JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JUSTICE S.V.N. BHATTI

The Supreme Court reversed the Kerala High Court's quashing of drug misbranding prosecutions, holding that Section 202 CrPC enquiry is not mandatory when complaints are filed by public servants acting officially, and that limitation under Section 468(2)(c) CrPC commences only when offender's identity crystallizes during investigation under Section 469(1)(c). The decisive ground was that the proviso to Section 200 CrPC read with Section 32 of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940 places public servants on a distinct pedestal, exempting them from examination on oath and consequently from Section 202 enquiry, as clarified in Cheminova India Ltd. v. State of Punjab (2021) 8 SCC 818 where Government Analyst reports are per se admissible under Section 293 CrPC. Rejecting the contention that Cheminova was distinguishable for lacking analyst corroboration, the Court held that the legislative intent in exempting public servants from examination applies uniformly to all complaints by authorized officers. The Court further ruled that vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Act against company directors requires factual determination at trial, not at pre-cognizance stage. Setting aside the impugned judgments, the Court directed fresh summons against the companies and substituted the deceased Managing Director with persons then in charge, emphasizing that findings are limited to procedural aspects and do not prejudice merits.

JUSTICE PANKAJ MITHAL, JUSTICE S.V.N. BHATTI

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that Ext.1 dated 23.03.1998 executed by Late Anima Bose in favour of Vivekananda Kendra created a valid 99-year lease and not a mere licence, rendering the unilateral cancellation deed dated 03.12.2003 illegal and the subsequent sale to Defendants 3-4 during lis pendens void. The decisive ground is that the document expressly “demises” the land with buildings for 99 years at yearly rent of Rs.1,000, grants the Kendra exclusive possession of the demised portion, empowers alterations and constructions, and binds “heirs, successors, administrators and permitted assigns”, thereby satisfying Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; retention of the first floor by the lessor only excluded that portion from demise and did not negative exclusive possession. Rejecting the High Court’s reliance on post-execution conduct, the Court held that where the text is unambiguous the intention must be gathered from the plain language alone, eschewing purposive or ex-post facto construction. Applying Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor AIR 1959 SC 1262 and Mrs M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain AIR 1965 SC 610, the Court emphasised that nomenclature is irrelevant and the substance must be preferred to form; since the Kendra acquired a leasehold interest, Section 111 TPA conditions for determination were not met, the purchasers had notice under Section 52 TPA (lis pendens), and the suit filed in 2005 was within limitation. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court decrees are restored; Defendants 3-4 take subject to the lease.

JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH, JUSTICE SANDEEP MEHTA

The Supreme Court directed all States and Union Territories to operationalise and expand Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) as constitutionally mandated instruments of rehabilitative justice under Article 21, holding that chronic prison overcrowding (120.8% national average) and systemic exclusion of women violate fundamental rights. The decisive ground is that OCIs cost merely Rs 49.60 per prisoner per day against Rs 333.12 in closed prisons, while offering graded liberty, community employment and family integration essential for reformation. Rejecting the Union’s plea that “prisons” fall under Entry 4 State List, the Court invoked its Article 32 power to enforce constitutional guarantees of dignity, equality and social reintegration, emphasising that incarceration must not degenerate into inhumanity. Drawing upon Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608 (right to life includes dignified living conditions) and Rama Murthy v. Karnataka (1997) 2 SCC 642 (open prisons as “successful individualisation of penalties”), the Court framed Common Minimum Standards through a High-Powered Committee chaired by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, mandated to formulate uniform eligibility, gender-sensitive access, community-work models and quarterly monitoring via suo motu writs before every High Court. States lacking OCIs must create them or open barracks within three months, fill existing vacancies within two months, and file compliance before State-level Committees headed by SLSA Chairpersons.

JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA, JUSTICE AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH

The Supreme Court held that simultaneous CIRP proceedings against both principal debtor and corporate guarantor are maintainable under IBC, overruling Vishnu Kumar Agarwal v. Piramal Enterprises which prohibited second applications after admission against one entity. The decisive ground is Section 60(2) IBC read with Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which establishes co-extensive liability of guarantors, as affirmed in BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. Rejecting arguments based on doctrine of election and double enrichment, the Court held that creditors need not split claims between debtor and guarantor since proceedings remain separate with distinct CoCs, and safeguards under Regulations 12A and 14 of the 2016 Regulations prevent excess recovery through mandatory claim updates. The Court emphasized that IBC proceedings, though not recovery mechanisms per se, cannot deny creditors their contractual right to proceed simultaneously against both parties, particularly when guarantees serve as fail-safe mechanisms. Following the 'clean slate' principle from Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons v. Edelweiss ARC and Essar Steel v. Satish Kumar Gupta, the Court held that restricting claims would force creditors to forfeit legitimate dues. Accordingly, appeals against NCLT/NCLAT orders rejecting simultaneous proceedings were allowed, while those permitting such proceedings were dismissed, keeping all merits open for adjudication.

JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN

The Delhi High Court disposed of O.M.P. (COMM) 503/2024 by applying the doctrine of merger, holding that since the impugned arbitral award stood set aside by the coordinate bench's judgment in O.M.P. (COMM) 475/2024 delivered the same day, the petitioner's challenge had become infructuous. The decisive ground was that the earlier judgment, having attained finality between the same parties concerning identical subject matter, operated as res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, rendering any separate adjudication superfluous. The Court rejected the Railway Board's contention that the petition required independent consideration, emphasizing that judicial economy and consistency in coordinate benches mandated disposal in terms of the precedent established in O.M.P. 475/2024. Applying the principles enunciated in Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1454, that judgments of coordinate benches bind each other absent contrary Supreme Court authority, the Court held that allowing divergent outcomes on identical facts would violate the basic structure of judicial discipline. Consequently, the petition stood disposed of with all pending applications, following the precedent that once an award is set aside in companion proceedings, derivative challenges must necessarily fail, embodying the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium."

JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

The Delhi High Court declined to interfere with an eviction order under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, holding that the petitioner must pursue the statutory appeal remedy under Rule 22(3)(4) of the Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009, within the 60-day limitation period. The decisive ground was that the order dated 31.01.2026 was explicitly appealable, and the Court found no merit in bypassing this hierarchy when the alternative remedy remained unexhausted. While rejecting the petitioner's plea to set aside the eviction on the basis of an earlier protection order under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 restraining dispossession from the shared household, the Court emphasized that the apparent conflict between the two statutory regimes—PWDV Act and Senior Citizens Act—must be resolved in the appellate forum. Relying on Smt. S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors., (2021) 15 SCC 730, which held that the Senior Citizens Act cannot be used to nullify protections under other laws especially Section 17 PWDV Act, the Court granted a 10-day stay on coercive action purely on humanitarian grounds to enable the petitioner to file an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, clarifying that no observations were made on merits.

JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal holding that the deceased was a bona fide passenger and his death constituted an "untoward incident" under Section 123(c)(2) of the Railways Act, 1989, setting aside the Tribunal's dismissal of the claim application. The decisive ground was that the recovered ticket (No. H-28434390) verified by the Chief Booking Supervisor and the body found between railway tracks at KM 1367/2 discharged the initial burden of proof, shifting the onus to the Railways which failed to rebut the presumption. The Court rejected the Tribunal's technical approach demanding CRIS verification and its characterization of injuries as "self-inflicted," emphasizing that Section 124-A imposes strict no-fault liability where fault becomes irrelevant once an untoward incident is established. Relying on Union of India v. Rina Devi (2019) 3 SCC 572 for burden-shifting principles and Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (2008) 9 SCC 527 for liberal interpretation of beneficial legislation, the Court held that mid-section discovery without "run over" reports cannot constitute exceptions under Section 124-A proviso clauses (a)-(e). The matter was remanded for compensation assessment within two months, listing before the Tribunal on 10.03.2026, with directions to disburse amounts thereafter.

JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003, holding that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant dishonestly abstracted electricity by illegally tapping supply from BSES LT MP boxes to 229 dwelling units. The decisive ground was the unrebutted statutory presumption under the third proviso to Section 135, which shifts the burden onto the accused once theft is proved, a principle reinforced by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Milind (2001) 2 SCC 18. The Court rejected the appellant’s contentions regarding non-examination of consumers, absence of proof of ownership of premises L-21, and delay in lodging the complaint, holding that contemporaneous inspection reports, seizure memos, and videographic evidence constituted cogent proof of the offence independent of title deeds. It distinguished between residence at L-382 and the operational site L-21, noting that DW1’s testimony only addressed the former and failed to rebut the presumption. The departmental delay of ten months was held to be procedurally explained by the requirement to raise a theft bill and issue notice before criminal prosecution, causing no prejudice to the accused. Consequently, the sentence of two years’ simple imprisonment and cumulative liability of ₹1.84 crores was affirmed.

JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA

The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition seeking examination of defence witnesses and challenging previous judicial orders, holding it to be a frivolous attempt to protract trial proceedings. The decisive ground was the petitioner's failure to demonstrate any application before the trial court for summoning defence witnesses, coupled with his inability to substantiate allegations of forgery under Section 313 CrPC or explain how a Single Bench could set aside Division Bench orders in LPA No. 667/2023. The Court rejected all prayer clauses as the learned counsel failed to respond to specific queries regarding the maintainability of setting aside coordinate bench orders and the legal basis for treating judicial actions as contempt under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or offence under Section 198 BNS. Following the principles established in Godrej Pacific Tech Ltd. v. Computer Joint India Ltd. (2008) 11 SCC 108 and T. Nagappa v. Y.R. Murlidhar (2008) 2 SCC (Crl.) 677 regarding abuse of process, the Court imposed costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- to be deposited with DLSA, Central District within one week, while directing the Secretary, DLSA to ensure recovery of both trial court and High Court costs through due process of law.

JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH

The Delhi High Court appointed Mr. Varun Kumar Chopra as Sole Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, holding that prima facie the arbitration clause in Clause 10(j) of the 2014 Distribution Agreement subsists despite three subsequent Settlement Agreements (SAs). The decisive ground was that the SAs merely restructured payment schedules without expressly superseding the original arbitration clause, rendering the plea of novation under Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act a disputed question of fact and law reserved for the arbitrator under the kompetenz-kompetenz principle. Rejecting the respondent’s contention that the SAs’ exclusive jurisdiction clauses evidenced conscious exclusion of arbitration, the Court held that such substitution requires detailed examination of contractual intent, which is impermissible at the referral stage. Applying Sanjiv Prakash v. Seema Kukreja (2021) 9 SCC 732 and Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn. (2021) 2 SCC 1, the Court emphasized that Section 11(6A) confines judicial scrutiny to prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement, not novation or arbitrability. The Court distinguished Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta AIR 1959 SC 1362 as pre-dating the 1996 Act’s minimalist intervention scheme. Consequently, all objections including novation, survival of the arbitration clause, and jurisdiction are left open for the arbitrator to determine under DIAC Rules, with parties directed to approach the arbitrator within two weeks.

JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

The Delhi High Court held that a writ petition challenging bank account freezing during criminal investigation must be registered as a criminal writ petition, not civil, since the action emanates from FIR No. 35/2025 and Sections 94 and 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, rendering the dispute predominantly criminal in nature. The decisive ground was that the impugned notices dated 23-24 January 2026 were issued by Tamil Nadu Police invoking investigative provisions to prevent diversion of suspected scam proceeds, thereby attracting the test laid down in M/s Nagpur Cable Operators’ Association v. Commissioner of Police, Nagpur (AIR 1996 Bom 180) and followed in N. Prakash v. Manoj Kumar (2025 SCC OnLine Ker 1149), that writ petitions arising from investigation, enquiry or trial of offences are criminal proceedings. The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that Section 107 BNSS, a civil forfeiture provision, ought to have been invoked, observing that whether the police correctly invoked Section 106 BNSS is a merit issue to be decided later. Applying the principle that nomenclature does not circumscribe Article 226 power, the Court directed re-registration of the petition as Writ Petition (Criminal) and listing before the appropriate Bench, leaving all rights and contentions open.

N/A

The Delhi High Court declined to quash the summoning order under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, holding that despite the mechanical nature of the order dated 29.04.2023, the ingredients of the offence were prima facie satisfied. The decisive ground was that the cheque, though issued as 'security', was dishonoured for insufficient funds, and the statutory notice under Section 138 was duly served, triggering the presumption under Section 139. The Court rejected the petitioners’ contention that the cheque was not meant for presentment absent prior intimation and cure period, ruling that such contractual stipulations do not negate criminal liability under Section 138. It emphasised that existence of debt or liability is a triable issue, not to be scrutinised at the summoning stage. The Court, relying on *Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda*, (2015) 12 SCC 420 and *JM Laboratories v. State of A.P.*, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 208, reiterated that while a Magistrate need not record detailed reasons, the summoning order must reflect application of mind to the factual matrix and legal ingredients. Though the impugned order lacked reasoning, the Court, having perused the complaint, cheque, dishonour memo, and statutory notice, found sufficient ground for proceeding. It vacated the stay and directed the trial court to proceed expeditiously in accordance with law.

N/A

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of summoning order dated 23.08.2018 against SRK Devbuild Pvt Ltd in proceedings under Section 138 NI Act, holding that the company was properly arrayed as accused despite the cheque being drawn on director's personal account. The decisive ground was that the cheque dated 05.06.2018 for Rs. 2 crores was issued in accordance with the Personal Guarantee Deed dated 31.03.2017 whereby director Subhash Chand Aggarwal stood guarantee for company's obligations, thereby establishing composite liability under Section 141 NI Act. The Court rejected arguments regarding mechanical summoning and lack of application of mind, distinguishing Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749 and Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda (2015) 12 SCC 420, while noting that detailed reasons are not mandatory at summoning stage. The petitioner's reliance on subsequent CIRP proceedings initiated on 03.01.2020 and liquidation ordered on 26.02.2021 was held irrelevant since the offence under Section 138 NI Act crystallized upon dishonour on 08.06.2018, much before insolvency proceedings. The Court vacated the stay granted on 15.07.2024 and directed proceedings to continue against the company, emphasizing that vicarious liability under Section 141 NI Act extends to companies when cheques are issued for corporate debts.

JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

The Delhi High Court stayed the termination notice issued by Pushpawati Singhania Research Institute against Mahajan Imaging under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, holding that the Radiology Services Agreement was not determinable under Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The decisive ground was that Clause 10.2(a) conditioned termination upon material breach and mandatory 45-day cure notice, which respondents failed to issue, rendering the termination procedurally invalid. Rejecting respondents’ reliance on National Highways Authority v. HK Toll Road and Indian Oil v. Amritsar Gas, the Court distinguished that contracts terminable only for cause with cure mechanisms are not determinable, applying K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa which classifies such agreements as category (iv) – terminable for cause subject to notice and opportunity to cure – and thus specifically enforceable. The Court found prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury established, noting premature termination would divest petitioner of 5-year unexpired tenure and render arbitration nugatory. Directions issued to maintain status quo ante, preserve contractual framework, and strictly adhere to Clause 10 termination protocol pending arbitration, while expressly reserving all merits for arbitral tribunal.

JUSTICE GIRISH KATHPALIA

The High Court dismissed the bail application in FIR No. 72/2021 under Sections 363/366(A)/368/370/370(A)/372/376/34 IPC read with Sections 3/4/5/6/7 ITP Act and Sections 6/17 POCSO Act, observing that the accused allegedly trafficked girls including a minor into prostitution resulting in repeated rapes. The decisive ground was the applicant's continued absence despite the matter being listed four times, including three adjournments granted by the predecessor bench at her counsel's request, and today neither the arguing counsel nor any instructing counsel appeared, with only a proxy counsel seeking further passover which the Court declined given the 179 old pending bail applications transferred to this bench. The Court rejected the tacit prayer for adjournment, noting that bail jurisprudence under Section 439 CrPC requires the accused to demonstrate prima facie case, flight risk and tampering concerns, but here the applicant's conduct manifested absence of diligence and the record revealed grave offences of human trafficking and aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child. Following the principle in State v. Sanjay Chandra (2012) 1 SCC 40 that bail is not an absolute right and the accused must cooperate with the process, the Court dismissed the application, leaving the applicant to pursue statutory remedies with proper representation.

JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN

The Delhi High Court set aside the arbitral award dated 05.08.2024, holding that the unilateral appointment of a serving Railway employee as sole arbitrator violated Section 12(5) read with Schedule VII of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, rendering the appointment void ab initio and the award a nullity. The decisive ground was the absence of an express agreement in writing waiving Section 12(5), as mandatorily required by its proviso, despite the respondent’s explicit communications dated 29.05.2023 and 11.08.2023 refusing such waiver. Rejecting the respondent’s contention that shortlisting two names from the petitioner’s panel or consenting to fast-track arbitration under clause 2905(c)(ii)(a) of the Indian Railway Standard Conditions of Contract constituted implied waiver, the Court reaffirmed that waiver must be unequivocal, conscious and in writing, not inferred from conduct. Reliance on Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 INSC 6, and Mahavir Prasad Gupta v. GNCTD, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4241, the Court emphasised that ineligibility under Schedule VII is peremptory, equal treatment in appointment is non-negotiable, and a party who unilaterally appoints an ineligible arbitrator cannot be estopped from challenging the award under Section 34. The petition was allowed and the award set aside.

JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA

The High Court acquitted the appellants convicted under Section 308 read with Section 34 IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the trial court erred in relying on contradictory testimony. The decisive ground was that PW2 (injured) and PW5 (occurrence witness) turned hostile, with PW2 explicitly denying that the appellants caused his injuries and stating he became unconscious after being hit from behind without identifying assailants, while PW5 denied seeing weapons or the actual assault, creating irreconcilable contradictions with the prosecution's case that the three brothers attacked with iron rods and bricks. The Court rejected the trial court's reliance on the FIR and medical evidence alone, emphasizing that while injuries were established, there was no credible evidence linking the appellants to the assault, particularly when key witnesses disavowed their previous statements. Applying the principle that conviction cannot rest on hostile witness testimony without corroboration, the Court followed the precedent that hostile witnesses require careful scrutiny and independent evidence for conviction. The appeal was allowed under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C., acquitting all appellants and cancelling their bail bonds, with their immediate liberty directed.

JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

The Delhi High Court dismissed the Union of India's application for restoration of its writ petition and condonation of 395 days' delay, holding that state instrumentalities cannot claim indulgence for repeated defaults rooted in systemic lethargy. The decisive ground was the petitioner-department's third dismissal for non-prosecution between 2010-2024, exposing a persistent pattern of callousness despite two earlier restorations on payment of costs of Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 15,000. Rejecting the plea that disbanding its erstwhile panel counsel disrupted tracking, the Court emphasised that administrative lapses and counsel-switching cannot constitute "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Applying the rigorous standard laid down in Shivamma (dead) v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, it held that delay must be explained day-by-day with bona fide diligence throughout, particularly when the State is party, lest constitutional courts legitimise official apathy. Reliance was also placed on Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, (2012) 5 SCC 157, and Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, to reiterate that government agencies shoulder special obligation to litigate diligently and that liberal condonation cannot be anticipated as a benefit. Consequently, the vague, after-thought explanation blaming former counsel was held insufficient, the delay was not condoned, the restoration application was dismissed, and the respondent-workman was held entitled to enjoy the fruits of the Industrial Tribunal's 2003 reinstatement award unhindered by further procedural spoliation.

JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

The Delhi High Court set aside the arbitral tribunal's order directing the appellant-society to deposit ₹3,00,000/- monthly as mesne profits from 15.10.2018, holding that Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot be invoked to grant substantive monetary relief where the foundational liability itself remains seriously disputed. The decisive ground was that the impugned order, though styled as interim protection, effectively pre-judged core disputes regarding title, validity of lease termination dated 09.04.2018, and alleged family settlement without any evidentiary assessment, thereby transgressing the preservative (not adjudicatory) contours of Section 17. Rejecting the respondent's reliance on comparable lease deeds of 2021 and 2025 to retrospectively fix quantum from 2018, the Court emphasized that quantification of mesne profits is inherently fact-intensive and cannot be mechanically premised on unverified exemplars sans trial or expert evaluation. Applying the triple test for interim relief—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury—the Court found the tribunal failed to record any satisfaction thereof, while the appellant-educational institution faced coercive financial prejudice without any demonstrated urgency or asset-dissipation risk. Upholding the protective directions permitting monthly inspection and restraining third-party interests as they merely preserve the subject-matter, the Court followed Evergreen Land Mark Pvt. Ltd. v. John Tinson & Company Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 7 SCC 757, which held that disputed monetary liability cannot be secured under Section 17 prior to adjudication on merits.

JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

The Delhi High Court directed Jamia Hamdard to pay minimum wages under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 from the date of the Section 17B application (2025) till disposal of its writ petition challenging the Labour Court’s reinstatement award, holding that the workman’s affidavit asserting continuous unemployment since 1996 termination shifted the burden onto the employer to prove gainful employment, which burden the university failed to discharge despite 13-year delay in filing the application; the Court rejected the management’s contention that the delay evidenced absence of financial hardship, explaining that transient or intermittent village labour does not constitute “adequate remuneration” under the proviso to Section 17B and that the provision is mandatory once statutory conditions are satisfied, as clarified in Centaur Hotel v. P.S. Mohan Nair (2011 SCC OnLine Del 1861) and Surjeet Singh v. Dominant Systems (2023 SCC OnLine Del 1999). Reiterating the principles from Food Craft Institute v. Rameshwar Sharma (2006 SCC OnLine Del 505), the Court held that merits of the writ petition are irrelevant at this stage, ordered monthly minimum-wage payment by the 9th of each month with 6% interest for default, and made payment conditional on the workman filing a fresh fortnightly affidavit of unemployment, while keeping the main writ petition listed for final arguments on 20 April 2026.

JUSTICE SANDEEP V. MARNE

The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging eviction under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, holding that a protected tenant under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 cannot resist eviction once the premises become “public premises” under Section 2(e) of the PP Act. The decisive ground was the Supreme Court’s ruling in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Vita (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2772) which overruled Dr. Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and held that the PP Act overrides all State rent control legislations irrespective of when the tenancy was created, once the premises are acquired by a government entity and are in unauthorised occupation. The Court rejected the contention that the 1972 decree under Section 13(1)(hh) of the Bombay Rent Act operated as res judicata against the Bank’s fresh plea of bona fide requirement, emphasising that such requirement is a continuing phenomenon. It also repelled the vagueness challenge to the Section 4 notice, noting that 47 years of admitted non-payment of rent and the petitioner’s indirect sub-letting to a third party running a different business constituted clear grounds under Section 4(1) read with Section 7(3) of the PP Act. The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 was declined, as no jurisdictional error or perversity was found in the District Judge’s concurrent findings.

JUSTICE RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, JUSTICE ABHAY J. MANTRI

The Bombay High Court dismissed 25 writ petitions challenging eviction orders under Section 5A of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, holding that unauthorised structures on railway land at Malad (East) since 1980 cannot claim rehabilitation under the Government Resolution dated 12 December 2000 or the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) Resettlement & Rehabilitation Policy. The decisive ground was petitioners’ failure to establish eligibility as Project Affected Persons (PAPs) under Clause 6 of the 2000 Resolution, absence of proof that structures fall within 10 metres of the 6th railway line, and non-demonstration of coverage under any railway scheme. Rejecting reliance on Utran Se Besthan Railway Jhopadpatti Vikas Mandal v. Union of India (2021), the Court distinguished that due process under Section 5A(2) was followed here, unlike the arbitrary action condemned in Utran. Applying the principle that special statutes like the 1971 Act provide a summary eviction mechanism for public premises (Section 2(e), 2(g), 5A), and drawing on Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan (1997) 11 SCC 121, the Court directed vacation within 60 days, authorised forcible demolition with police assistance, mandated collector-recording of occupants for future rehabilitation consideration, and clarified that any allotment shall be at authorities’ discretion and not necessarily at the same site.

JUSTICE SMT. JUSTICE MUKULIKA SHRIKANT JAWALKAR, JUSTICE NANDESH SHANKARRAO DESHPANDE

The Bombay High Court quashed the District Caste Certificate Verification Committee’s 27-09-2023 order invalidating the petitioner’s ‘Mang’ Scheduled Caste claim, holding that mere entry of ‘Christian’ in grandfather’s 1962 school record does not establish conversion absent baptism or community exclusion. The decisive ground was that pre-constitutional documents of 1932 and 1934 consistently show the family as ‘Mang’, a validity certificate already exists in favour of grandfather Prabhakar Ganpat Sathe, and the Committee failed to discharge its burden to prove actual conversion through Christian rituals. Rejecting the State’s reliance on Kiranlata Sontakke and Selvarani where baptism was proved, the Court distinguished those facts and applied Bhanudas Hona Gajbhiv, Tejashree Dambale, Parvi Chakravarti and Suvarna Kharat which hold that nominal entry or presence of cross/statue does not sever caste ties unless the community treats the family as Christian and baptism is established. Emphasising that disadvantages peculiar to Scheduled Castes persist, the Court declared the petitioner a ‘Mang’ by caste and directed issuance of validity certificate within two months, holding the impugned order perverse for mechanically inferring conversion without material proof.

JUSTICE Y. G. KHOBRAGADE

The Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court allowed anticipatory bail to Kausalyabai Telang under Section 438 Cr.P.C. despite Section 18 bar of the SC/ST Act, holding that the FIR failed to disclose prima facie commission of offences under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(va) or 3(2)(5) of the Act. The decisive ground was that the complaint contained no whisper that the appellant is non-SC/ST or had knowledge of the deceased’s caste, ingredients mandatorily adverted to in Keshav Reddy v. State of Maharashtra (Cri. App. 1024/2019) and Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1886). Rejecting the prosecution’s plea for custodial interrogation to seize an alleged bond, the Court accepted the appellant’s offer to produce the original agreement to sell executed between her son and the deceased’s mother, rendering “deemed custody” under Section 27 Evidence Act sufficient, as clarified in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (AIR 2020 SC 831). The Court quashed the Sessions Judge’s refusal of pre-arrest bail, directed release on a PR bond of ₹25,000/- with two sureties, and imposed conditions of weekly police station attendance, territorial restriction to Nanded taluka, non-tampering with witnesses and co-operation with the investigation.

JUSTICE MEHROZ ASHRAF KHAN PATHAN

The Bombay High Court quashed the appellate court's order setting aside amendment applications under Exhs.28A and 30A in DV proceedings, holding that amendments seeking residence details under Section 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and adding the husband's nephew as respondent were purely procedural orders against which Section 29 appeals are not maintainable, following Abhijit Bhikaseth Auti v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 1 BomCR (Cri) 845. The decisive ground was that the trial court correctly exercised its inherent power under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to allow consequential amendments enabling the petitioner-wife to lead evidence regarding shared household particulars, particularly after the husband transferred the property to defeat her residence rights. Rejecting the appellate court's reasoning that the amendments transformed domestic violence proceedings into property disputes, the Court emphasized that Section 26 of the DV Act expressly permits seeking residence relief in concurrent civil proceedings, as clarified in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2020) 10 SCC 529, and that the nephew being a relative falls within Section 2(q)'s respondent definition. The Court restored the trial court's 12.06.2025 orders, directed expeditious amendment within 14 days, and mandated prompt disposal of the DV application, holding that denying amendments would defeat the Act's benevolent purpose of protecting women's residence rights.

JUSTICE DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE

The High Court dismissed the appeal against acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, holding that the respondent successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139 by establishing a probable defence of blank cheque misuse. The decisive ground was the complainant's failure to prove the existence of a legally enforceable debt of Rs. 8.5 lakhs, as he could not specify dates of disbursement, source of funds, or produce any documentary evidence like loan agreements, receipts, or bank statements. The Court rejected the appellant's contention that mere cheque issuance creates irrebuttable liability, emphasizing that Section 139 presumption is rebuttable by preponderance of probabilities. Following Rangappa v. Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441, the Court held that once the accused raises a plausible defence creating doubt about the debt, the burden shifts back to the complainant. The respondent's defence that he issued blank signed cheques to the complainant (his brother-in-law) for business management during his absence, which was subsequently misused after family disputes, was accepted as probable based on unimpeached defence evidence. Applying Tota Singh v. State of Punjab (1987) 2 SCC 529, the Court affirmed that appellate interference with acquittal is warranted only for manifest illegality or perverse findings, which was absent here.

JUSTICE KRISHNA RAO

The Calcutta High Court held that the bank's deduction of penal interest without prior notice violated RBI's Fair Lending Practice guidelines, rendering the NPA classification procedurally flawed. The decisive ground was the bank's failure to comply with Clause 3(vii) of the RBI Circular dated 18th August 2023, which mandates prior communication of penal charges and reasons thereof before deduction. Justice Krishna Rao rejected the bank's contention that the writ was not maintainable, holding that violation of statutory RBI circulars falls within constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Court found that despite the petitioners' MSME status and their compliance with WhatsApp instructions to deposit Rs. 6,20,000/-, the bank arbitrarily debited Rs. 15,61,350/- as penal interest without the required notice. Following the principle in Olive Tree Retail Pvt. Ltd. v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Cal 2397) that appropriate remedy under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act is premature when statutory violations are alleged, the Court held the writ maintainable. The Court disposed of W.P.A. No. 25431/2024 by vacating the interim order, holding that the bank must strictly adhere to RBI's penal charges regime while emphasizing that Master Circular provisions and Fair Lending Practice guidelines have statutory force binding on all regulated entities.

JUSTICE KRISHNA RAO

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging orders dated 3rd and 31st July 2023 passed under the repealed West Bengal Building (Regulation of Promotion of Construction and Transfer by Promoters) Act, 1993, holding that the proceedings were validly continued under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The decisive ground was that the Supreme Court’s judgment in Forum for People’s Collective Efforts (FPCE) v. State of West Bengal (2021) 8 SCC 599, which impliedly repealed the 1993 Act upon enactment of RERA, did not expressly terminate pending proceedings or mandate their transfer to RERA authorities. The Court rejected the petitioners’ contention of coram non judice, reasoning that unless a different intention appears, repeal does not affect pending legal proceedings or accrued rights, as affirmed in State of Punjab v. Bhajan Kaur (2008) 12 SCC 112. Applying the principle that procedural remedies under repealed statutes survive for enforcement of accrued liabilities, the Court held the impugned orders—compensating flat purchasers for delayed possession and area deficiency—were lawfully passed by the Authorized Officer in continuation of revisional proceedings initiated in 2006. The judgment reinforces that implied repeal under Article 254(1) read with Sections 88–89 of RERA does not retrospectively invalidate substantive rights or pending adjudications under the erstwhile regime.

JUSTICE SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, JUSTICE SUPRATIM BHATTACHARYA

The Division Bench held that Clause (d) of the proviso to Rule 5(1) of the West Bengal Excise (Change in Management) Rules, 2009 is discriminatory for excluding "change in management in the usual course of business" exemption for private limited companies while granting it to public limited companies, and accordingly read into Clause (d) the words "or change in management in the usual course of business" to achieve parity with Clause (e). The decisive ground was that both categories being "limited companies" constitute the same class vis-à-vis the object of the 2009 Rules, and the distinction lacks intelligible differentia having rational nexus with the regulatory objective, since change in the usual course of business is involuntary and beyond managerial control, as recognized uniformly in Rule 4(1) proviso. Rejecting the State's contention that liquor licence is mere privilege immune from Article 14, the Court applied Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489 to hold that distribution of State largesse including licences must conform to non-discriminatory norms, and relied upon Budhan Choudhary v. State of Bihar (1954) 2 SCC 791 for the twin test of permissible classification. The Court also held that the 2020 amendment defining "change in management" is substantive and not clarificatory, hence not retrospective. Consequently, the appeal is disposed of by modifying the impugned judgment to read up Clause (d) as aforesaid, while affirming the refund of excess licence fee exacted from the respondent-Company.

JUSTICE LANUSUNGKUM JAMIR, JUSTICE RAI CHATTOPADHYAY

The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition by holding that disputed questions of fact regarding employer-employee relationship and sham contract require determination by the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, not the High Court under Article 226. The decisive ground was that whether the contractor arrangement was merely a camouflage to deprive sponsored workers of regular employment benefits, and whether the principal employer exercised direct supervision and control, are factual disputes unsuitable for writ jurisdiction. The Court rejected the Corporation's contention of no privity of contract and the workers' claim of automatic absorption under the 2008 tripartite settlement, emphasizing that limiting recruitment only to Employment Exchange sponsored candidates violates Article 16's equality principle as held in Excise Superintendent v. Visweshwara Rao. Following the binding precedent in Awadhesh Singh v. Union of India, the Court directed that the writ petition be treated as an industrial dispute application before the Assistant Labour Commissioner/Conciliation Officer for adjudication on evidence regarding: (i) existence of employer-employee relationship despite contractor intermediaries; (ii) perennial nature of maintenance work; (iii) direct payment and supervision by the Corporation; and (iv) whether the contractor was interposed as a ruse to deny statutory benefits under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act.