and fragmented wards by allowing some constituencies to proceed while postponing others, contrary to its own earlier stand in Rahul S/o. Shankarrav Khandagale. Rejecting the Commission’s justification that delayed appeals necessitated postponement to preserve candidates’ withdrawal rights under Rule 17, the Court emphasized that electoral uniformity and voter autonomy must be safeguarded. Relying on S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2013) 9 SCC 659, which affirmed that the “free agency of the voter” is fundamental to electoral democracy, and PUCL v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399, which held that any state action impairing voters’ independent choice is unconstitutional, the Court directed that counting and declaration of results for all municipal bodies—whether under the original or revised programme—be deferred until after polling in postponed areas on 20 December 2025, with all results to be declared together on or after 21 December 2025, and prohibited exit polls until voting concludes.

JUSTICE MANISH PITALE, JUSTICE SMT MANJUSHA AJAY DESHPANDE

The Bombay High Court acquitted all five appellants convicted for murder under Sections 302, 324, 307, 143, 147 and 148 IPC, holding that the prosecution's sole reliance on injured eye-witnesses Suraj Khode and Amol Nikam was insufficient when their testimony was seriously tainted by previous enmity and unnatural conduct. The decisive ground was that these witnesses, despite knowing the accused, failed to disclose their identities to anyone—including police who were with them from 11:00 p.m. to 4:30 a.m.—creating reasonable doubt of false implication, especially after the trial court itself had discarded the third eye-witness Sachin Kadam's evidence and disbelieved weapon recoveries. Rejecting the State's contention that injured eye-witnesses command inherent credibility, the Court applied the Supreme Court's ruling in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614) that witnesses falling in the "neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable" category require corroboration in material particulars, and followed Muluwa v. State of M.P. [(1976) 1 SCC 37] where delayed disclosure rendered testimony unnatural. The Court emphasized that previous enmity being a double-edged sword, the prosecution's failure to examine crucial witnesses like Gorakh Nathe and Saurabh Junagade, coupled with negative ballistic reports and absence of independent witnesses, compelled extending benefit of doubt to accused. The appeals were allowed, convictions set aside, and appellants directed to be released forthwith on executing PR bonds of Rs.25,000 each under Section 481 BNSS.

JUSTICE M. M. SATHAYE

The Bombay High Court dismissed STC's revision applications, holding that Clause 15 of the lease deed does not cap mesne profits at Rs.12/- per sq.ft. per month, applying Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The decisive ground was that Clause 15 stipulates a penalty for unauthorized occupation "without prejudice to other rights and remedies," expressly preserving the landlord's right to claim higher compensation. Rejecting STC's contention that mesne profits are contractually limited, the Court distinguished between 'penalty' under Section 74 and 'mesne profits' under Section 2(12) CPC, emphasizing that wrongful possession, not breach of contract, is the essence of mesne profits. Following Humayun Dhanrajgir v. Ezra Aboody [(2008) SCC OnLine Bom 420], it held that a party in wrongful possession cannot claim absence of profits to reduce liability. The Court affirmed the principle from STC v. Neelam Choudhary (CRA/111/2019) that contractual penalties do not preclude higher mesne profits, a view upheld by the Supreme Court. Consequently, it allowed Godavaridevi Agrawal's revision, restoring the trial court's award of Rs.150/- per sq.ft. per month for the period 01/10/2003 to 31/10/2010, while dismissing STC's applications seeking to limit mesne profits to Rs.12/- per sq.ft.

JUSTICE M. M. SATHAYE

The Bombay High Court dismissed STC’s revisions and held that Clause 15 of the lease deed does not cap mesne profits at Rs 12/- per sq ft per month; the decisive ground is that the clause, being a stipulation by way of penalty under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, is expressly “without prejudice to the lessor’s other rights and remedies” and therefore does not limit the landlord’s statutory claim under Section 2(12) CPC for wrongful possession after the 20-year term. Rejecting STC’s plea that the named sum is an upper limit and that newly discovered documents showing non-profit government service should reduce liability, the Court emphasised that mesne profits are assessed on what the wrongful possessor might ordinarily have received, not on actual profits, following Humayun Dhanrajgir v Ezra Aboody. The Court maintained judicial consistency with the coordinate bench judgment in STC v Neelam Choudhary (since affirmed by the Supreme Court) and restored the trial court award of Rs 150/- per sq ft per month for the period 1-10-2003 to 31-10-2010, allowing CRA 929/2014 and dismissing CRA 308/2011 and 835/2014; depositors were permitted to withdraw amounts with accrued interest, subject to final adjustment in execution.

JUSTICE M. M. SATHAYE

The Bombay High Court dismissed STC’s revisions and held that Clause 15 of the lease deed, stipulating Rs 12/- per sq ft per month for unauthorised occupation after 20 years, is a penalty under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and does not cap mesne profits; the decisive ground is the express “without prejudice to other rights and remedies” language which keeps mesne profits, governed by Section 2(12) CPC and distinct from breach of contract, outside the clause. Rejecting STC’s plea that the named sum is the outer limit and that newly-discovered documents showing non-profit operations under government direction should reduce the award, the Court followed its coordinate judgment in STC v Neelam Choudhary (dismissed by Supreme Court on 15-01-2025 and review rejected on 08-09-2025) and Humayun Dhanrajgir v Ezra Aboody, 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 420, which emphasise that wrongful possession is the essence of mesne profits and the defendant cannot plead absence of profit. Applying Martin & Harris v Rajendra Mehta, (2022) 8 SCC 527, the Court maintained consistency and enhanced the rate to Rs 150/- per sq ft per month for the Nariman Point premises for the period 01-10-2003 to 31-10-2010, allowed withdrawal of deposited amounts with interest, and refused further interim protection.

JUSTICE M. M. SATHAYE

The Bombay High Court dismissed STC’s revisions and held that Clause 15 of the lease deed does not cap mesne profits at Rs 12/- per sq ft per month; the decisive ground is that the clause, being a stipulation by way of penalty under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, is expressly “without prejudice to the lessor’s other rights and remedies” and therefore does not limit the landlord’s entitlement to claim higher mesne profits under Section 2(12) CPC for wrongful possession after the 20-year term. Rejecting STC’s plea that the named sum is an upper limit and that newly discovered documents showing non-profitability should be entertained, the Court ruled that mesne profits are assessed on what the wrongful possessor might ordinarily have received (relying on Humayun Dhanrajgir v. Ezra Aboody) and that concurrent findings in STC v. Neelam Choudhary, affirmed by the Supreme Court, operate as constructive res judicata. Following Martin & Harris v. Rajendra Mehta, the Court enhanced the rate to Rs 150/- per sq ft per month for the Nariman Point premises from 1-10-2003 to 31-10-2010, allowed CRA 929/2014, dismissed CRA 308/2011 and CRA 835/2014, and directed release of deposited amounts with accrued interest.

JUSTICE BISWAJIT BASU

The Calcutta High Court quashed the State's creation of 1600 supernumerary posts to absorb expired-panel waitlisted candidates of 1st SLST 2016, holding that such action violates Articles 14 and 16 and the West Bengal School Service Commission (Upper Primary) Rules 2016. The decisive ground is that the panel and waiting list lapsed on 11-12-2019, and Rule 16 proviso bars recommendation against vacancies not notified under Rule 8(3)(b); consequently, the cabinet decision dated 05-05-2022 and notifications dated 19-05-2022 and 14-10-2022 are arbitrary attempts to revive a dead panel. Rejecting the State’s plea that the posts serve Article 21-A and RTE Act obligations, the Court held that executive power under Article 162 cannot override constitutional equality or statutory recruitment procedure, and supernumerary posts can only absorb existing employees, not confer fresh appointments. The unsuccessful petitioners possess locus as participants alleging fraud vitiating the entire process, and delay is no bar where fundamental rights are breached. Reliance is placed on B. Valluvan v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 686 (panel life is strictly statutory), Jagdish Chopra v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 8 SCC 161 (one-year norm), and Devdutta v. State of M.P. 1991 Supp (2) SCC 553 (absorption presupposes prior employment). The writ petitions are listed for January 2026 to decide remaining issues.

JUSTICE APURBA SINHA RAY

The Calcutta High Court allowed the civil revision and directed immediate execution of the decree dated 16.01.2007, holding that the executing court erred in refusing to proceed merely because the judgment-debtor had deposited occupational charges with delays and some gaps, when the High Court's order dated 11.04.2016 in SAT No. 193 of 2012 expressly provided that interim stay would "automatically vacate" upon any failure to deposit either arrears or current monthly charges of Rs. 7,000 within the 10th of each month. The decisive ground was that the executing court lacked discretion to ignore patent non-compliance with the conditional stay order once the decree-holder furnished prima facie proof of delayed and missing payments, and the judgment-debtor's absence after service amounted to admission. Rejecting the respondent's implied plea of substantial compliance, the Court reaffirmed the maxim qui non obstat quod obstare potest facere videtur (he who does not prevent what he can prevent is taken to have done it) and the principle that conditional orders must be strictly construed; it relied on its own coordinate ruling in Satyendra Nath Dutta v. Prabir Kumar Dutta, 2015 SCC OnLine Cal 7798, where similar default in deposit automatically lifted stay. The executing court was directed to examine its records and, if the affidavit of breaches is verified, to forthwith proceed with Title Execution Case No. 72 of 2007 without awaiting further directions.

JUSTICE LANUSUNGKUM JAMIR, JUSTICE RAI CHATTOPADHYAY

The Division Bench partially allowed the appeal holding that the Single Judge erred in suo motu enhancing gratuity from 18 to 33 years when neither party had challenged the Appellate Authority’s finding under Section 4(2) read with Section 2A of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; the decisive ground is that access to justice under the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, as expounded in Bhagubhai Dhnbhai Kalasi (2007) 4 SCC 241 and Ashok Kumar Nigam (2016) 12 SCC 797, forbids putting an appellant in a worse-off position by creating a third case. Rejecting the employer’s plea that leave registers alone discharge the burden of proving broken service, the Court held that once the master-servant relationship subsisted till superannuation without any break order under Section 2A(1), the Appellate Authority’s concurrent finding of 18 years’ continuous service stands immune from perverse interference; the principle that factual findings under the Act attain finality unless patently unreasonable, reiterated in Bakshish Singh (1994) 1 SCC 9, applies. Accordingly, the Court directed payment of gratuity on Rs. 549.41 per day wages for 18 years aggregating Rs. 2,83,083.51 with interest under Section 7(3A), adjusting Rs. 99,000 already paid and releasing the deposited Rs. 83,752 within four weeks.

JUSTICE SAUGATA BHATTACHARYYA

The Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition directing the respondents to treat the petitioner as medically fit for appointment as Constable (G.D.) in CAPFs, the decisive ground being the conclusive medical report dated 24th November, 2025 from the independent Medical Board of IPGMER-SSKM Hospital which found the petitioner's thyroid function and anatomy to be normal with no clinical significance attached to an incidental tiny cyst, thereby establishing that he does not suffer from enlarged thyroid as previously declared in the review medical test. Rejecting the respondents' reliance on Koushik Gayen v. Union of India (WPA 20911 of 2023) where a candidate was found medically unfit due to low haemoglobin levels, the Court distinguished that precedent on the principle that while haemoglobin levels can be improved through diet and medication within a short period, thyroid enlargement represents a permanent medical condition, and more significantly, the independent medical examination has conclusively established the absence of such condition. The Court applied the principle that when divergent medical opinions exist, reference to an independent medical expert is warranted, and having found the Medical Board's report to be credible and unambiguous in stating that the petitioner's condition is "NOT A CONTRAINDICATION for disqualification of employment," directed the concerned authorities to consider his appointment if otherwise eligible.

JUSTICE ANANYA BANDYOPADHYAY

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the writ petition seeking regularization of a casual worker appointed in 1999 by the Pradhan without sanctioned post, selection process, or State approval, holding such appointment illegal ab initio under Section 86 of West Bengal Panchayat Samiti Administration Rules, 2008 and Section 20 of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973. Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay rejected the plea that 20 years of unblemished service could cure illegality, emphasizing the distinction drawn in Umadevi (3) (2006) 4 SCC 1 and M.L. Kesari (2010) 9 SCC 247: irregular appointments against sanctioned posts may be regularized if minimum qualifications and 10 years’ service exist, but illegal appointments—made without sanctioned vacancy, statutory process, or competent authority—are void from inception and cannot be validated by efflux of time. The Court held that compassionate engagement by Pradhan under Section 20 for social development does not equate to recruitment under Rules; absence of District Level Selection Committee, advertisement, and prior State approval rendered the engagement not merely procedurally defective but jurisdictionally non-est. Consequently, no legitimate expectation or equitable relief under Articles 14 and 16 can compel regularization of an appointment born outside the constitutional and statutory scheme.

JUSTICE ANANYA BANDYOPADHYAY

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging disciplinary proceedings under CISF Rules 2001, holding that judicial review under Article 226 is supervisory, not appellate, and cannot re-appreciate evidence where enquiry complied with statutory rules and natural justice principles. The decisive ground was that the petitioner admitted failing to deposit one magazine and 15 live rounds within stipulated time—a grave lapse for disciplined force personnel—while the Enquiry Officer considered evidence, permitted cross-examination, supplied enquiry report, and disciplinary authority applied independent mind before imposing removal penalty. Rejecting arguments of procedural irregularity, bias and disproportionality, the Court emphasized that disciplinary authorities are exclusive fact-finding bodies whose findings cannot be interfered with unless perverse, irrational, or violating Wednesbury principles of reasonableness. Following Union of India v. Dalbir Singh (2021) 11 SCC 3216 and State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar (2011) 10 SCC 249, the Court held that where misconduct is established on preponderance of probability and procedural safeguards are satisfied, punishment cannot be termed shocking to judicial conscience merely because other personnel weren't proceeded against, absent demonstrable mala fide or perversity. The Court reaffirmed that constitutional courts cannot substitute their assessment for disciplinary authorities' factual conclusions regarding quantum of punishment.

JUSTICE HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the revision petition holding that an executing court can direct delivery of khas possession even when a decree for specific performance of contract is silent on possession, since delivery is an inseparable incident of sale under Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya rejected the judgment-debtors’ contention that Explanation V to Section 11 CPC deemed the relief refused, ruling that the decree, by directing execution of the sale deed, impliedly compelled the vendor to put the purchaser in possession. The decisive reasoning followed Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal (1982) 1 SCC 525 where the Supreme Court read Section 22 and Section 28(3) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 together and held that “in an appropriate case” a decree for specific performance simpliciter gives complete relief without express possession clause, because the seller’s obligation to deliver possession flows from the contract itself. The Court distinguished Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Daulet (2001) 7 SCC 698 and Desh Raj v. Rohtash Singh (2023) 3 SCC 714 as dealing with personal acts and earnest money refund, not with the substantive incident of sale. Emphasising that the executing court must give full effect to the decree, the judgment affirmed that once the sale deed was executed through court, delivery of possession was mandatory to satisfy the decree, and no separate suit was necessary.

JUSTICE DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the criminal revision petition seeking quashing of proceedings under Sections 341/323/506/34 IPC, holding that the FIR prima facie disclosed cognizable offences and the retracted medical report alone could not vitiate the prosecution. The decisive ground was that while Dr. Udit Roy admitted the injury report mentioning "grievous hurt" was prepared in haste, this did not negate the allegations of wrongful restraint, simple hurt and criminal intimidation, particularly when the victim's statement and witness accounts supported the occurrence. Rejecting arguments under Sections 167(5) and 468 Cr.P.C., the Court held that supplementary charge-sheet filed pursuant to High Court's direction for further investigation could not be invalidated by delay, and cognizance taken on police report was protected under Section 460(e) Cr.P.C. Applying the principles from Rabi Shankar Srivastava and Ravindra Kumar Goenka that Section 482 power must be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of process, the Court emphasized that disputed factual questions including medical evidence credibility required trial adjudication. The Court clarified that mere existence of civil disputes between parties or personal animosity could not automatically render criminal proceedings mala fide, directing that all defenses could be raised during charge hearing before the trial court.

JUSTICE KRISHNA RAO

The High Court dismissed the criminal revision and upheld the conviction under Section 354 IPC, holding that the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts were based on credible evidence. The decisive ground was the consistent testimony of the victim (PW-1) that the petitioner Sk. Abu Saleh and co-accused Khokon Mallick had forcibly touched her breasts and torn her blouse during the assault, which was corroborated by the independent eyewitness PW-2 and the medical evidence of PW-3 who found tenderness over both breasts. The Court rejected the defence suggestion of self-inflicted injury as the cross-examination failed to challenge the material particulars or the doctor’s report marked as Exhibit-1. Applying the principle that modesty of a woman is outraged when the act is such as would be perceived as insulting to the modesty of a female, the Court found the act of touching breasts and tearing the blouse squarely covered by Section 354 IPC. Following the precedential value of State of Punjab v. Major Singh, the Court held that the reduction of sentence from one year to six months by the appellate court was already lenient and no further interference was warranted, directing the petitioner to surrender within one week to serve the modified sentence.

JUSTICE SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, JUSTICE SUPRATIM BHATTACHARYA

The Division Bench allowed the appeal setting aside the Single Judge's direction to modify the July 17, 2019 Vacancy Notification, holding that the State correctly applied the 2013 Control Order as amended by the December 18, 2018 Notification which removed preference for women-run SHGs while retaining SHGs as eligible category alongside cooperatives and individuals, and maintained Rs.50 lakh working capital requirement per July 21, 2014 Government Order. The decisive ground was that the September 25, 2018 Division Bench judgment merely directed fresh notification "in terms of the 2013 Control Order" without mandating retention of women SHG preference, its observations being obiter dicta as held in Arun Kumar Aggarwal v. State of M.P. (2014) 13 SCC 707, and since neither the 2018 amendment nor the 2014 financial criterion were challenged, the respondent cannot seek modification under Edukanti Kistamma v. S. Venkatareddy (2010) 1 SCC 756. Rejecting parity plea for Rs.25 lakh limit applicable to other locations, the Court distinguished Jamtalahat as being governed by specific judicial directions, and held that tender conditions cannot be interfered with merely because preferable terms exist, following Directorate of Education v. Educomp Datamatics Ltd. (2004) 4 SCC 19, directing authorities to proceed with the 2019 notification from its current stage.

JUSTICE SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, JUSTICE SUPRATIM BHATTACHARYA

The Division Bench allowed the State’s appeal and restored the Sub-Divisional Controller’s order dated 24-03-2025 revoking the Fair Price Shop licence of respondent Kandi Srijani, holding that a licensing authority inherently possesses the power to recall a licence issued ab initio to an ineligible entity without any specific statutory clause of revocation. The decisive ground was that the respondent, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and not a co-operative society, fell squarely outside the mandatory eligibility criteria of the 11-12-2023 Vacancy Notification which, by employing the word “must”, confined applications to individuals, registered partnership firms, registered co-operative societies, SHGs or Sanghas operating in Domkal Sub-Division, and therefore the grant was void from inception. Rejecting the writ petitioner’s plea that Clause 24 of the West Bengal PDS (Maintenance & Control) Order 2013 or natural justice required a post-grant hearing, the Court distinguished “revocation” (recalling an invalid act) from “cancellation” (penal termination for post-licence misconduct) and held that no separate hearing is due when the very issuance is ultra vires. Reliance on Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1985 SC 697 (power to revoke inheres in the authority that grants) and Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Ajit Kumar Kar, AIR 2009 SC 34 (bona fide mistake conferring no right) fortified the view that the licensing authority could correct its error; Section 21 General Clauses Act was held inapplicable to an executive vacancy notification. The Bench clarified that subsequent 2025 amendment inserting Clause 14A, empowering higher authorities to revoke, is prospective and cannot whittle down the inherent power; coordinate Bench decision in Sonai Food Marketing distinguishing a “group of individuals” clause was held contextually irrelevant. Consequentially, the Single Judge judgment reinstating the licence was set aside with no order as to costs.